Building political relations: cooperation, segmentation 

and government in Bancoumana (Mali) by Pes, Luca Giuseppe
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political 
Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Building political relations: cooperation, segmentation 
and government in Bancoumana (Mali) 
 
 
 
Luca Giuseppe Pes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Anthropology 
of the London School of Economics for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, London, December 2011 
2 
 
Declaration 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other 
than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent 
of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without 
my prior written consent. 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of 
any third party. 
I declare that my thesis consists of 83,188 words.  
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
A stable and peaceful country by West African standards, Mali uneasily fits the 
paradigm of a ‘failed state.’ While government and development agencies tend to 
interpret Mali’s stability as the outcome of successful institutional reform, foreign 
scholars and local intellectuals emphasise the power of enduring traditions and their 
adaptation to changing conditions in Malian society. Critically assessing both views, 
this dissertation explores political relations and practices in post-colonial Mali in a rural 
locality of Mande, the region south-west of the capital Bamako. The work draws on 18 
months of field research in the rural municipality of Bancoumana to document an 
intensely mediated form of government resulting from the dynamic process of grouping 
and of building cooperative relations in everyday social life.  
I examine how projects broadly intended to deepen state control such as the ‘framing’ of 
resident and migrant populations by the state, the betterment of the land, the recognition 
and the registration of ‘traditional’ rights, among other practices of bureaucratic ‘fixing’ 
are dealt with in the locality. The analysis links their history to processes of fission and 
fusion of social groups, where the interventions may exacerbate tensions or, instead, 
create solidarity among different village factions. Thus, the practices and processes of 
government in the locality are able to successfully fill the gap between the state and 
other agencies, and society. Contributing to the anthropological tradition studying law, 
politics and the state in Africa, the dissertation links recent trends in the anthropology of 
the state, and of more specific regulatory domains such as land development and 
taxation, to a reanalysis of the traditional chestnut of the anthropology of West Africa, a 
‘segmentary style’ of social organization. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Shining democracy or failed state? 
Compared to other countries of the West African region, Mali is a peaceful place. 
Unlike in bordering Côte d’Ivoire or nearby Liberia, there is neither civil war nor 
widespread political violence. Its social and political landscape is commonly seen as 
one of the most stable and reliable in West Africa, in contrast to neighbours such as 
Guinea, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. Processes of accumulation of wealth and social 
stratification accompanying the exploitation of natural and economic resources 
(minerals, land and agricultural produce) did not result in violent conflicts or in the 
criminalization of the state, as happened in Nigeria and Sierra Leone (Bayart et al. 
1999:1, 92; Reno 1995, 1998).  
The only important security concern in the recent past – the Tuareg ‘rebellion’ in the 
mid-1990s – was successfully turned by the Malian political class into an opportunity to 
reinforce the structures and presence of the state on its territory. Separatist proposals in 
the north of the country have provided the initial ground for ‘decentralization reform,’ 
channelling to Mali considerable amounts of international aid (Seely 2001:506). In 
more recent times, the alarm concerning the presence of the mysterious terrorist group 
‘Al-Quaida of the Islamic Maghreb’ (AQIM) has been similarly exploited by the 
military and political establishment supported by the United States rather than it 
releasing violent insecurity (Keenan 2009). 
On the eve of the fifth consecutive round of ‘free and fair’ elections and of a major 
constitutional reform, the Malian institutional environment is certainly among those in 
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Africa most trusted by the international community.1 Without any embarrassment about 
the tone of patent paternalism, official publications of USAID (the American 
development agency) refer to Mali as ‘a poster-child for democracy’ (USAID 2002, 
quoted in Soares 2006); or, to put it in the words of the representatives of the two 
largest donor countries: ‘an extremely good pupil’ and ‘a shining example of 
democracy.’2 
Similar statements pointing to Mali as a ‘success story’ of institutional development and 
state-building sound at best ironic, considering Mali’s discouraging poverty record and 
its general state of economic dependency. Mali is the ninth poorest country on earth, 
followed only by Niger and Burkina Faso in the region (UNDP 2010). It has the fourth 
greatest net migration rate in Africa (-5.23 migrants/1,000 population) and one tenth the 
citizens living abroad (CIA World Factbook 2011). It is one of the most prominent 
recipients of international aid, accounting for more than one half of the government 
expenditure and one tenth of the gross domestic product (WB 2011). Moreover, 
pointing at Mali as a model democracy is also limited to an appreciation of an 
‘apparent’ institutional environment, hiding less praise-worthy aspects such as 
corruption, lack of ‘good governance’ and the like, that officials are generally ready to 
acknowledge in more private assessments of how state and power work in the country. 
In short, one might discard such views on the grounds that they do not reflect empirical 
reality. And yet Mali’s social and political environment is peaceful compared to the rest 
of the region. Over the last two decades, perhaps only Ghana, Senegal and Benin have 
enjoyed a similar reputation. This hardly resembles the context of what development 
studies and political scientists call ‘failed states’ (Reno 1998; Rotberg 2004).  
What explains such a peaceful condition? Is it the outcome of institutional reform 
backed by development agencies, as claimed by the political establishment? Is it 
                                                 
1 The constitutional reform foresees the creation of a second Parliament chamber whose members will be 
elected by local authorities (collectivités territoriales, i.e. municipalities, districts and regions). Rumours 
that this reform was a disguised tentative by the President of the Republic Amadou Toumani Toure to 
amend the two-mandates constitutional limit to its office (as it happened in Burkina Faso in 2010) proved 
wrong.  
2 The first statement is by EU chief of delegation Irene Jorges and the second by USAID director Alex 
Newton. They have been collected in a filmed interview by the researcher and published in the 
documentary movie The Good Pupil: Mali and US, Paris: Blackout, 2006. 
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explained by the power of enduring ‘traditions’ and the subtle processes of their 
adaptation to changing conditions in society, as has been maintained by some 
intellectuals? Broadly speaking, this thesis offers an answer to these questions from the 
perspective of a rural locality of Mande, the region south-west of the capital Bamako. 
While providing evidence to support an interpretation of Mali as a peaceful and 
relatively stable political environment, my study of political relations in Bancoumana 
offers critical insights on the country’s reputation as a ‘good pupil’ of development 
institutions and a ‘model democracy’ in West Africa. Political relations and practices, I 
shall argue, reflect the intensely mediated character of government in the locality, filling 
the ‘grey area’ between the state (among other agencies) and society. In supporting this 
argument, my analysis combines the anthropology of the state – and of more specific 
regulatory domains such as land development and taxation – with an awareness, 
traditionally central in the political and legal anthropology of West Africa, of a 
‘segmentary style’ social organization. 
Extraction and dependence: a first impression of state and society in post-colonial 
Mali 
Depending on one’s point of view, Mali’s peaceful condition can be either 
acknowledged or dismissed as a mystification. While on the one hand an appreciation of 
the politico-economical outlook of the country reveals that it does not escape processes 
of extraction and economic dependence affecting the whole region, on the other, similar 
circumstances have not prevented neighbouring countries from being plunged into far 
greater levels of social and political violence. Perhaps such things are disguised in Mali, 
hiding below the surface of a seemingly peaceful state of affairs. Perhaps, this country is 
an exception to the more generalized perception that most states in West Africa have 
failed in terms of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government. 
And yet, how do relations between power, law and society in Mali compare to those of 
its more evidently troubled neighbours and, more generally, to other ‘postcolonial’ 
contexts?  
To describe Mali as a postcolonial context is to employ a characterisation in general use 
by anthropologists working in Africa and elsewhere. In fact, many of the circumstances 
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briefly reviewed below have led authors such as Mbembe (2001) and Comaroff and 
Comaroff (2006) to talk about ‘the postcolony’ in a fashion clearly transcending 
geographical and political boundaries. However, the Malian socio-political landscape 
fits that paradigm only uneasily, if at all. The image of ‘the postcolony’ is a 
generalization, inadequate for making sense of Malian society. 
While richness in natural resources is a common variable explaining the political 
instability of places like Nigeria (oil), Niger (minerals and recently oil), and Sierra 
Leone (diamonds), Mali does not represent a clear contrast in this regard. It would be 
misleading to think of Mali as poor of similar resources. Gold-mining – accounting for 
an astonishing 33 percent of the gross domestic product and 70 percent of exports – is 
clear evidence that the Malian economy is heavily dependent on the exploitation of its 
natural resources (EIU 2011:7). Mali is indeed one of the largest gold producers in the 
world, second only to Ghana in the region. Operated by foreign multinational 
companies in the south of the country, mining ventures in Mali are not intrinsically 
‘better’ than in many other African countries, nor do they generate greater revenues for 
the local population.3 With the exclusion of a tiny elite of wealthy businessmen and 
politicians – dubbed le Pouvoir in the capital Bamako – ordinary citizens are blatantly 
denied the returns of such forms of wealth. They are instead excluded and dispossessed, 
brutally expelled from their land and forbidden local economic activities, including 
artisanal, small-scale extraction of gold: a practice dating back to medieval times, and 
once the main economic base of the Mali Empire. Comparable situations, including 
deportation of the populations of entire villages, occurred with the infamous dams 
sponsored by the World-Bank (Bonavita 2000; Pottinger 1998). 
Further evidence of Mali’s similarity to its neighbours, and its connectedness to regional 
and global economies, is provided by the agricultural sector, overwhelmingly the most 
important aspect of the economy.4 The main cash crop is cotton, second only to gold for 
the total revenue generated by exports (EIU 2011:6). Cultivated in many parts of the 
                                                 
3 For a case study of two Malian gold mines (Morila and Kalana), see Keita et al. (2008). See also Panella 
(2010), on the local economies of artisanal gold mining in Mali and elsewhere, and the documentary 
movie by Robert Nugent, End of the Rainbow, Trans Europe Film, 2007. 
4 Despite this is evident to any analyst of Mali, agricultural output for self-consumption does not figure in 
official statistics based on the gross domestic product, where the rubric ‘agriculture’ accounts slightly less 
than ‘services.’  
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country, cotton generates important revenue for Malian households (unlike the countries 
on the coast, in Mali, there are virtually no plantations). The harvest is bought by a 
‘para-statal’ agency, the Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles 
(CMDT), at a subsidized price and with a monopoly. Far from developing a textile 
industry, the CMDT sells cotton in almost unrefined form on the international markets. 
Despite being the third largest producer in the world, Mali is forced to sell its cotton at a 
loss. Cotton prices are set by the United States – through subsidies paid to American 
growers. The CMDT is in the process of being privatized, leading to diminished 
production and lower returns to the farmers, with direct consequences on householders’ 
poverty.5 Seen from the perspective of the production of a global commodity and its 
crucial role in the national economy, Mali is not very different to more ‘troubled’ 
countries like Côte d’Ivoire (cocoa and coffee), Niger (minerals and oil), and Burkina 
Faso (cotton). 
Prospects for the other part of the agricultural sector – food production – are even 
gloomier as a consequence of the global food crisis of 2008, among other factors. Mali 
does not produce enough to be self-sufficient: 12.5 percent of imported goods are 
foodstuffs, equalling nine percent of the gross domestic product (EIU 2011:6). Rice is 
the second cash crop after cotton. In contrast to cotton it is mostly sold on the domestic 
market, and is therefore crucial for covering Mali’s food production deficit. The 
government, however, has recently adopted measures gearing rice production toward 
exports, while relying on imports of cheaper qualities of rice from East Asia. The 
launch of the government program Opération riz was accompanied by massive loans of 
productive land to foreign investors in the Niger inner delta, with no other commitment 
than expanding the area of irrigated agriculture of the Office du Niger, a French early-
colonial project which was abandoned at less than one tenth of the envisaged surface 
(Van Beusekom 2000; Filipovich 2001).6 The deals so far concluded by the government 
left foreign investors free to take the entirety of the harvest out of the country. Rice, 
therefore, is following a similar fate to cotton, as a result of land-grabbing ‘joint 
                                                 
5 On the history and political economy of cotton production in Mali, originally developed to the benefit of 
the French textile industry, see Roberts (1996). 
6 See also Chapter Two in this thesis. For an overview of land grabbing in Mali, see 
http://farmlandgrab.org (last retrieved 11 October 2011). As with gold exploitation, there are virtually no 
academic articles on this crucial and ongoing aspect of the Malian political economy. 
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ventures’ between the Malian state on the one side and, on the other, foreign banks and 
corporations based in Libya, China and the Gulf states. 
What kind of relations between the state, power and society might one expect in Mali, 
given such exploitative conditions? The regional and global connectedness makes it 
certainly naive to think of it as an exceptional context. Despite praise for its institutional 
infrastructure, Mali as a state is no more ‘sovereign’ than the rest of its neighbours. As 
put by Bayart et al. (1999:20), a sovereign state in such conditions resembles to a ‘legal 
edifice which is the partner of multilateral institutions and Western governments,’ and 
which is set apart from ‘the real fabric of society.’  
In Mali, as elsewhere, the state can be understood as a façade, hiding a public-private 
network of power-holders who constitute the true ruling class (Bagayogo 1987). Their 
economic base lies in the extraction of agricultural produce and natural resources, now 
including crucial means of livelihood such as arable land. Through such lucrative 
practices, political relations have been reconfigured into a widely studied form of 
government known as neo-patrimonialism (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Englebert 2000). 
The configuration of power thus described by anthropologists and political scientists is 
one characterized by social stratification and increasing polarization of society into 
‘haves’ and ‘have nots,’ and by the exercise of power increasingly by private means 
(Bayart 2009:263).  
Neopatrimonial models can certainly be of use in interpreting many issues in the Malian 
political economy. Yet, in contrast to many of its neighbours, this power configuration 
has not plunged Mali into social and political violence, massive social exclusion and 
instability. From the perspective of the rural locality addressed in my thesis, the vast 
majority of those excluded from power and from these niches is perhaps increasingly 
poor, but not destitute. Doubts thus arise about Mali’s resemblance to many of its 
neighbours and with postcolonial contexts more generally.  
In his collection of essays On the Postcolony, Achille Mbembe (2001) problematizes 
the autonomy of the African state in the post-colonial period. He argues that the style of 
government in contemporary Africa is still best explained by its connections to the 
experience of colonial rule. As a political paradigm, the postcolony is characterized by 
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the proliferation of forms of ‘private indirect government,’ which share with the 
political condition of colonialism the violent dehumanization of the subject (Mbembe 
2001:80-82). Mbembe’s concept of private indirect government recalls the widely 
observed phenomena of atomization of power and of privatization of sovereignty and 
the state, resulting from the transformation of ‘informal’ economic and political 
relations into rather formalized niches of power (see also Hibou 2004; Bayart 2009). 
According to Mbembe, the distinctive way in which power is administered in 
contemporary Africa is captured by the notion of ‘discharge,’ a process occurring when, 
the functions supposed to be public, and obligations that flow from sovereignty, are 
increasingly performed by private operators for private ends. Soldiers and policemen 
live off the inhabitants; officials supposed to perform administrative tasks sell the 
public service required and pocket what they get (Mbembe 2001:80). 
In the edited volume Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Comaroff and Comaroff 
(2006) describe as ‘postcolonial’ those political contexts characterized by the 
proliferation of legal practices and claims, coupled with a paradoxical increase of social 
and political violence. Such a seemingly contradictory relation between law and 
disorder is ascribed to the neoliberal condition of permanent ‘transition’ (to democracy, 
good governance, civil society and the like), characterized by outsourcing the coercive, 
social and economic functions of the state. Although explained through a different 
historical trajectory, the result is similar to Mbembe’s: the fragmentation of sovereignty 
into public-private networks of power, where the line separating ‘legitimate’ exercises 
of power from illegality is extremely blurred. 
Considered in the light of the anthropological tradition studying law, politics and the 
state in Africa, the paradigm of ‘the postcolony’ appears an abstract idea, at times 
contradicting ethnographic analysis. Sharing such a generalizing concept, the 
approaches of Mbembe and Comaroff and Comaroff seem to obscure, rather than to 
clarify, past and present accomplishments in anthropology.  
Studying the state: political relations and practices in Africa and beyond 
Mali’s reputation of ‘model democracy’ is not upheld by informed political analysis. 
This image also contrasts sharply with most recent academic scholarship focusing on 
the state and political relations in Africa, some of which has been referred to above 
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(page 16ff). If anything, the broad range of approaches on this subject, spanning from 
political science (Bayart 2009; Reno 1995, 1998) to analyses of postcolonial 
subjectivity (Mbembe 2001), tend to depict African political landscapes as violent, 
extractive or even criminal. However, and as I observed above (page 14), such 
characterizations do not readily apply to Mali. If extractive relations and economic 
dependency provide considerable opportunities for political power, just as elsewhere in 
Africa, in the case of Mali this has not meant the descent of society into political 
violence. The reason for this, however, is not necessarily the outcome of political and 
institutional reform at the level of the state. I would argue instead that a more 
convincing explanation of the peaceful character of Mali is to be found by scrutinizing 
the ‘grey area’ between state and society. More particularly, my analysis will focus on 
the intensely mediated processes of government in connection to the ‘segmentary style’ 
social organization of a locality like Bancoumana. 
A closer consideration of the relationship between state and society will serve the 
double purpose of identifying a body of literature relevant to my work and of clarifying 
the terrain of political relations addressed more broadly in this thesis. How have 
anthropologists investigated the nature of the state, the political system and its 
connection or non-connection to ‘ordinary society’? How has the political domain been 
distinguished from the wider social environment?  
Literature on the state and political relations in Africa has stresses the observation that 
the state is rooted in society. Variously combining anthropology with political science, 
authors including Bayart (2009), Bayart et al. (1999), Reno (2011), Roitman (2005) 
have convincingly explored the social ‘embeddedness’ of the exercise of political power 
in Africa. In his studies of warlordism, corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone, for 
example, Reno (1995, 1998 and 2011) puts an emphasis on the economic underpinning 
of this, resulting in the lack of a public/private division which would characterize the 
African state. Adopting a significantly different style of analysis (often inspired by 
Michel Foucault), Roitman’s study of regimes of fiscality in the Chad basin (2005) 
shows a preoccupation with a result of such lack of distinction, but on a more ideational 
or knowledge-oriented level. These diverse approaches share the aim of documenting 
the ways African states are rooted in society and, in the case of Roitman, in a specific 
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regulatory domain (fiscality). They provide evidence of the fact that states, in Africa or 
elsewhere, are not homogeneous entities and that from an anthropological or 
sociological perspective they cannot be studied separately from social practices and 
institutions. 
Authors, often adopting perspectives similar to Roitman’s (e.g. Mitchell 1991, 1999) 
claim that the ‘embeddedness’ of the state in society results in continuity rather than 
rupture. These accounts insist on the porosity of the boundary between state and society, 
something that is elusive and ideological in character. According to Mitchell (1991:90), 
the elusiveness of such boundary is an inherent character of the ideology of the modern 
state, a distinguishing element of political modernity: the gap between state and society 
is only a projection of the ‘idea of the state.’ According to alternative approaches 
discussed below, the boundary between state and society is established contextually and 
negotiated in the domain of political relations; in the work of anthropologists such as 
Roitman and Mitchell, this is in fact produced through various symbolic and ideological 
techniques, engendering – according to Mitchell’s terminology – a ‘state-effect’ 
(Mitchell 1999:76; see also Roitman 2005:49). 
Objecting to the over-generalized and imprecise character of postmodern analyses such 
as Roitman’s and Mitchell’s, anthropologists of development like Bierschenk and 
Olivier de Sardan (2003; see also Bierschenk 2010) argue that we need a more 
grounded, possibly even more ‘old-fashioned,’ sociological analysis, which explores the 
nitty-gritty of institutional arrangements. While I agree with these authors’ reaction to 
Foucauldian approaches to the anthropology of the state, the next section will argue that 
simply exploring state and quasi-state institutions (as these authors do) is not enough for 
understanding political relations and practices in Bancoumana. What is needed is a 
perspective focused on practices. 
I draw here on the work of scholars such as Falk Moore (1978), who by exploring 
‘semi-autonomous social fields’ helps to illuminate arenas that exist between the state 
and society. Moving on from the work of Falk Moore and other scholars of the 
Manchester school, we can end up with a less methodologically individualist, more 
‘practice theory’ (Ortner 1984) approach to political life, in which practices and 
processes assume much greater importance. This allows us to ‘get to the state’ through 
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the study of political practices: an approach commensurate with that of Christian Lund, 
who looks at domains which, although constructed as apolitical, nonetheless have 
‘institutional ramifications’ (Lund 2006:697). Using this diverse range of literatures 
enables one to avoid saying that ‘everything is political,’ or that ‘the state is pervasive 
throughout society,’ as maintained by authors on the African state; but it acknowledges, 
nonetheless, that there are practices which ramify more broadly, thus becoming in some 
sense ‘institutionalised’ or part of the political (the point is expanded in the next section, 
see especially page 25). 
Finally, understanding the political process requires that one revisits how 
anthropologists of West Africa have explored ‘segmentary’ societies. The concluding 
section of this literature review (page 26ff) will investigate this topic, with particular 
reference to the Mande region and the practices of ordinary grouping. Set on this 
ground, my analysis of political relations in Bancoumana will cast a new light on the 
‘segmentary style’ social organization with which anthropologists of West Africa were 
once particularly familiar. But let me start by reviewing some important contributions to 
the (sociologically grounded) literature on the ‘embeddedness’ of the state in Africa.  
The state in society 
In all domains and political contexts, it is difficult to ascribe the exercise of authority to 
‘the state’ as a coherent institution. The most obvious reason for this is simply that in 
most empirical analyses the state turns out to be merely an abstract idea. The multiple 
layers, branches and agencies constituting the bureaucratic apparatus of the modern 
state (the ‘state-system’ as opposed to the ‘state-idea’) can hardly be attributed a single 
agency and intentionality. This is all more evident in the context of African states, in 
which it is normal to observe functionaries and state agencies at all levels pursuing 
competing agendas at cross-purposes with each other (e.g. Blundo et al. 2006). 
The complexity of the state has been analysed by sociologists and political scientists 
more than by anthropologists, who have only recently claimed to have turned to the 
state as an object of study (Gupta and Sharma 2006). Taking the lead from Abrams 
(1988), anthropologists have begun to explore the complexity of modern states in their 
relationship with ‘other forms of power.’ One of the most popular targets of these 
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analyses has been the Weberian conception of the modern state as a compulsory 
association with a territorial basis characterized by a legal-bureaucratic rationality. 
According to Weber, the modern state is characterized by a system of administrative 
and legal order, which ‘claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, 
the citizens [...] but also to a very large extent, over all action taking place in the area of 
its jurisdiction’ (Weber 1964:156).  
Reacting to the rather uncritical reproduction of the Weberian model in much of the 
anthropological literature, some authors began to demonstrate that modern states do not 
look or act in the same way everywhere. Statehood is not defined by one same logic – 
‘modern’ or ‘rational’ – and nor is this uniform for all domains of state authority. States 
are the product of substantive cultural factors, of the history and the economy of 
particular places, and not only of bureaucratic rationality uniformly applied to society. 
In a challenge to general socio-legal constructs propounded by law and political science, 
anthropologists have argued that the quasi-universal diffusion of the modern state and 
its pervasiveness in different domains of social life do not necessarily entail a greater 
uniformity of political practices (e.g. Hansen and Stepputat 2001). 
One way anthropologists have done this is to explore how modern states interact with 
other forms of power often referred to as ‘informal’ politico-legal practices enrooted in 
‘non-state’ institutions. Authors adopting such a perspective address the social and 
political reality in which the state is embedded through the study of empirically specific 
domains of social life in particular places. This results in contextual analyses of the 
boundary between the state and society, variously emphasising its porosity and its 
shifting character according to different places, times and social domains.  
A significant move forward in such analysis was provided by authors including Fuller 
and Harriss regarding India (2001), and Biershenk and Olivier de Sardan regarding 
West Africa (2000, 2003). These authors show that the boundary between state and 
society cannot be drawn in the abstract; rather, every exercise of the political authority 
of the organization called ‘the state’ entails the negotiation of such a barrier with other 
power instances in society, and thus must be studied in particular contexts. In other 
words, despite the fact that state and society are intimately connected, there is 
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nonetheless a gap between the two – the nature of which must be explored empirically, 
even sociologically.  
There is a paradoxical situation in African contexts such as Mali. Authors who write on 
the African state point to the ‘rhizomic’ or ‘shadow’ nature of the state in society 
(Bayart 2009 and Reno 1995, respectively); but anthropologists exploring this question 
in more particular contexts point to the fact that the connection between the state and 
society also entails a gap or disconnection (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2000, 
2003; Fuller and Harriss 2001). As observed from the perspective of my field-site 
Bancoumana, the state is interrelated with, but is simultaneously distinct from, a 
complex plurality of other practices and institutions bearing explicit connection to the 
exercise of authority. For example, a variety of ‘traditional’ institutions such as the 
village council (see Chapter Two and Chapter Four), the elders’ assembly of the 
gwatiguiw (see Chapter Six), the vigilante group of the tontiguiw (see Chapter Five), do 
have explicit claims to the exercise of public authority in the locality. The political 
legitimacy of such groups is variably connected to that of state institutions: while 
legitimacy is established by contrast or opposition to the state in some circumstances, it 
may also closely connect to the exercise of state power in others (the point is expanded 
later in this section). 
Methodologically, however, my analysis tries to avoid a too rigid and limiting focus on 
institutions inhabiting an abstractly defined political domain. Rather, my reading of 
political relations in Bancoumana is based on the analysis of social processes of 
cooperation, segmentation and government, and aims at showing how political relations 
are built by ordinary people while operating in a variety of domains of their social life. 
On the one hand, such an approach is necessitated by the fact that, like elsewhere in 
Africa, in Bancoumana there is a variable number of political actors, whose legitimacy 
is not established in any fixed and clear-cut way. On the other hand, my approach 
intends to foreground an aspect of crucial importance for the understanding of political 
relations in and beyond Africa: under the scrutiny of an empirical analysis, the 
prerogatives of different power holders, as well as their relationship to ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ groups, ‘state’ or ‘non-state’ institutions are constantly shifting and can never 
be assumed as statically or neatly defined. 
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The jurisdiction (i.e. the legitimate reach of the actions) of political actors in 
Bancoumana does indeed vary, being the object of shifts and constant negotiations. No 
matter what their relationship with the state (official/unofficial), or the degree of 
formalism of their actions (formal/informal), the boundaries of political organizations 
vary from one domain of social life to another. For example, the regulating of many 
agricultural and ecological practices connected to the use of the land in Bancoumana 
(Chapter Four and Chapter Five) is exercised by local, ‘traditional’ authorities with 
remarkable autonomy from state control and institutions; on the contrary, the role of 
those same institutions in the domain of taxation (addressed in Chapter Six) reveals a 
much greater connection to the state. Moreover, while political relations in these 
domains generally result in a rather harmonious state of either separation (agriculture) 
or institutional cooperation (taxation), more conflicting relationships emerge from the 
analysis of political projects concerning the development of inhabitable and agricultural 
land (Chapter Two): here, the legitimacy of local political institutions is defined rather 
by their sharp opposition to the state, which has led in the past to acrimonious conflicts 
and violent confrontation within and beyond different village factions. 
As has been argued elsewhere (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999), in Bancoumana, 
political projects intended to deepen state control and manufacture a clearer border 
between the state and society are consistently mediated and occasionally resisted by 
local social forces. Almost inevitably, then, they produce unforeseen consequences, 
blurring the boundary between their ‘failure’ or ‘success’ (Ferguson 1990). Most of the 
material analysed throughout the thesis will confirm that such view holds true with 
regard to the whole political project of ‘democratization’ of Mali: an agenda set by the 
state among other planners, such as foreign ‘donor’ countries and international NGOs, 
and pursued by various means, including decentralization (involving the establishment 
of municipalities like Bancoumana), ‘participatory development’ practices and, 
increasingly, the involvement of migrants in the ‘development’ of their places of origin 
(see Chapter Two). 
While the use of migrants’ remittances in the development of their home-towns is by no 
means a recent phenomenon, the channelling of such money by state services, foreign 
donors and international NGOs in operations branded as ‘co-development’ is a 
24 
 
relatively new concern. Over the last few years, the Malian state – through the Ministry 
of the Malians Abroad and with the political and financial support of the European 
Union – has deployed very noticeable and consistent efforts in the ‘framing’ of 
transnational migrants, especially by channelling migrants’ remittances (hence 
controlling the flow of such money) in initiatives of ‘co-development.’7 Similar policies 
provide a good illustration of the new objectives of the Malian state in the age of 
transnational migration and financial capitalism. ‘Co-development’ provides the Malian 
state with a device to govern its transnational migrant population, a new type of fiscal 
policy through which the state aims to control the monetary flows generated by its 
migrant citizens (the point will be better understood when set against the historical 
background provided by Chapter Two). 
Both from an analytical and a methodological point of view, I am interested in 
documenting how projects broadly intended to deepen state control (including 
migration, but certainly not limited to that) are handled within the locality: in particular, 
how they connect to processes of fission and fusion of social groups, for example by 
exacerbating the tensions or, instead, by creating solidarity among different village 
factions. To refer again to migration, for example, I suggest that political relations in 
Bancoumana cannot be understood without taking into account the role played by 
various types of migrants (e.g. seasonal, semi-permanent, urban, transnational) as well 
as by their associations, which happen to be increasingly involved by the state and 
development agencies in initiatives of ‘co-development.’ Rather than confining 
migration to a particular chapter, however, I provide specific analyses of its impact on 
and its functions within the body social. While such particular assessments of migrants’ 
involvement demonstrate that the political system cannot be assumed to operate in 
isolation, they also reveal that, from the perspective of a rural locality like Bancoumana, 
migration is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, one that can hardly be ‘put in a 
box’ and addressed with the same ethnographic method I employed for the main subject 
of my analysis. Apart from requiring a different set of methodological tools (e.g. multi-
sited ethnography), to address migration as a problem in itself would fall beyond the 
                                                 
7 An illustration is provided by the internet site http://www.codeveloppementmali.org/ (last retrieved 20 
October 2011), containing an archive and an official description of co-development initiatives in Mali.  
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purpose of my analysis; I rather examine the effects of different forms of migration on 
local political organization.  
Similar to migration, another theme illuminating how state and development projects 
are handled in the locality, is the complexity occasioned by the use of written 
documents among other bureaucratic practices of ‘fixing.’ While bureaucrats expect 
devices such as plans, paper documents and written registration to organize and make 
more governable social life, an observation of how such things work in practice often 
suggests greater levels of uncertainty (Scott 1985, 1998; Bernstein 2003, 2010). While 
such a situation may prevail on the ground, however, the higher echelons of the 
bureaucratic organizations conceiving plans may be provided with greater legibility and 
eventually control of social practices – or they may consider having achieved such 
objectives while in practice they did not. We will see these tensions when considering 
efforts by the state and other ‘developers’ to parcel out the land according to 
bureaucratic criteria of efficiency and ‘rationality’ (Chapter Two and Chapter Four), as 
well as with relation to tax collection (Chapter Six). 
To conclude, let me clarify the contours of the political field by briefly summarising the 
perspective adopted in the analysis of political relations in Bancoumana. The political 
nature of local institutions (either of state or non-state kind) cannot be assumed a-priori, 
since ethnographic analysis reveals that the character of these is not neatly and stably 
defined on the ground. In Bancoumana, groups and social organizations which do not 
appear at first sight to be political may, and often do, exercise political power of a non-
state variety. This further complicates the picture of political relations, since it questions 
assumptions concerning what constitutes the political field and which institutions, actors 
and practices it encompasses. Consideration for this further aspect of the gap between 
the state and society suggests that it is not in terms of institutions – by distinguishing 
which are ‘political’ and which others, instead, are ‘social’ – that we can solve the 
problem of identifying the political field. What is needed here is a perspective centred 
on practices, showing how political relations (some of which may be thought as 
underpinning ‘institutions’) consist, in fact, of ordinary aspects of social life, which 
define in turn the political domain (Lund 2006:690).  
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Just as the contours of the political as a field of study are blurred, so in the same way is 
the distinction between law, politics and society; indeed what we are looking at is not a 
bounded field, inhabited by institutions with specific characteristics, but a field of 
practice. Looking at the organization of social life in specific domains, with a particular 
focus on the grouping dynamics as described in the next section, will provide the 
necessary evidence to show that the boundary between state and society cannot be 
drawn in the abstract. Rather, because such a barrier entails multiple negotiations of 
political authority, an empirically-based understanding of political relations (including 
those surrounding and ‘making up’ the state) is likely to render a picture much closer to 
reality. 
Anthropological views on the openness or semi-autonomy of social groupings in Mande 
It is my claim that through an analysis of political – and social – relations in one 
locality, I can provide a way of understanding why Mali looks different from many of 
its neighbours. The answer predominantly offered to this query in assessments by state 
and development officials has already been alluded to: well designed and well 
implemented reform, aimed at developing a strong institutional environment, made Mali 
different. Intellectuals have suggested, in contrast, that the answer is rooted in Malian 
culture and historical traditions. Peace, they maintain, has resulted from the fluid and 
harmonious relations among ethnic groups, as expressed in joking relations and other 
social institutions.  
Among the strongest supporters of this position figure, for example, a group of Malian 
and Guinean intellectuals gathered in the “N’Ko movement” (Conrad 2001), some of 
whom have important connections to the political establishment in Mali (Amselle 
2004:22). Their view, emphasising ‘the power of tradition,’ is commensurate with that 
of some anthropologists and particularly with those working in the Mande region (e.g. 
Cissé and Leynaud 1978; Tamari 1997), which includes Bancoumana. This is the area 
that had once been the heart of the Mali Empire and is seen today as the home of Mande 
people: a cluster of ‘ethnic groups’ including the Mandinka – to whom belong the 
people of Bancoumana, bearing the patronymic Camara – as well as other groups 
(Soninke, Bambara, Dyula and others). A brief socio-historical sketch of this region will 
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provide us with a better understanding of the key themes in the social anthropology of 
Mande. 
Despite nonexistence as such in official topography, Mande is commonly understood as 
the region comprised between the source of the Niger River (a mountainous area in the 
north-west of Guinea) and the area south-west of the Malian capital Bamako. As 
documented by historians (Niane 1984; Ajayi and Crowder 1985) this area was the 
original nucleus of expansion of the Mali Empire. Between the 13th and the 15th 
century, this legendary West African pre-colonial state stretched east-west from present 
day Niger to the Atlantic Ocean, and north-south from the Sahara desert to the Niger 
River. The extraordinary quantity of gold reaching the Mediterranean costs of Africa 
from Mali is recounted by numerous written sources (Arabic, German, Portuguese, 
English, Italian, see Levitzion and Hopkins 2000; Masonen 2001), notably mentioning 
the sumptuous pilgrimage to Mecca of king Mansa Musa I (c. 1312 – c.1337). 
The early stages of the foundation of the Empire and its subsequent expansion are 
recounted in the epic of Soundiata Keita, who is credited by the oral tradition as being 
the first Emperor (Mansa) of Mali (Johnson et at. 2003; see, more generally, Cissé and 
Kamissoko 1988, 1991; Jansen 1995; Camara 1996). The recitation of this famous 
tradition is the exclusive domain of bards in Mande (an endogamous professional group 
of people called jeliw), and a commonly spoken and researched aspect of Mande 
culture, perhaps especially so in modern Mali given that some jeliw, among other 
singers of Malian culture, are artists of global reach. 
Besides being researched by historians and ‘traditionalists’ (as Malian intellectuals 
often call themselves), the epic of Soundiata works as a sort of foundational myth for 
Mande: it narrates wars and alliances between different clans (all identified by 
patronymics which are still in current use), it traces the genealogies of ruling and 
defeated groups, establishing kinship and quasi-kinship relationships; finally, the epic 
refers to a complex and almost open-ended system of social differentiation comprising 
many categories of people, like ‘freemen’ warriors (horonw), ‘slaves’ by capture (jonw) 
or by descent (wolosow), professional groups (nyamakalaw), including various other 
denominations such as bards (jeliw), blacksmiths, potters and woodcarvers (numuw), 
leatherworkers (garankew) and others.  
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Similar ways of classifying people, based on patronymic name, descent, quasi-kinship 
relations and the like, are of ordinary use in a place like Bancoumana – no matter 
whether people relate them to oral traditions or not. The ‘system’ of social 
differentiation resulting from the employment of such categories is far from simple and 
clear-cut; moreover, it is rendered particularly subtle by the multiple ways-of-being and 
of addressing each other that people employ in ordinary social interaction, with the 
result of reproducing similar distinctions in implicit and non-verbalized ways. Despite 
its open-ended and not rigidly bounded character – or perhaps precisely because of that 
– such a system can only be understood as a complex and articulated scheme of social 
differentiations cross-cutting with each other. While people do often make a point of 
being unequal – especially so, when they need to express their unity, which is based on 
complementarity (see page 31 below) – it is virtually impossible for a disinterested 
observer to classify people into bounded groups and then order these into ‘higher’ and 
‘lower’ ranks of society, as French administrators and ethnographers did in a blunt 
colonial fashion (on the most famous among these figures, Maurice Delafosse, see Van 
Hoven 1990; more generally, see Grosz-Ngaté 1988).  
It should be no surprise by now to acknowledge that since early times anthropologists 
working in Mande paid relatively higher attention than others to the complex system of 
statuses and social differentiations talked about by their informants – who, incidentally, 
tended to over-represent the coherence of such system of social differentiation and to 
ground it in a mythical and ‘invented’ past (Griaule and Dieterlen 1965; for a critique, 
van Beek 1991). Likewise, it is not surprising that, in more recent times, Mande 
anthropologists have turned to studies of historical depth with the aim of ‘decolonizing’ 
such categories, while showing their ongoing and perhaps increased importance in 
everyday life in modern Mali (see references below). 
Among the mostly read and researched topics of recent anthropological literature on 
Mande is the fluid character of the social groups based on status and identity (Conrad 
and Frank 1995; Amselle 1998; Schulz 2000). Over the last 20 years, Mande studies 
have provided a powerful cultural decolonization of concepts like ‘caste,’ ‘slavery’ and 
‘ethnicity,’ while also combining a narrow regional focus with themes discussed in 
wider anthropological circles, such as agency and the rediscovery of history in 
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anthropology (e.g. Perinbam 1997; Silla 1998; Soares 2005; Mann 2006). While I deem 
such studies indispensable for understanding the Mande social context – in particular 
the subtle and articulated system of social differentiation – I shall argue that Mande 
anthropologists have shown a surprising lack of interest for studying how such fluid and 
complex dynamics of social grouping impact on political relations. 
Mande anthropology has offered insightful analyses of ‘notable’ social distinctions, like 
the three categories mentioned above, with a recurrent focus on the occupational groups 
called nyamakalaw (see page 27 above; McNaughton 1993; Frank 1998; Hoffman 2000; 
Schulz 2001). Less attention has been paid, instead, to the ordinary ways of grouping 
considered in this thesis as mattering crucially for the analysis of political relations. 
This fact is particularly surprising considering that for earlier anthropology of West 
Africa, the socially mediated character of government and the analysis of political 
systems were the main subjects of analysis (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1940; Fortes 
1945). 
My enquiry concerns the mobilization of people into social groups based on matrilineal 
and patrilineal descent (maternal and paternal groups, see Chapter Three), age and 
generation (classificatory siblings, fathers and sons, see Chapter Five), anteriority of 
settlement (first-comers and late-comers, see Chapter Four), among other things. 
Although the ideological foundation of groups of descendants, peers or settlers has often 
emerged in ethnographic analyses of Mande, the relevance of such groups for the 
analysis of political organization has been generally overlooked. More particularly, the 
openness and flexibility which characterize processes of ordinary grouping in my 
analysis have been relatively unexamined by recent ethnographic works on the region. 
How do ordinary groups based – inter alia – on age, descent and anteriority, differ from 
those formed by mobilising ‘notable’ identities, like caste, slave descent and ethnicity? 
Is the openness of such groups a distinguishing character and how it can be defined? 
How are these dynamics conceived of in Bancoumana? How do people express them in 
vernacular terms? With the aim of further defining and clarifying the subject of my 
analysis, let me address these questions in order. By showing how distinctions based on 
descent, age, anteriority are commonly employed as means for achieving cooperative 
ends, I emphasize the everyday relevance of grouping dynamics in Mande.  
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The exploration of ordinary processes of grouping in a variety of domains of daily life 
in Bancoumana (development, household, land, agriculture and taxation) reveals a 
pervasive and recurrent ideology of complementary opposition. Such an ideology, 
which one often finds expressed in a ‘segmentary’ idiom, has been described by Sahlins 
(1961) as an ‘ideology of predatory expansion.’ It is with such an idiom of segmentation 
and such an inclusive and ‘open’ ideology that West African anthropologists – and 
Mande specialists in particular – seem to have lost familiarity in recent times. 
Discourses drawing on complementary oppositions and distinguishing ‘insiders’ from 
‘outsiders’ may engender less encompassing barriers than those consequent to the 
manipulation of categories deeply rooted in the historical (and particularly colonial) 
past, such as caste, slavery and ethnicity, but the actual results in terms of mobilization 
of people around group identities are not dissimilar. My characterization of, and focus 
on, ‘ordinary groupings’ aims at drawing attention to the relevance of segmentary 
dynamics in daily life rather than to distinguish between different types of social 
groups, although groups may differ in the degree to which they are corporate entities. 
Beyond the recurrence of a segmentary idiom, ethnographic analysis of ordinary 
grouping in Bancoumana reveals the open character of social groups. From the point of 
view of an individual social actor, what is open is often the possibility of casting oneself 
(or one’s group) in multiple ways. To put it another way, individuals draw – sometimes 
simultaneously, at other times exclusively – on multiple identities and on claims to 
membership of different social groups. For example, within a residential unit in 
Bancoumana (a compound), individuals exploit differently the rules of descent 
according to the particular claim they may want to frame. There is often room for 
insisting on membership in a multiplicity of groups: of same-mother and same-father 
descendants and on various levels of patrilineal descent, larger or smaller than the 
compound (see Chapter Three, in particular on page 109).  
Not only individuals but also collectivities cast themselves strategically into open 
groups: for example, my host compound Messerejanna (see methodology and Chapter 
Three) can be conceived of as a single descent group comprising the descendants of its 
founder or as constituted of two or three smaller descent groups, corresponding to 
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maternal or paternal groups of patrilineal descendants.8 Descent groups larger than the 
compound (see methodology and Chapter Six) should also be considered, adding to the 
complexity of one’s identification into descent groups.  
Crucially, however, the issue of strategic grouping goes well beyond the domain of 
descent – itself not a domain constituted rigidly around clear-cut rules of patrilineal 
descent. For example, Chapter Two on the dichotomy of insiders and outsiders in the 
field of development and Chapter Four on the complementary opposition between first-
comers and late-comers will illustrate that a ‘segmentary’ logic is at play in these fields 
too and that ideologies of complementary opposition produce comparable results in 
terms of inclusiveness (Sahlin’s predatory expansionism) and openness of social groups.  
It emerges from the analysis of the ethnographic data that, in playing out one’s 
membership of multiple social groups, there is often considerable room for ambiguity, a 
recurrent aspect of both individual and collective agency in Bancoumana. Instead of 
adopting a perspective centred on individual social actors, however, I focus on the fact 
that the groups of which individuals strategically claim to be the members allow for – 
and indeed are characterized by – such openness. 
The open character of social groups is the other face of the ambiguity of individual 
agency outlined by literature on Mande social relationships (e.g. Conrad and Frank 
1995). Group ‘openness’ is a consequence of the fact that both individual and collective 
social actors make circumstantial use of their membership of larger entities – sometimes 
emphasizing their similarity and calling for unity and cooperation, at other times 
insisting on difference and calling for division and competition. As the complementary 
statuses of uterine and paternal brotherhood, to which I will now turn, such 
‘segmentary’ logic draws on the domain of kinship relations (according to descent 
rules) yet operates more widely in society.  
All over Mande, people employ the vernacular kinship concept of badenya (uterine 
brotherhood, literally ‘mother-childness’), referring to the need of grouping for 
cooperative ends and, more generally, to group solidarity. In the Mande worldview, this 
                                                 
8 As detailed in Chapter Three, compound residents are the descendants of the two wives of the founding 
ancestor and of three of their sons. 
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notion is in permanent tension with the opposite paternal half-brotherhood (fadenya or 
‘father-childness’), evoking instead a sentiment of rivalry, competition and selfishness. 
Although badenya is more consistently valued and invariably evoked in positive terms, 
its opposite fadenya, with its association with heroic behaviour, nonetheless has very 
positive connotations (McNaughton 2008; Wooten 2009). In short, these vernacular 
concepts are employed to stress different but related aspects of social relations, 
including individuality and rivalry (fadenya) as well as social harmony and collectivity 
(badenya).  
As several Mande specialists have convincingly shown (Bird and Kendall 1980; Jansen 
and Zobel 1996; Hoffman 2000), the tension between fadenya and badenya is central to 
the local understanding of social relations, defining a particular aesthetic of action 
(Hardin 1993; McNaughton 2008). The two concepts should be seen in a continuum 
rather than in opposition. It was expressed by Wooten thus:  
[mother-childness and father-childness] are not polar opposites, but rather 
complementary elements of a complex whole. Depending on timing and context, 
individuals and groups may accent either element of this integrated cultural model. 
They are interrelated in tension and stably lodged in the Mande worldview (2009:20-1). 
This thesis is concerned with processes of grouping and of building cooperative 
relations. By such processes, the people of Bancoumana cast themselves – or are cast 
and represented by others – into social groups, pursuing a wide range of purposes and 
activities. Addressing how cooperative relationships are built (and undone) in a range of 
ordinary domains of social life, my analysis suggests that dynamic processes of 
segmentation are key to the understanding of political relations in Bancoumana. An 
examination of how ‘soft’ distinctions (in comparison to the ‘notable’ identities 
mentioned above) are mobilized in the constitution of social groups will reveal that the 
logic underpinning processes of grouping in a ‘segmentary style’ prizes ambiguity and 
the possibility to cast oneself in multiple legitimate ways. Thus, segmentation allows 
groups not to be ‘frozen’ into fixed entities, for example into institutions recognised by 
state law, while mediating in important ways bureaucratic control by the state and other 
agencies. Finally, the particular style of grouping of the people of Bancoumana allows 
them to resist economic processes of transformation – again by mediating these forces, 
as we shall see. 
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A non-urban Malian town 
Bancoumana is a rural municipality (commune rurale) located at 60 km from Bamako, 
on the road connecting the Malian capital to Siguiri (Guinea) and bordering the Niger 
River. The municipality is formed by the village of Bancoumana – approximately 8,300 
people – and by 13 other villages and smaller settlements, where the rest of the 
population lives, totalling 22,000 residents. 
Being positioned mid-way between Bamako and the border with Guinea, the region of 
my fieldwork plays a significant role in the border economy connecting the Guinean 
capital and port-town of Conakry to land-locked Mali and its capital Bamako. Among 
other signals of this fact, is the long line of shops bordering Bancoumana’s main street 
and surrounding the market square, selling flash lights, transistor radios, portable 
phones, music and video cassettes, cuckoo clocks and prayer clocks, fake hairs, 
detergents, and the like. The ready availability of such goods reflects the village 
proximity to Bamako and to the Guinean border, and stands in contrast with the weekly 
cadence of the market fair (taking place every Monday), where the sale of cattle and 
locally produced food attracts nonetheless considerable numbers. The traffic with 
Guinea was undergoing a period of crisis when I entered the field, due to the recent 
tarring of an alternative route, connecting Siguiri to Bamako (the Sibi-Narena road), but 
cutting-off my field-site. In 2010, Bancoumana’s road was eventually asphalted; not 
having returned since 2008, I cannot say whether this had led to a recovery of 
commerce. 
Despite being uniformly spoken as a ‘village’ (dugu in Mandenkakan, village in 
French), Bancoumana has many of the characteristics of a small town, including a 
population of remarkable size, the presence of administrative services and the already 
mentioned market fair, which attracts both buyers and sellers from a vast area including 
the capital Bamako. The biggest centres in nearby municipalities (Kangaba, Sibi, 
Narena, Djoliba) hardly surpass 5,000 inhabitants, making of Bancoumana the most 
populous settlement of the region south-west of Bamako. Compared to the localities 
mentioned above, however, my field-site presents a much less ‘urban’ outlook due to 
the recent failure of the plan of ‘squaring’ inhabitable land (the procedure of plotting 
described in Chapter Two). Moreover, urban infrastructure such as tap water, sewage 
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and electricity are absent, while it is not uncommon to find them in much smaller places 
(including all the neighbouring centres referred to above). The exceptional lack of such 
infrastructure suggests that tensions inevitably accompanying similar developments – 
regularly prospected and planned but never achieved – could not be overcome in 
Bancoumana (see, in particular, Chapter Two). This crucial aspect for the understanding 
of local political relations will emerge at various points of the thesis and will be the 
object of further analyses. 
With the size of a town, but without the look and feel of urbanisation, Bancoumana is 
nonetheless an administrative centre of some importance. Such a status is prominently 
signalled by the two storey building hosting the rural municipality (the only 
construction of this kind), which is located right at the entrance of the village along the 
main road to Bamako. Other visible state-infrastructure lie at a short distance, on the 
same eastern side of the village. The health centre (centre de santé communautaire) 
consists of a large and recently enwalled compound hosting three cement buildings: the 
doctor’s practice and pharmacy (one resident doctor is assisted by a practicing 
doctor/nurse), the mid-wifery and the quarters of a medical project monitoring malaria. 
Since the establishment of this project in the mid-2000s (see methodology), the site has 
not only been entirely refurbished, but also connected to two electricity-generators 
powering air conditioning, laboratory research instruments, computers, printers and 
satellite-internet connection. Despite the sad irony of the lack of medical equipment – 
the project provided an ambulance instead, for driving urgent patients to Bamako – this 
research facility stands as a very unusual place in Bancoumana.  
More modest, state-related buildings are the headquarters of the ‘para-statal’ agency for 
agricultural development (Office de la Haute Vallée du Niger, see Chapter Two), and a 
small police station, made of two rooms and a shed bordering the road, which is 
permanently staffed by two policemen taking turns from nearby Sibi. The presence of 
state buildings and infrastructure is completed by two public schools – one on the east, 
the other on the west of the village – providing education up to secondary level (9th year 
of education). The two schools are staffed with approximately 20 teachers and pupils 
exceed 1,000. Following the model of French school and administration (see also 
Chapter Six), most teachers come from elsewhere in Mali, sometimes from distant 
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locations. Like other state officials (fonctionnaires), they normally reside in the village 
for a limited time – one or two years – before being transferred elsewhere. Although 
numbers may seem large, Bancoumana’s school pupils only constitute about one-third 
of the school-aged population, which includes other villages in the municipality. The 
classes of both schools are critically over-populated, averaging numbers of 80-90 pupils 
per classroom (the Ministry of education sets the limit at 50) and reaching 197 in one 
case. Both the low rate of school attendance and the crowding of classes have direct 
repercussions on literacy in the locality; they also severely limit the chances for 
Bancoumana’s pupils to further pursue their studies in Bamako or elsewhere (see, in 
particular Chapter Three and Chapter Five). 
Methodology 
I first visited the village of Bancoumana in June 2005, collecting material for my 
Master’s dissertation, and shooting a documentary movie with a crew of Malian and 
Italian friends and university colleagues.9 One year and a half later, in February 2007, I 
started my fieldwork, which ended in December 2008. By that time, I had conducted 18 
months of research in the village, while the rest of the time was spent either travelling or 
in the capital Bamako. 
Since the first day of my stay in Bancoumana, I lived in the Messerejanna compound as 
a guest of Makan Camara, a man in his sixties, and his family, including his older 
brother and compound headman Nanamori Camara. In this relatively populous family 
setting, which will be described in Chapter Three, I was given a room in a mud-brick 
house on one corner of the compound (see map on page 86), furnished with a plastic 
deckchair topped by a straw mattress and a kerosene lantern light. I was normally the 
sole occupier of the room, although for variable periods of time I shared it with either of 
the two French speaking family members (Adama and Bakari, see Chapter Three), who 
                                                 
9 The dissertation, entitled Land Tenure and Socio-political Structure in Bancoumana, Mali, was 
submitted to the Anthropology Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, in 
September, 2005 in part fulfillment of the requirements for the MSc Law, Anthropology and Society. The 
documentary movie has been mentioned in note 2.  
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did not have a room of their own in the compound and who were my nearly-constant 
companions during the first months of fieldwork. 
My affiliation with the Messerejanna compound, and particularly with my most direct 
host Makan Camara, was not the product of chance. First, I was recommended by a 
friend and researcher who had previously sojourned in the locality – Amadou Keita, 
who was also a member of the film crew in 2005. The connection with this Malian 
researcher facilitated my access to the field, while also reinforcing the relationship 
between Keita, a middle-class Bamako dweller, and my hosts in Bancoumana. 
Greetings, congratulations and condolences were frequently exchanged through me 
going and coming back from the capital city. On one occasion during my stay, Keita 
also paid a visit to my hosts in the village.  
The second reason for my affiliation to Makan Camara lies in the particular office that 
he held in the village. Makan was in fact the headman (Premier Conseiller) of a semi-
traditional institution called the village council (see especially Chapter Six). Acting as a 
deputy of the village chief – whose office was vacant in Bancoumana – he had a 
customary duty to receive foreigners like Keita and myself. Therefore, on the day I 
arrived in Bancoumana, it was to him that I offered the usual ten kola nuts in sign of 
respect. I was accompanied to his ‘chatting place’ (sigiyoro) on the market square, 
where I was told that I would be his guest. I was then accompanied to the compound 
called Messerejanna, where I was introduced to the family headman Nanamori. 
As it will emerge from subsequent chapters, the Messerejanna family is a relatively 
prestigious group in Bancoumana, holding considerable political influence and power, 
and descending from allegedly first-settler Camara people (the clan and patronymic 
associated with Bancoumana). Signalling this fact, a few years after I left the field-site, 
compound headman Nanamori has become village chief – while Makan has kept his 
position of village first-councillor – ending a dispute among different factions and 
stake-holders started in 1991, with the death of the previous village chief Nassira 
Camara.  
Despite their local political prestige, however, my hosts were not amongst the 
wealthiest people by the standard of an administrative and commercial centre like 
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Bancoumana. Unlike other families, Messerejanna could not count on salaries or other 
regular cash income (migrants’ remittances, income from trade, pensions and the like). 
Moreover, family members did not possess a large number of heads of cattle – a 
common form of investment and symbol of wealth. Finally, unlike richer compounds 
living from a combination of income sources (remittances, trade and cattle), 
Messerejanna was heavily dependent on human-powered agriculture: all the active men 
and women residing in the compound were full-time farmers, growing both subsistence 
crops (millet, sorghum, maize, rice and peanuts) and cash crops (onions, beans and 
mangos). 
As expected, language has been a rather challenging aspect throughout the research. 
Although I was fluent in French, I entered the field with only a preliminary command of 
Bambara (the more widespread version of Mandenkakan spoken in Bancoumana), 
which I leant through private tuition in London. During the first eight months of 
fieldwork, I spent most afternoons in the company of Alassane Maiga, a shopkeeper and 
respected religious teacher (he was the deputy imam of one of the five mosques of 
Bancoumana), who agreed to teach me Mandenkakan. 
Maiga was a foreigner, native of the Gourma region near Timbuktu, and had settled in 
Bancoumana approximately thirty years ago. Both his religious status and his condition 
of long-term foreigner made of him a much respected personality in the neighbourhood 
(the surroundings of his house and his shop). The location of my language tuition – the 
veranda of the shop – was indeed a successful chatting place, frequented by many of 
Maiga’s friends who became my first informants after the members of my host family. 
Most of his friends were neighbours, inhabiting the eastern side of the village along the 
road toward Bamako (see page 34 above): a direction in which the village is expanding, 
where most newcomers like Maiga are settled. Maiga’s shop was also set in a 
convenient location, next to the building hosting the municipality, which I frequented 
assiduously since the beginning of my fieldwork. 
I soon became a regular frequenter of various chatting places other than Maiga’s shop, 
all of which were set along the main road and around the market square. These are 
shaded spaces where groups of friends – invariably males and generally members of the 
same adult generation – gather frequently and spend time together chatting and drinking 
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tea. Some are set in front of shops and work-places (the municipality, the local radio 
station, the para-statal agency for agricultural development), while others, especially 
those frequented by elder people, are located in more quiet corners of the village. As 
soon as my language skills improved, I got used to visiting many of these places on a 
daily basis, gathering information, asking questions and taking part in conversations.  
Although my preferred method of inquiry was ordinary conversation, I was occasionally 
invited to go and ask some elder people about subjects of my interest and research. 
Thus, at various times during my fieldwork, I collected oral accounts, such as those 
concerning the foundation of Bancoumana (see Chapter Four).10 In doing so, I was 
normally in the company of a member of my hosting family (Adama or Bakari) or of 
another French speaking informant. In some cases I tape-recorded the accounts and then 
paid some friends in Bamako to translate them. I never had a research assistant in the 
village and no money was ever paid in return for information. 
The last method I employed was a survey. Towards the end of my fieldwork, I became 
acquainted with a number of doctors based at the local health centre and working for the 
above mentioned U.S. funded project monitoring malaria. This initiative – vernacularly 
known as projet palud and established for more than two years when I started my 
fieldwork – consisted in studying the incidence of malaria in infants in the village as 
well as testing a number of vaccines on a sample of 200 young children, half of whom 
were inoculated a placebo solution.11 Due to its statistical nature, the study was based 
on an accurate and regularly updated dataset of the entire resident population of 
Bancoumana, in order to measure the incidence in relation to the sample. I was kindly 
given access to these data – a census, given that it covered the entire population – which 
I have further elaborated as explained below. 
In the census conducted for the malaria project, each individual residing in Bancoumana 
was given a nine figure identification number codifying the following information: a) 
                                                 
10 Accounts of the foundation of Bancoumana were collected from ‘Damafin’ Lamine Sinaba 
(blacksmiths’ headman in Bancoumana) and ‘El Hadji’ Messere Camara. Other elder informants include 
‘Karamogo Gueman’ Camara, Makan Camara, Modibo Diabaté, ‘Kempes’ Camara and Alassane Maiga.  
11 The project, based at the University of Bamako and funded by the U.S. National Institutes of Health 
among other donors, bears the official name of Malaria Research and Training Centre. See 
http://www.malariagen.net/node/197 (last retrieved 11 October 2011). 
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area of residence: the village was subdivided into four areas, to be surveyed by different 
people; b) compound: within each of the four areas, each residential unit was given a 
progressive number based on its location; c) conjugal unit: within every compound, 
each married couple and children was given a progressive number; and d) individual: 
each individual was given a three figures number indicating his position within the 
conjugal unit (husband, wife or children). In addition, the census recorded full names, 
dates of birth and sex of all residents.  
Some of these data have been employed directly in my research, for example in 
analysing compound size and density (page 98), the frequency of patronymic names 
(page 127) and the age of particular individuals (page 208). More generally, however, 
the presence of an accurate data set and the availability of five trained surveyors in 
charge of keeping these data up to date presented the opportunity to collect further 
information. 
Over a period of three weeks towards the end of my fieldwork, four surveyors of the 
malaria project conducted a compound-based survey on my behalf, gathering 
information to which I will refer throughout the thesis. In particular, the 446 
respondents (all the compound headmen of Bancoumana) were asked to describe 
themselves as either ‘first-comers’ of ‘late-comers’ in relation to the ‘original 
occupation’ of the village, as well as to indicate their ‘hosts’ in case of late-comer status 
(the meaning of all words in inverted commas is discussed in Chapter Four). Moreover, 
respondents were asked to cast their compound into larger groups based on descent in 
classificatory sense, hence including forms of affiliation such as hospitality, dependency 
and the like.  
By the time my survey was conducted (at around the 15th month of fieldwork), I had 
acquired first-hand knowledge and experience of the complexity as well as the 
subtleness of the system of social differentiation explored by many contributions to the 
anthropological literature on Mande (some of which were referred to above) and 
elsewhere in Africa (Lan 1985; and Kuba and Lentz 2006). Therefore, I was fully aware 
that social distinctions based on criteria such as ‘prior occupation’ and ‘descent’ do not 
define bounded groups of people. Yet, ever since an early stage of fieldwork, my 
interest for how people build cooperative relations drew my attention to the recurrent 
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use of such categories and classifications in the making (and unmaking) of social 
groups. Hence, in order to achieve a sense of how such processes occurred on a scale of 
more than 8,000 inhabitants, I seized the opportunity to survey a number of affiliations 
based on prior occupation and descent as detailed above. Chapter Five will further 
clarify my intent in conducting such survey, while also reflecting on the reasons which 
make problematic and only partially successful similar efforts to ‘map’ descent-based 
affiliations among other things (see especially Kuper 1982).  
Chapters outline 
Providing the historical background required for understanding the present-day relation 
between the central state and the local municipality, Chapter Two addresses a series of 
land developments in Bancoumana’s recent history (1944-2008). Comparing a sequence 
of ‘failed’ attempts to boost rice production with more recent plans to ‘square’ the 
village-site into a regular series of land-plots, the analysis enlightens historical changes 
and continuities in the way development agencies, including the state, have targeted the 
land farmed and inhabited by the people of Bancoumana. I shall emphasize, more 
particularly, the long term relevance of indirect ways of governing the land by changing 
forms of state in Mali (late-colonial, independent, developmental and decentralized) and 
provide evidence of a shift in the means and the agenda of the current, decentralized 
form of state in ‘developing’ its territory. Originally aimed at gaining control of the 
domestic agricultural production, plans for land development by the state have started 
targeting inhabitable land as a condition for the reproduction of a growing migrant 
population. 
The square plots envisaged in the recent plans to develop inhabitable land are associated 
with concrete houses and simple family structures exemplified, as we shall see, by the 
restricted sociality of the migrants who financed most of the operation. In sharp contrast 
to this imagined state of affair, Chapter Three illustrates the existing and far more 
complex modes of organizing space and kinship relations in an actual compound in 
Bancoumana. The chapter describes the domestic setting of the Messerejanna 
compound, the living quarters of my hosts, with a focus on the way its inhabitants group 
for various purposes. Crucial insights on grouping dynamics are firstly presented 
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through the analysis of the main spaces and activities in the courtyard, focusing on the 
use and disposition of buildings, and on daily, ordinary practices related to the 
preparation and consumption of food, such as husking, cooking, collecting kitchen fuel 
and eating together. Following that, family sub-groups are addressed by analysing their 
organization in two or three descent lines according to the particular view the individual 
takes on patrilineal descent. Overall, the analysis identifies a tension – as well as a room 
for strategic manoeuvre – between maternal and paternal groups of patrilineal 
descendants. 
In Bancoumana, the ‘land is to rule.’ Chapter Four focuses on land as an attribute of 
political leadership and an enduring symbol of the legitimate exercise of political 
authority. Through the historical narrative of the founding of the village, I illustrate how 
the principle of anteriority in land occupation is used to create a distinction between two 
groups of villagers with different rights and opportunities in accessing land: first-comers 
and late-comers. Such distinction constitutes the base of a socially codified system of 
‘hospitality’ allowing first-comers to incorporate late-comers while regulating the 
latter’s access to resources and adapting it to changing circumstances. However, there is 
not a clear-cut dichotomy between first-comers and late-comers, hosts and guests, but 
rather an extremely subtle status distinction. Moreover, through a case study of a 
dispute involving two late-comers, Traore and Diarra, I show that ‘hospitality’ is only 
one strategy employed by latecomers to secure their interests. Another way, not 
necessarily alternative to the former, is to resort to a written document issued by the 
Mayor: the attestation de vente. Despite the fact of involving two latecomers – one of 
whom literate and able to resort to an attestation de vente – the case shows that support 
from one’s host lineage was still crucial in securing land at the time of my fieldwork in 
Bancoumana. Negotiation of both litigants’ status and relations of dependence proved to 
be more effective than the written attestation signed by the state representative and 
produced by the defendant in order to resist the claim on land he purchased two decades 
ago.  
Chapter Five deals with age-based associations in Bancoumana and their role in 
farming, illuminating crucial aspects of collective agency in relation to age groups and 
beyond. The first part of the chapter introduces age groups emphasizing their important 
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agricultural role as well as their connection to the political domain, a linkage that has 
been previously stressed by much of the literature dealing with age-based associations 
in the region and in Africa more generally. The core of my analysis, however, targets 
one particular age group – the Sina kari – and concentrates on the exchange and the 
performance of group-farming labour. A detailed description of one day farming the 
fields with the group will show that speaking of a ‘structured’ kind and commensality 
contribute significantly to the definition of the work setting. In particular, different 
patterns of interaction between the farming group and its ‘hosts’ (landlords) distinguish 
less commoditised forms of work from more ‘disembedded’ economic exchanges (gift 
form commodity).  
The analytic emphasis on structured speaking among other aspects of the performance 
of group farming also serves to interrogate the open and flexible character of groups. 
Age groups like the Sina kari operate according to a rather flexible configuration: 
despite a strong sense of membership to the same cohort (emphatically played out in 
some circumstances), members can split into separate groups for the performance of 
specific tasks. In the case of the Sina kari, two groups bearing the same name and 
farming on the same day of the week (hence underplaying their difference) were in fact 
quite deeply divided along lineage membership lines. One of the two sub-groups also 
found an ingenious way to appoint an alternative chief without challenging too openly 
the legitimacy of Sina, the age-group headman officially appointed by the elders. 
Chapter Six focuses on the most important local tax paid on a yearly basis by 
Bancoumana residents: the Taxe de Développement Régional et Local or TDRL. A 
successor of the colonial head tax, TDRL is due to the local state administration (the 
municipality) according to the records resulting from a registry, listing imposable 
people and properties for each chef de famille who is entitled a carnet de famille. The 
chapter starts from an analysis of Bancoumana registry of the carnets de famille, 
focusing on the way information is updated (handwritten) and the tax is calculated every 
year by the secretary general of the municipality. 
The payment of the tax constitutes an exercise of negotiation and mediation between the 
municipal bureaucracy and other local political actors. The analysis of mediation does 
not simply reveal the power balance among different local political actors endowed with 
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contrasting legitimacies in collecting tax money; most importantly, it unveils a process 
of interaction between, on the one side, the written bureaucratic culture of state 
administration and, on the other, different ways Bancoumana residents group into 
extended family networks and lineages. The dynamism and flexibility of similar 
processes of grouping are reinforced by their ‘oral’ nature: grouping dynamism is 
‘frozen’ by written registration aimed at administrative as well as cognitive purposes. 
The literacy skills upon which written registration is based, however, can also be used 
for setting up a ‘screen’ between bureaucratic practices such as tax collection and their 
intended target. The mediation of village councillors – keeping written records, but 
refusing to disclose them to the municipality – appears crucial to this regard: it protects 
the local political process against ‘fission’ by written registration, ensuring 
communication with the local state authorities while challenging bureaucratic control.  
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Chapter Two 
Developing farming and inhabitable land  
Introduction 
The ‘betterment’ of land is an enduring concern of states and other developers, in Mali 
as in other parts of the world; one traditionally generating much conflict and 
misunderstanding between planners and beneficiaries (Ferguson 1990:262-3; James 
1988; Moore 2000). Since the French colonial administration launched a series of 
‘small-scale’ agricultural developments in the region, the land farmed and inhabited by 
the people of Bancoumana has received such attention. This chapter analyses a series of 
land developments in Bancoumana’s recent history (1944-2008) with the aim of 
exploring their connection to political and socio-economic relations in the locality. 
Providing the historical background required to understand the present-day relation 
between the central state and the local municipality, the analysis will also shed light on 
historical changes and continuities in forms of government. I shall emphasise, more 
particularly, the long term relevance of indirect ways of governing the land (despite the 
French direct rule) and provide evidence of a shift in the means and the agenda of the 
Malian state in ‘developing’ its territory: originally aimed at gaining control of the 
domestic agricultural production, plans for land development by the state have started 
targeting inhabitable land as a condition for the reproduction of a growing migrant 
population.  
The first part of the chapter addresses the history of the Bancoumana rice plain, which 
was the object, until the mid-1980s, of several projects aiming at ‘developing’ rice 
production. During that period, physical infrastructure such as dikes and canals were 
built, the ground was levelled by means of both motorized and animal traction, and 
agricultural production was organized through the establishment of institutions 
providing farmers with training, tools of production, and services such as credit and 
marketing. All such efforts, however, ended in a revolt against plans to distribute the 
allotments. The chapter will then address the more recent affair of the plotting of 
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inhabitable village land, which was aimed at urbanizing Bancoumana by reorganizing 
the space according to a grid plan. The first phase of this process – preliminary to a 
bureaucratic procedure required by state law – was prompted by the newly established 
municipality in the year 2000. It was suddenly dropped, however, due to another revolt 
by one faction of the village.  
While today the first set of agricultural developments is perceived as belonging to the 
past, there is a widespread – though publically unspoken – sense that village land 
plotting ought still to happen and that, sooner or later, the village will be presented with 
new opportunities for it. It is uncertain, however, how and when the different agencies 
to be involved might overcome their disagreement. Mention of disagreement in either 
set of developments is taboo: discussion of the actual dynamics that led to failure and of 
the composition of opposing factions is frequently diverted and always avoided in 
public conversations. 
The comparison between these two cases, as well among the different stages in the 
longer history of the rice plain, provides insights on the way land and development were 
– and still are – understood and governed by different agencies. Various meanings of 
land, contrasting ideas and misunderstandings about its use and distribution are disputed 
by different groups of actors such as state representatives, bureaucrats, farmers, 
‘traditional’ land owners, and both transnational and urban migrants. 
Watering the crops and ‘fishing’ the fields in the dry season 
Compared to the drier localities in most of the region, water in Bancoumana plays a 
greater (and rather peculiar) role in the local economy, although certainly not the one 
envisaged by the state and other agencies aiming at developing irrigated rice production 
as this chapter will describe. In consequence of the irreversible state of decay of the rice 
plain caused by these projects, Bancoumana farmers produce today only negligible 
quantities for rice, most of which is used for domestic consumption and does not reach 
the market. However, the system of canals originally designed for flood-controlled 
irrigation serves new purposes having considerable impact on the economy, such as the 
growing of cash-crops during the dry season (from November to April) and the catching 
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of fish. Introducing these features of the present-day local economy – an unexpected 
legacy of development intervention in Bancoumana – is crucial to understand the 
historical record of ‘failures’ of projects of agricultural development targeting 
Bancoumana’s rice plain (addressed in the next section).  
After the end of the rains, in September-October, streams from the Mande hills continue 
to supply Bancoumana’s system of canals, where – depending on their size and depth – 
it progressively dries or stagnates until the advent of new rains in May-June. Thanks to 
the remnants of this canal infrastructure, those having land bordering a waterway can 
grow vegetables and fruit for part or the whole length of the dry season, depending on 
the location of their land. Some of these dry season crops like salad, tomatoes, 
cucumbers and watermelons are grown in ‘gardens’ (nakow), i.e. relatively small pieces 
of land, either bordering a waterway or equipped with wells, where no other crops are 
normally cultivated. Along with some fruit (mangoes, bananas), garden produce is 
normally sold in small quantities in the local market, providing a considerable number 
of households – and especially women – with moderate amounts of cash.  
Other dry season crops, instead, are grown on larger surfaces, often the same fields 
farmed during the rainy season (forow). The fields are irrigated with small, movable 
motor-pumps – a common sight on the racks of the bicycles criss-crossing the 
countryside during the rainy season – for growing oranges, mangoes, bananas and, 
above all, onions. Cash crops such as these are grown in large quantities by 
Bancoumana farmers, to be either marketed in Bamako or sold (in bulk) to wholesale 
buyers visiting the countryside at harvest time with large trucks.  
In Bancoumana, onion growing is a very common entrepreneurial activity. It requires a 
certain capital for the initial investment in seeds and chemical fertilizers, as these two 
inputs are indispensable for growing vegetables of marketable size and on portions of 
the same fields that have just been harvested. Onion is planted shortly after the harvest 
of other crops, hence the land cannot rest and be fertilized by the cattle grazing. Onion 
growing also requires a motor-pump, which is normally shared by the members of the 
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same compound (see Chapter Three) along with a weekly amount of money for buying 
petrol over a period of three to four months.12  
Onions are grown almost exclusively by men – a fact connected to the necessity of the 
above mentioned capital investment – and most of the work is done individually. The 
solitary nature of onion growing stands in sharp opposition to the way work is 
organized for most other crops (certainly those producing comparable harvests): millet, 
sorghum, maize, rice, peanuts and the like are all farmed by groups (see Chapter Three 
and Chapter Five). In the case of onions, people associate into groups only for buying 
wholesale seeds and fertilizers, or for borrowing the money to purchase smaller 
quantities of such inputs. Neither the household nor farming associations (see, 
respectively, Chapter Three and Chapter Five) play any considerable role.  
Finally, onion farming is a particularly demanding activity. Perhaps, this is because this 
crop is grown at a time of rest in the agricultural cycle (so is traditionally defined the 
dry season), and also because of the solitary nature of work outlined above. Despite the 
great amount of effort required, however, returns are not great, improving only if the 
harvest is stored and marketed months later.13 Young men (those who do not leave the 
village after the farming season) re-plant onion every autumn, grumbling and hoping for 
better prices on the following year. In fact, many do not see such activity as an option: 
for unmarried or recently married people, for example, to grow onions is the most 
common way to accumulate enough cash for paying (or completing the payment of) 
their bride-wealth (see also Wooten 2005). 
A second and highly unexpected legacy of the development of irrigated agriculture in 
Bancoumana is the abundance of fish and the popularity of fish-catching practices. This 
is somehow a more social (and also pleasurable) activity than farming onions, since it is 
mostly done into groups. Just as with onions, however, fish constitutes an important 
                                                 
12 A common investment in onion farming at the time of my fieldwork required the following amounts of 
money: from 100,000 to150,000 CFA Francs (£130-£200) for fertilizers; from 20,000 to 50,000 CFA 
Francs (£25-£65) for a box of seed, depending on quality and kind (red, yellow or white onion); 
approximately 50,000 CFA Francs (£65) for petrol, for watering the crops once a week during three to 
four months.  
13 Returns are highly variable. During my fieldwork, for example, onion prices swung from 50 CFA 
Francs/Kg (£0.07) to 400 CFA Francs/Kg (£0.53) depending on the time of the sale. So far as I could 
judge, however, 100,000 CFA Francs (£130, net in relation to the costs) would be an average figure for 
the harvest of one person. 
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item of trade in Bancoumana, one which has attracted women entrepreneurs coming 
specifically from Bamako to buy fish from many different farmers, reselling most of it 
straight away in the local market.  
In the final part of the dry season, water begins to dry in the canal infrastructure and 
people organize fishing groups supplying both their households and sellers in the local 
market with the product of their catch. Fish traps, made of net and flexible wood, are 
placed inside the small canals surrounding the fields and looked after daily to 
discourage thieves; but the most effective way of fishing is a collective catch in isolated 
traits of the canals, where the fish has arrived with the floods and has remained trapped 
in pools separated by dried tracts of canal.  
Fish catching of a collective kind is also the object of regulation by ‘traditional 
authorities’ such as the cohort of people serving as a vigilante group (these will be seen 
in Chapter Five). By decision of such a group, the fishing season is declared open and 
whoever is found catching fish in the canals before this announcement can be fined. 
Both men and women – but especially the latter – gather in groups of several tens of 
people and catch fish by means of nets, conical traps, lances, machetes and other 
instruments: while some hold long nets isolating one area of the canal and progressively 
narrowing the spot, others catch the fish trapped inside.  
In Mande, like in other areas of West Africa, fishermen and farmers normally constitute 
distinct groups, often distinguished by patronymic name and specializing in either of the 
two activities – which also provides the ‘social infrastructure’ for their trade (Koenig et 
al. 1998; Koenig 2005). Thus, the fact that the Camara people of Bancoumana (a 
patronymic traditionally associated with agriculturalists) fish on their own fields is 
something which is often, and with some humour, remarked by their neighbours. 
Because of their main occupation as farmers, however, Bancoumana residents refrain 
from fishing on the Niger River nearby – and often from canoeing or swimming; 
activities for which the fishermen people known as the Somono who live on the bank of 
the river are better qualified. 
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Rice cultivation and the legacy of its development 
The location of Bancoumana is one particularly suitable for flooded rice cultivation. On 
the north-western side of the village, the ground slopes slowly for approximately 40 km 
(about ten metres in height difference), conveying water from the Mande hills towards 
the Niger River. Average rainfall is about 1,000 mm between May and October (and 
proximate to zero for the rest of the year).14 A vast plain area, of more than 2,000 
hectares, separates the village from the river, about four to seven kilometres to the 
south-west. During the rainiest part of the year, abundant streams flow into the river, 
flooding the plain area where rice is cultivated. 
Colonial agronomists used to complain that, before the arrival of the French, farmers of 
the Upper Niger Valley – the part of the river where Bancoumana is located – made 
little effort to alter the environment in a way that would have allowed the cultivation of 
rice (Guernier 1949; Guillaume 1960a).15 Later on, experts working for the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) assumed that rice was not 
normally grown in the area and played no role in the diet of the local people (Anders 
1981:57). Yet, as studies have suggested, rice has been grown in this area since c. 1500 
BC (Portères 1950; Linares 2002) and Mande farmers have sophisticated knowledge of 
rice farming techniques, through which several varieties of rice have been domesticated 
and adapted to the particular environment of the Upper Niger Valley. 
Several local varieties, belonging to the species Ozyra glaberrima, are still cultivated 
today, albeit increasingly challenged by Asian varieties of the other rice species (Ozyra 
sativa) and by a hybrid variety known as ‘New Rice for Africa’ (NERICA).16 Some 
varieties cultivated in Bancoumana are adapted to grow in dry conditions, similar to 
millet and sorghum, and unlike maize which is a more water-demanding crop, 
distributed for only a few centuries in West Africa. Other varieties – wet and floating – 
                                                 
14 Source: Office de la Haute Vallée du Niger (OHVN, see later in the text) for the years 2001-2003 (last 
data available online). See http://www.maliagriculture.org/services_tech/OHVN/ (last retrieved 26 
October 2011). In 1959, Guillaume (1960:59) reports 1,100 mm for the same area. 
15 The Haute Vallée du Niger is that part of the river Niger flowing from the north west of Guinea to 
Bamako. Further areas across Malian territory are: the ‘pre-deltaic’ (up to Segou), the ‘inner delta’ 
(around Djenne and Mopti), and the ‘post-deltaic’ (before the lake region surrounding the Lac Débo). 
16 It is ironical that one of these local varieties is called Ozyra Barthii, after the German explorer Barth 
who is credited with its ‘discovery’ in 1853; the same variety was then brought to the Americas by 
African slaves and diffused through their labour (Littlefield 1981:98). 
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are employed on flooded terrains, where farmers have to make careful decisions 
according to different conditions of depth and timing of submersion, moisture and type 
of soil, and the like. Farming techniques too have been adapted for many centuries to 
changing conditions and largely ‘uncontrolled’ conditions. Along with the trial and 
adaptation of new varieties such as NERICA, the most recent of these has been the 
degradation of the plain’s surface consequent to unsuccessful development intervention.  
Rice cultivation in the Upper Niger Valley has traditionally developed in places like 
Bancoumana according to specific techniques designed to take advantage of floods and 
other natural environmental features. It was only in the latter period of French colonial 
rule, however, that this and similar places were ‘developed’ according to a particular 
kind of agricultural knowledge prescribing, among other things, very particular 
transformations of the natural environment, such as the construction of dikes, canals and 
ground-levelling; and requiring specific technology and farming techniques, such as 
irrigation, the ox plough, and exogenous crops such as the ‘paddy’ rice from East Asia 
and, more recently the NERICA. Similar ‘developments’ in agricultural production also 
implied the establishment of institutions aimed at disciplining farming labour, with the 
power to regulate agricultural production and to purchase of the entirety of the harvest.
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Figure 1. Satellite view of Bancoumana's rice plain 
The area bordered in white indicates the flooded rice plain developed by the French between 1944 and 1949. The area bordered in black corresponds to the irrigated polder first developed by the 
government in 1964 and then re-developed by the USAID-funded Operation Haute Vallée started in 1978. The Koba River, a non-perennial tributary of the Niger, borders the left (western) side of 
the developments. Source: Google Earth
52 
 
Figure 2. Development of the irrigated rice polder (1964) 
The plan, corresponding to the area bordered in black in Figure 1, shows the irrigation system to be re-developed by the USAID in 1978, including the 100 hectares ‘demonstration area’ described 
later in the text. Source: USAID, ‘Rehabilitation of the Bankoumana irrigated polder,’ 1981
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Figure 3. This image, 'The floodgate built by the French in 1944-1949' from the Encyclopédie coloniale et  
Maritime (Guernier 1949), has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation.  
  
Developing the rice plain  
Since colonial times, three waves of transformation of the rice plain have occurred. For 
the sake of clarity, I shall outline them in this subsection, before turning to a more 
contextual analysis showing ruptures and continuities in a larger historical frame. 
Between 1944 and 1959, the French colonial administration caused a long canal backed 
by an embankment to be dug containing the flood of the Niger River southbound (see 
Figure 1). On the western side of the plain, the tributary of the Niger River ‘Koba,’ 
literally ‘main stream,’ was damned with a cement structure allowing for control of the 
flood coming upstream from the Niger (see Figure 1 and Figure 3). Through a shorter 
canal departing from the dam (barely visible in Figure 1, in correspondence with the 
floodgate), water was conveyed into the rice plain allowing the submersion under 
controlled conditions of approximately 1,700 hectares. 
This rudimentary infrastructure (which was cost-effective, as we shall see later) was 
designed by the agricultural division of the French colonial administration (service de 
l’agriculture) and executed by means of forced labour – presumably recruited locally 
and not deported as the French used to do for larger-scale developments (like the Office 
du Niger mentioned in Chapter One; see also page 59 below). Despite the infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image not available 
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still visibly affecting the flooding of the plain and its landscape today, this initial 
development of Bancoumana’s rice plain stands as a small-scale and rather rudimentary 
intervention, when compared to the system of irrigation (as opposed to controlled 
flooding) aimed at by the following projects. 
In 1964, the first independent government of Mali – the socialist regime of Modibo 
Keita – prompted a major new land development in Bancoumana aimed at increasing 
rice production. Five hundred hectares were developed on the northern side of the plain, 
on the slightly drier area between the French colonial development and the village (see 
Figure 1). One hundred and fifty additional hectares were then developed on lands 
bordering the Koba tributary on the east of the village. Through new gates located on 
this different place (indicated in Figure 1), the Koba alimented a canal-infrastructure 
made of a deep perimeter-canal crossed by smaller canals in a grid-like formation, as 
can be seen in Figure 2 above. Unlike the colonial development, the land to be irrigated 
by this system was levelled (by mechanical means) and divided into paddies measuring 
3.5 hectares each: an unusually large size which, together with poor levelling, was 
subsequently deemed the reason for its failure, only to be replicated in a following 
project funded by the USAID as I will later document (page 56).  
This second development was realized by the Malian Genie Rural (the state engineering 
agency) with the support of the North Vietnamese government – like Mali, a former 
territory of the French colonial Empire. In particular, the latter provided the huge 
tractors of Soviet production that the Malian technicians employed for levelling the 
land, as my elder informants still recalled in 2008. Following the overthrow of Modibo 
Keita, by a coup supported by France that brought to power General Moussa Traore, 
further financial and technical assistance for the management of Bancoumana’s 
agricultural infrastructure was provided by France’s Bureau pour le Développement de 
la Production Agricole (BDPA). The insistence of the French agronomists working for 
this organization and trying to persuade Bancoumana’s farmers to grow rice and, later, 
onion is still somehow jokingly remembered in the village (see page 61 below).  
The 1964 development consisted of a significantly different intervention from the 
previous and original one. On the one hand, it aimed at a greater control of water, one 
closer to irrigation than to controlled submersion. On the other, unlike the French 
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colonial development, it involved the squaring and demarcation of the fields into rice 
paddies, necessary to contain water keeping the crops uniformly submerged. The 
allocation of the 160 rice paddies led to acrimonious conflicts in the village, which 
eventually culminated in a ‘rebellion’ that is recalled by my informants as having drawn 
the army to Bancoumana and caused the imprisonment of a large part of the male active 
population for a period of four months.  
Since the raking up of old disagreements is taboo in the village (see also later in this 
chapter), I could not find detailed information concerning the events, but I understood 
that plans for division and allocation of land were finalized in 1971 by the Genie Rural 
and involved consultation of a semi-traditional institution known as the village council 
(see Chapter Six). In a document called plan parcellaire, land plots were numbered and 
allocated to 160 different ‘families’ (USAID 1978:73) – presumably compounds, since 
these are the ordinary units of mobilization of labour. A contract book (cahier de 
charges) was signed by the headman of each of these families, by which certain 
conditions were agreed, including the payment of fees for the use of water and of 50 kg 
of paddy rice per hectare in order to retain the right to use the land. According to my 
informants, the allocation of paddies was contested by some village-faction against 
others, but it was ultimately against some aspects of the management of the project (the 
payment of fees for the use of water and the like) that greater numbers of people 
revolted, threatening the local bureaucrats of the Genie Rural, destroying means of 
measurement, landmarks and documents. Such actions precipitated the arrival of the 
army and, plausibly, ‘the revolt’ that is still remembered along the lines mentioned 
above. 
It is interesting to know, at this stage, that the USAID officials who started the 
subsequent and third project aiming at the ‘rehabilitation of Bancoumana’s irrigated rice 
polder’ (in 1978) seemed to have been in the dark about the tensions having surrounded 
– and probably having rather violently ended – the previous development of the rice 
plain only seven years before. Despite occasional mentions of the plan parcellaire 
drawn by the Genie Rural and of the involvement of the village council in the 
distribution of land to families, the several thousands of pages of the USAID project 
Operation Haute Vallée (1978-1988) do not make any mention of past problems 
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concerning the distribution of land, nor do they envisage the possibility that such 
instances may arise in the future.17 However, along with the reiterated ‘technical’ 
failures, for which past developments were repeatedly blamed (inaccurate calculations, 
mismanagement, bad planning and the like), the redevelopment prompted by the 
USAID will be abandoned precisely because of the lack of cooperation by farmers 
(USAID 1982:21). 
This third and last development of Bancoumana’s rice plain was operated by a newly 
created para-statal agency – the Operation Haute Vallée – financed almost entirely by 
the USAID. The ‘rehabilitation of Bancoumana’s irrigated rice polder’ was one of eight 
objectives of the USAID project, which aimed more generally at improving cash crop 
production in the Upper Niger Valley area as well as the infrastructure necessary for the 
commercialization of crops. While a large part of the US$20,000,000 budget was 
allocated to the construction of roads (including two roads departing from Bancoumana, 
toward Sibi and Niame), approximately one tenth of that sum was spent to restore 
Bancoumana’s plain from its state of deterioration.18 Relying consistently on the data 
and knowledge of its ‘local partners’ (the para-statal Operation Haute Vallée and the 
Genie Rural), USAID project documents repeatedly blame ‘technical’ failures of past 
developments (uneven levelling, excessive size of the paddies and the like), paying little 
attention to the equally important social dimension of the management of the plain.  
Despite the time and money spent on this project component, the USAID 
redevelopment of Bancoumana’s rice plain by the USAID ended at an early stage. 
While maintenance and recovery of the infrastructure of the whole perimeter was 
carried out, the plan envisaged the creation of a ‘demonstration area’ of 100 hectares, 
divided into 30 plots of three hectares each. It was intended that, unlike in the 1964 
development, the land would be levelled by the farmers themselves using animal 
traction provided by the project through a subsidized credit scheme. Technical failures 
concerning such idea were remarked as soon as operations started, in particular: the 
                                                 
17 Project documents are now available online through the portal http://dec.usaid.gov (last retrieved 26 
October 2011). 
18 To the project ‘Operation Haute Vallée’ (1978-1988, n° 6880210) followed another ten-years project 
by the USAID (n° 6880233, named ‘Development Haute Vallée’) worth $US29,500,000.  
57 
 
chosen variety of oxen turned out to be too weak, the soil heavier than expected, and the 
amount of water provided by the Koba River only about half that initially calculated.  
As put by Simpson (1999:129): ‘after stinging critiques of the project’s early 
performance [...], the project was extended and amended several times before it reached 
USAID’s ten-year statute of limitation on project funding [...].’ More particularly, one 
of the evaluations commissioned by USAID referred to the project component of the 
Bancoumana irrigated rice polder as a ‘complete failure’ (Bloch 1986:128). The report 
argues that, 
Dispossessing [the farmers] means changing the social structure of the village and 
region in ways that are obvious to everyone but project planners, it seems. The 
Bancoumana polder in Mali, to be rehabilitated by USAID, has failed for this reason, 
but also for a more subtle one: the village leaders apparently fear that, if the first 
perimeter succeeds, the government will come back and take more land, and distribute 
it to outsiders (Bloch 1986:13). 
The ‘fear’ that land would be distributed to outsiders was rightly pointed out by the 
report: we shall see later in the thesis (Chapter Four) that the control of – and the 
capacity to give access to – land is a crucial aspect of the exercise of authority in 
Bancoumana, one mattering in important ways for the capacity to mediate political 
relations, that is for the constitution of ‘political person’ (see also Chapter Seven). Since 
the ‘failure’ of USAID’s plans in the mid-1980s, the more than 2,000 hectares suitable 
for rice cultivation in Bancoumana have not been the object of ambitious efforts of 
development, except for a few relatively small-scale projects for the cultivation of 
bananas and sugar cane. 
As a result of these events, the state of the rice plain deteriorated even further, to the 
point that rice cultivation is today possible only on scattered areas and under 
increasingly uncontrolled conditions due to the progressive deterioration of the 
infrastructure. In such conditions only low-yield varieties of rice can be grown, 
producing an average of 0.8 tonnes per hectare as opposed to the three tonnes envisaged 
by the USAID development. Moreover, as a consequence of the uneven terrain and its 
extraordinary deterioration, cultivation can be conducted only on a small-scale (one-two 
hectares). This picture explains overall why most of the rice produced in Bancoumana is 
consumed locally, lasting in the granaries of a normal household for no more than a few 
months, while only negligible amounts can be marketed. 
58 
 
The deterioration of infrastructure paralleled the diminishing control of the state over 
agricultural production and commercialization. As the conclusion of this chapter will 
suggest, this can be interpreted as a somehow necessary and hence conscious 
disengagement of the state from national agricultural policy. What is clear, though, is 
that such state disengagement is consistent with the new role Mali tends to play in the 
global economic system: as a supplier of migrant labour, rather than agricultural 
produce, and as a consumer – not a producer – of food supplied from elsewhere at more 
competitive prices.  
The picture emerging is complex, but suggests that the development of Bancoumana’s 
rice-plain reflects broader changes in the relation between the changing form of the state 
(colonial, Malian and developmental) in relation to Bancoumana. This requires framing 
my story in a broader historical perspective.  
Rice production in historical perspective and the ‘framing’ of agriculture by the state  
After the Second World War (WWII), the laying out of agricultural land for rice 
production along the Niger River became an increasingly important concern for colonial 
administrators of the French Sudan (now Mali). Following instructions from Paris, 
colonial administrators wanted to increase crop exports from French Sudan to other 
regions of the Empire, in particular to neighbouring colonies on the West African 
shores, which in turn specialized in the production of crops for export to the metropolis. 
The Encyclopédie Coloniale et Maritime provides an example of such plans. In the 
section on agricultural hydraulics in French Sudan, we read, 
Over the past few years, a particular effort has been made, in [French] Sudan, in order 
to increase rice production up to a scale which can not only satisfy, jointly with 
sorghum and millet, the needs of local consumption, but that can also sustain a flow of 
exports toward neighbouring territories; Senegal mainly, but also Guinea and Ivory 
Coast have oriented their agricultural production toward produce destined to the 
Metropolis: peanuts, bananas, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, etc., or toward supply of local 
industry (Guernier 1949:338).19 
                                                 
19 My emphasis and translation. 
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A decade later, a report by the ‘general inspector of agriculture’ working for the French 
government interpreted in the same vein the colonial policy aimed at transforming 
French Sudan into a granary for the colonies on the shores, 
At the moment when the development of urban centres and the partial abandonment of 
subsistence agriculture by producers of peanuts in Senegal, coffee and cocoa in Ivory 
Coast, motivated a considerable increase of imports of foreign rice [...] it came naturally 
to the mind the project of substituting these imports with local production, making, in 
this way, the somnolent economy of [French] Sudan to participate in the expansion of 
the shore areas (Guillaume 1960b:54).20 
The objective to increase rice production in the French Sudan was explicitly set by the 
metropolitan government in the administration of the French colonial empire, becoming 
an important priority in the aftermath of WWII. Various models of agricultural 
development were available, differing with regard to the amount of investments in 
infrastructure and to the time during which results were to be produced.  
By WWII, the expensive and lengthy model of agricultural development exemplified by 
the Office du Niger had already been implemented for more than a decade and was 
judged to be not cost-effective by the French metropolitan government. This large scale 
development was established in the 1930s in the central Niger delta, where the 
agronomist Emile Bélime had envisaged developing a fully irrigated surface of nearly 
2,000,000 hectares for the production of cotton, in order to supply the French textile 
industry. Such a project would have involved a population of some 1,500,000 people, 
over three times the population of the inland delta, or more than 30 percent of the entire 
population of Mali at the time (Filipovich 2001:241). Finally, less than one tenth of the 
land envisaged by the project was actually developed (90,000 hectares), involving 
nevertheless the construction of two large dams, at the price of thousands of lives of 
forced labourers displaced from Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) and the equally forced 
resettlement of some 30,000 farmers (Filipovich 2001:239). As mentioned in Chapter 
One (page 15), at present, a private company formed by investors and the governments 
of Mali and Libya is in the process of realising another tenth of this colonial project 
(100,000 hectares) with no other publically agreed intent than ‘producing rice’ as part of 
the demagogical campaign of the Malian government ‘Opération riz.’ This leaves open 
                                                 
20 My emphasis and translation. 
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the possibility of exporting the entire harvest – when high global prices make it 
profitable.  
To return to the colonial era, perhaps as a consequence of the change of policy by the 
French government with regard to this grandiose project (in government 
correspondence, failure was acknowledged by the mid-1940s), colonial policies for 
agricultural development turned towards a different kind of intervention, centred on 
adapting farmers’ knowledge and techniques to small-scale, cost-effective 
developments. This approach was championed by the agronomist Pierre Viguier – a 
fierce opponent of the project of the Office du Niger – gaining full financial and 
administrative support after WWII (Van Beusekom 2000:93). Viguier’s model informed 
the 27 small-scale developments (aménagements) realized between 1944 and 1959 in 
the Upper Niger Valley, where approximately 25,000 hectares were developed for rice 
production, including Bancoumana’s rice plain (Guillaume 1960b:56).  
The influence of the views propounded by Viguier on the agricultural developments 
along the Niger River is acknowledged by the French inspector mentioned above (page 
59) – and later the Ministry of Agriculture – in the following way: 
Viguier’s book [La Riziculture Indigène au Soudan Français, 1939] outlined an overall 
conception of agricultural developments along the river, envisaging infrastructure 
proportionate to the hydraulic regimes and to the rainfall of the different sectors of the 
Valley. The program envisaged [by the book] is still at the heart of the development 
works realized in the former territories of Guinea, Sudan [nowadays Mali] and Niger 
since 1945 (Guillaume 1960b:55). 
The rice plain of Bancoumana, settled between 1944 and 1949, was one of such 
agricultural developments in the Upper Niger Valley. Operations consisted of laying out 
submersible land suitable for rice production, through the relatively simple 
infrastructure described above: a long embankment containing the flood from the Niger 
southbound and a floodgate allowing controlled submersion of the plain (see page 53). 
Thanks to this infrastructure, the plain was submerged in a more controlled way by 
sending water into the canal through a floodgate located on the affluent Koba river. 
Unlike irrigation, partial flood control did not necessitate the squaring and levelling of 
land, and consequently the creation of plots to be allotted to the farmers. 
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According to Viguier’s views as outlined above, however, the development of 
agriculture should not have relied on expensive agricultural infrastructure, but rather on 
farmers’ training and organization (encadrement). This training was aimed at profiting 
from the use of lands submerged under the new, controlled circumstances. For example, 
farmers were advised about the appropriate rice varieties for each differently submerged 
part of the plain; they had to be trained in the use of both ox plough and fertilizers that, 
in turn, gained ground through subsidized credit schemes. Shortly after these 
developments, they will be trained to grow onions and other complementary cash-crops 
during the dry season. 
Such an insistence on dry season farming is still remembered today, when people call 
‘Lafari’ – with tongue in cheek – a particular quality of white onion after the nickname 
of a Frenchman (presumably a BDPA agronomist), who allegedly spent a decade in the 
village attempting to make people grow this particular variety. One vivid memory of 
this man among my informants is the way he had of teasing the elderly during the dry 
season, when they were spending most of the day chatting while sitting on the 
traditional high benches (gala) in the shade of a tree: by miming the gesture of sawing 
the leg of the bench, Lafari invited them to employ the dry season instead for farming 
onions. Looking at present day Bancoumana, his invitation seems to have been largely 
accepted, although by a much younger generation and despite the fact that the white 
onion bearing his name is not the most cultivated variety. 
As shown above (page 45), the growing of dry season cash-crops and particularly onion 
constitutes an important legacy of the projects of re-developing the rice plain in 
Bancoumana. Considered the particular efforts put by the state (French colonial and 
then Malian) in the ‘framing’ of agricultural production in the region, the pedagogical 
function performed by people like Lafari appears as an element of crucial importance, 
one balancing the technical failures and the hardship of developing or rehabilitating 
agricultural infrastructure. Things such as agronomic literacy, training in the use of the 
ox-plough, and growing cash crops were deeply embedded in the infrastructure of 
Bancoumana’s rice plain and yet have survived its decline. They represent the most 
enduring legacy of the ‘development’ of agricultural production in the Upper Niger 
Valley.  
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The emphasis on the development of agriculture continued as a major concern of newly 
independent Mali, although with the objective of controlling the domestic agricultural 
economy (as the state’s domestic production) rather than marketing its surpluses, as in 
French colonial West Africa. In 1958, the agronomist Viguier was appointed director of 
the Malian Institute for Rural Economy (Institut d’Economie Rurale, still the most 
important institute for agronomic research in Mali). Although he had to leave office and 
returned to France four years later because of diverging opinions with one part of the 
Malian political establishment, his ideas remained widely influential, as testified by the 
fame of another of his books – West Africa seen by a farmer (1960) – which for a long 
time was distributed by the Malian government to all local state representatives (Van 
Beusekom 2000:93). His model of agricultural development, although more indirect and 
decentralized than others, has nonetheless provided the state with effective means of 
controlling agricultural production, hence the means to impact on local production and 
its social organization in places like Bancoumana. A crucial part of the effectiveness of 
such control, however, was due to the French grip over the market of cash crops, rather 
than to the model in itself. 
Under French rule, rice plain development in Bancoumana avoided the question of land 
ownership and distribution of the fields was never attempted.21 On a larger scale, the 
colonial power controlled agricultural production through the market of cash crops and 
did not need to engage the question of land tenure. This was both an indirect way of 
ruling farmers – perhaps anticipating later models of decentralized governance – and a 
realistic attitude toward the ‘development’ of land for agriculture or other purposes. In 
the case of the rice plain in Bancoumana, French colonial administrators seemed to rely 
entirely on the locally established system of land tenure, demonstrating a greater 
awareness of the centrality of such issue than subsequent developers such as USAID 
(see page 57 above). 
At the time of its original development, Bancoumana’s rice plain reflected the dominant 
French policy on agriculture, centred on small-scale, cost-effective interventions and 
                                                 
21 If this is generally true, one of the members of the Guillame hydro-agricultural enquiry in the Upper 
Niger Valley refers, in his report, to a number of difficulties in attributing developed land for rice 
cultivation for the villages of Banancoro and Kangaba (Millot 1959:23). 
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relying on farmers’ knowledge, locally available technology and established rules of 
land tenure. Land was not reallocated on the basis of any principle aiming at increasing 
production or agronomic efficiency. Such an indirect way of controlling the local 
agriculture was perhaps made possible by the fact that the colonial state was controlling 
agricultural produce on a higher level, through incentives and regulations of the cash 
crops market in West Africa and in the other territories of the French Empire (Cissé and 
Jacquemot 1981:28-31), and, more directly, by owning shares of the largest companies 
marketing colonial produce (Maisons de Commerce). The hypothesis is confirmed by 
the fact that this indirect ruling attitude started to collapse right after independence. 
Mali’s first independent government attempted to keep a degree of control of 
agricultural production and to make use of the available agricultural infrastructure and 
developments of colonial origin in order to reinforce the economy of the country; but, as 
in the rest of Africa, the constraints of economic dependence created by colonialism 
proved hard to overcome and the government of Modibo Keita collapsed as noted above 
(page 54). 
As part of the new agenda of controlling domestic agricultural production for building 
the state and an independent economy, in 1960, the government commissioned a demo-
anthropological survey of the Upper Niger Valley (Leynaud 1962; Cissé and Leynaud 
1978) addressing the issues of mobilization of labour and agricultural production in 
general, with the aim of figuring out how a selected number of village-level ‘traditional’ 
institutions (of the kind analysed in Chapters Three and Five of this thesis) could be 
turned into elements of a socialist mode of production. In Bancoumana, Keita’s 
government also nationalized 150 newly developed hectares north of the main road (see 
Figure 1). Collective work on the land expropriated by the government is still 
remembered. Farming was organized through cooperatives established on a village level 
(Groupements Rurales de Secours Mutuel et de Production) and integrated in the ruling 
party structure (the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, RDA). Produce was stocked 
in storage buildings on the market square. In Bancoumana, the first consequence of 
Modibo Keita’s violent overthrow in 1968 was the de facto restoration of farmers’ 
rights on the state-owned part of the rice plain, which in fact subsequent governments 
could never claim back. 
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In 1972 a para-statal agency for rural development was launched by Moussa Traore’s 
government with the support of USAID. It was part of the new regime’s politics of 
agricultural development centred on the number of Operations de Développement 
Rurale (ODR): the semi-autonomous, para-statal and foreign-financed agricultural 
development structures introduced above.22 The main characteristic of ODR, as seen in 
the case of the Operation Haute Vallée (OHV), was their capacity to receive funds from 
foreign financial institutions such as the Fonds Européen de Développement (FED) and 
the USAID. In 1970-73, 86.7 percent of Mali’s budget for agriculture was funded by 
foreign donors and mainly channelled to the ODRs (Cissé and Jacquemot 1981:34). 
Another aspect of ODRs was that they were conceived of as enabling the development 
of cash crops for export, buying yield surplus from farmers and generating revenue for 
the state and ODRs.  
ODRs were initially concentrated on the development of single crops (tobacco at the 
OHV), but then started to promote ‘integrated development,’ i.e. development based on 
agriculture, both for local consumption and for cash, but in the context of a wide variety 
of interventions such as constructing and maintaining roads, increasing agronomic 
literacy, running heath programs and the like (Cissé and Jacquemot 1981:111). 
According to Simpson, ‘in 1978, the USAID assumed financing for development 
activities in the OHV, and over the next 20 years would invest nearly $US50,000,000 in 
helping to expand the portfolio of services offered to rural households within the OHV 
zone’ (Simpson 1999:66; see also note 18).  
Developing reproductive land: the village plotting project 
The revolt surrounding plans for developing Bancoumana’s rice plain has not been the 
only one in the recent history of the village. In the early 2000s, another rebellion took 
place, this time against the project of ‘squaring’ the village and plotting habitable 
                                                 
22 The ODR were established by Ordonnance 24 mars 1974. Most important ODR includes: the Office du 
Niger (transformed in ODR after its establishment in colonial times), the Office des produits agricoles du 
Mali (OPAM), la Compagnie Malienne des Textiles (CMDT) and the Office de la Haute Vallée du Niger 
(OHVN). By the 1980s, about 30 ODRs were in place. See Cissé and Jaquemot (1981:36, 111). On 
ODRs, with specific reference to OHVN, see also Koenig et al. (1998:90-98) and Simpson (1999:65-79, 
129-31). 
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spaces. This happened during the first term of office of the newly established 
municipality (1999-2004) and coincided with a broader shift in the agenda of the Malian 
state in ‘developing’ its territory. If, in the post-independence political order, land 
development was used by the state as a means to gain control of the domestic 
agricultural production, and hence targeted farming land such as Bancoumana’s rice 
plain, in the more contemporary ‘neo-colonial’ setting attributing to African countries 
the role of suppliers of migrant workforce, land development started to be directed 
against inhabitable land, as a means for the state to control the conditions of the 
reproduction of a growing migrant population. 
As I was told, in the early 2000s, one faction of the village – which I later identified as 
headed by the people of Soridiana, one of the three lineages in Bancoumana – rose up 
violently against this particular development of village land, destroying documents, 
plans and drawings, and chasing away the topographers and the technicians, who by that 
time had already spent three months working in the locality. In contrast to the uprising 
over the rice plain, this time no one was imprisoned, although one part of the 
population, mobilized by the Soridiana lineage, violently confronted two other lineages, 
the Kolonwulena and Farana and the municipal staff.  
As the main institution around which the land-plotting procedure was centred, the 
municipality was supported by one faction of the village (Kolonwulena and Farana) 
against the other (Soridiana): while Mayor Adama Camara could end his mandate – 
indeed he would be elected in this office for a second time in 2009 – the secretary 
general of the municipality had to leave the village shortly after the disorders, feeling 
unsafe in Bancoumana. In 2004, after the election of Mayor Issa Traore – who was in 
office during my fieldwork – a sharp disagreement between the same two camps 
persisted, although in inverted form, Soridiana supporting the municipality (and the new 
Mayor Traore) and the two other lineages opposing it.  
The rest of this chapter will recount the unsuccessful attempt to plot inhabitable land in 
Bancoumana; first by introducing the plotting procedure and its legal-bureaucratic 
framework, and then by describing what actually happened in the village when plans 
had to be implemented and land ‘squared’ into plots. The analysis will emphasize the 
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role played by urban and transnational migrants in financing the operation as well as the 
attempts by other groups to influence the outcomes of the procedure. 
The legal and bureaucratic framework 
The plotting of village land – locally referred to as lotissement – is a procedure of 
‘municipal land subdivision’ envisaged by state law. It is defined as ‘the voluntary 
creation of a grid plan [tissu parcellaire], consisting of dividing a territory into several 
plots [parcelles] for use as habitation, gardens, offices, social and cultural buildings, or 
industrial or commercial establishments.’23 The shape of the plots is not specified by the 
law, but the requirement of comprising urban infrastructure like roads and the sewage 
system (explained below) is interpreted by the planners as a preference for square plots 
aggregated into bigger square blocks delimited by intersecting roads. 
The plotting procedure as attempted in Bancoumana serves two ends. On the one hand, 
it is a means of urban transformation and planning, by which a space such as that of a 
village or a neighbourhood is reshaped into regular series of blocks intersected by roads. 
This confers what is locally considered an urban look. On the other hand, plotting works 
as a procedure of collective land entitlement, whereby the land occupied by each 
compound is registered in the name of individuals in ‘formal’ land titles issued by the 
state. In fact, Malian law does not recognize property rights in the absence of such a 
procedure. Any lands not registered in the cadastre (immatriculées) are legally owned 
by the state. This principle, deriving from French law, is known as principe de 
domanialité.  
As will be explained in greater detail in Chapter Four, it is possible for an individual 
holding a land title in ‘traditional law’ to seek a formal entitlement issued by the state 
(titre foncier), but the required judicial and administrative procedure is very costly and, 
in any case, limited to one person at time. Plotting constitutes a kind of collective 
alternative to this individual procedure of entitlement, allowing the state, while 
                                                 
23 Décret N° 184 PGRM du 26 juin 1985, article 1. This law details the procedure foreseen by loi N° 82-
122/ANRM du 4 février 1982 concerning ‘les principes fondamentaux relatifs aux conditions d’attribution 
des terres du domaine privé de l’Etat’; and loi N° 85-83/ANRM du 22 juin 1985 concerning ‘l’institution 
des servitudes administratives en matière d’urbanisme.’ See Djiré (2007). 
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recognizing the prerogatives of existing traditional owners, to register large blocks of 
land (in the land registry) by one single procedure – ‘purging’ traditional law, in Malian 
legal jargon. Plot holders may later turn to the land registry and more easily obtain a 
formal entitlement, notably by avoiding the long and very uncertain phase of the 
contradictory enquiry (enquête commodo et incommodo, see Chapter Four).  
Because of the ineffective nature of the principle of state ownership of all unregistered 
land, which is far from representing the reality in most parts of rural Mali, the procedure 
of plotting works through an equally fictive mechanism, in which the state pretends to 
transfer land to the municipality which, in turn, proceeds to subdivide it into plots to be 
allocated to the inhabitants. In practice, however, things proceed in exactly the opposite 
way. Under the supervision of the municipality, the inhabitants of a locality agree on the 
sub-division of the land (which is already under their control) into plots. This normally 
happens by setting up a committee including ‘traditional land owners’ and village 
authorities like the village council, similar to what we have seen with the allocation of 
paddies on the rice plain. 
From an abstract procedural point of view, it is imagined that all land has owners, albeit 
in ‘traditional law,’ and that one main task of the committee is to translate their 
prerogatives into the field of state law – or at least into a language of individual rights 
compatible with subsequent recognition by state law. Such an assumption fails to 
understand the way headmen in Bancoumana control, but do not ‘own,’ large amounts 
of land: by virtue of their position in lineage structures, in the capacity of administrators 
more than owners (Gluckman 1965:75ff). It also fails to understand the way land is 
accessed and distributed to both groups and individuals mainly by recurring to an idiom 
of dependency, hence by articulating property relations around inclusion rather than 
around exclusion as in ‘modern’ western law, where property is defined as the right to 
exclude others (ius excludendi alios; Okoth-Ogendo 1989:10). It should not be 
surprising, then, that committees of the kind put in place by plotting procedures end up 
functioning more as sites of ‘invention’ than of recognition, of individual prerogatives 
on the land; and that they end up allocating and redistributing the land according to 
local power relations involving lineage structures, notabilities and other stake holders. 
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With the help of topographers, the land is measured and plans are drawn for each plot 
and for the whole territory sub-divided in this way. The municipality then submits a 
formal request to the Ministry of Territorial Administration (Ministère de 
l’Administration Territoriale), which, after further bureaucratic processes involving the 
Ministry of Urbanization, approves the plan by issuing a certificate. In this way, the 
legal fiction of the land’s transference from the state to the individual plot owners is 
made real. For localities of the size of Bancoumana (above 5,000 inhabitants), the plan 
must also include the presence of urban infrastructure such as roads, electricity, tap 
water and a sewage system, without which approval will not be granted. Therefore, the 
outcome of the plotting procedure is not only the issuing of a series of certificates by the 
Ministry attesting urban status of the settlement (for example, the certificat d’état de 
réalisation des travaux de viabilisation), but also the fact that land will be legally 
registered and customary law will be considered ‘purged’ in the sense explained above. 
The connection necessitated by the law between urbanization and formal registration of 
entitlements can turn the plotting of populous villages like Bancoumana into a much-
contested process.  
The initial stages of plotting in practice  
Sometime early in the term of the first Bancoumana Mayor Adama Camara (1999-
2004), moves were made to launch a procedure of plotting all inhabitable land in 
Bancoumana. The initiative apparently received general support, also considering that in 
the years immediately following 1999 – when municipalities were finally established 
through decentralization-oriented reform – there were high expectations and a certain 
enthusiasm for the role that these local institutions would play in similar procedures 
involving state administration. In the wake of the creation of locally elected municipal 
authorities, there were hopes of transforming the village into an urban space: one 
supplying a settlement of more than 8,000 residents like Bancoumana with modern 
infrastructure such as a sewage system, drinkable water and electricity. Because of the 
connection between urbanization and plotting outlined in the previous section, similar 
facilities are commonly expected outcomes of plotting procedures and may explain 
initial popular support. Difficulties arise, however, when it comes to putting the 
procedure into practice. 
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Although plotting is an administrative procedure mainly carried out by state agencies – 
from the local municipality to the Ministry of Territorial Administration – the funding 
of the preliminary operations in Bancoumana, involving measurement and planning, 
was interestingly provided by both transnational and urban migrants, native to the 
village. The strongest supporters of the initiative were the migrants living in Paris and 
gathered in an association called Bancoumana Jigui, literally ‘the treasure’ (or wallet) 
of Bancoumana.24 In 2002, the 36 members of this association offered Mayor Camara a 
trip to France to arrange their financial support for the preliminary operations of 
plotting. According to the president of the association (Chaka Camara) migrants gave 
Mayor Camara 9,000,000 CFA Francs (£12,330) collected between them, in part as an 
advance toward the acquisition of 42 plots – each worth 140,000 CFA Francs – and in 
part as loan towards expenses for starting the administrative procedure of lotissement.  
Adopting a practice already observed in other plotting projects in rural municipalities in 
Mali (e.g. Djiré 2007), the Mayor had solved the problem of funding the preliminary 
phase of a plotting project. He had done so by establishing a system of ‘reservations’ of 
land plots that, should the procedure succeed, he would have some power to distribute 
in the future.25 Of course, such a system of reservation is informal – and many of the 
practices involved are illegal when done by a public official like a Mayor – but this is 
the way many such procedures work in Mali and it was by no means hidden or 
contested by my informants, who instead all acknowledged and confirmed such support 
by private individuals (in this case transnational migrants) for the village plotting.  
More funds were expected from – and some must indeed have been provided by – urban 
migrants, in particular by those settled in Bamako and gathered in the Association pour 
le Développement de Bancoumana (ADB). Among the people in this association figure 
some well-educated and well-connected cadres in Malian politics and administration, 
                                                 
24 The members of this association are also part of a larger one, gathering migrants from the Mande area 
to the Paris (Ile de France) and numbering more than 400 people. In late April 2008, responding to my 
request to know more about the association, Bancoumana Jigui’s president, Chaka Camara, invited me to 
interview him in his two-storey house in Bamako (one of the three he built in the capital). The numbers 
given in the text concerning migrants’ involvement in the plotting procedure were collected on this 
occasion. 
25 Similar unofficial practices put in place by the Mayor will be addressed in Chapter Six with regard to 
the system of fictitious money orders and anticipated withdrawal of money that the municipality is 
entitled to by the central administration.  
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such as a prominent member of the second biggest national party (Modibo Camara, 
member of the Union pour la République et la Démocratie) and a high-ranking official 
at the Commission for Institutional Development attached to the Prime Ministry (Kalifa 
Diakité), who also serves as president of the migrants’ association.  
Perhaps because their connections with the central administration would have played a 
crucial role in the later stages of the plotting process, the price for the reservation of one 
housing land plot by urban migrants was lower: it was set by the Mayor – with the 
agreement of the committee which was introduced later – at 100,000 CFA Francs. Plots 
should have been located in a different part of the village from those reserved by 
transnational migrants, albeit in an equally new settlement area to be laid out along the 
main roads, where housing space would have been further expanded. The municipality 
secretary general Tounkara (see Chapter Six) set up a waiting list for the reservation of 
such plots.  
Urban migrants did not lend to the Mayor (nor were they requested to do so) an 
additional sum of money as transnational migrants did: both their position as wealthy 
and influent people in the village, and their connections with the central state 
administration in Bamako were valuable assets that could be traded in the system of 
reservation and advance payments set up by the Mayor. On the one hand, some of these 
people were key for building consensus in the village in support of the plotting (among 
them is Modibo Camara, mentioned above). On the other hand, the technicians required 
for drawing the first tentative plans and the initial measurements were found through 
urban migrants’ connections and, according to the president of the association Diakité, 
they accepted the exceptionally low offer of 16,000,000 CFA Francs to conduct the 
topographic study, whereas the bids of competitors ranged from three to four times such 
amount. By mobilizing their influence and connections, together with some money, 
urban migrants were able to reserve tens of plots in the system of reservations put in 
place by the Mayor, in addition to the 42 reserved by transnational migrants. 
In 2003, a group of topographers and other technicians spent three months working in 
Bancoumana: paid, lodged and fed at the expense of the municipality, using migrants’ 
money. Some informants also reported that it was likely that money from the starting 
endowment granted by the state to the municipality (dotation de décentralisation) had 
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been misappropriated by the Mayor and used for the preparatory phase of plotting 
together with the money received from the migrants. This seems plausible considering 
that, by the end of the term of the first Bancoumana Mayor in 2004 (only 5 years later 
the creation of the municipality), the budget was in a negative balance of 5,000,000 
CFA Francs. 
The phase following the topographical study should have seen the fulfilment of the 
project. The plotting of Bancoumana ended at this early stage, as will be explained 
below. But it was intended that precisely this preliminary phase was crucial for building 
a consensus at the lowest level, mainly because the following stages would have 
required such a large amount of money – for example to cover the construction of roads 
and of the sewage system – that public funds would be necessary (including those of 
international ‘donor’ agencies).26 Should the plan be submitted and approved by the 
Ministry, the grip of most of the local actors would at this later stage diminish 
significantly. 
The reason why the leading role of the municipality in the process was accepted by 
Bancoumana headmen lay in sheer pragmatism. Similar to what we will see in Chapter 
Six concerning taxation, the administrative nature of the procedure, which involves the 
state bureaucracy and local state representatives (such as the Sub-Prefect and the 
Prefect) from very early stages, made such pragmatism necessary. The involvement of 
migrants in both funding the preliminary phase and conducting the topographic study 
was a pragmatic necessity, considering the insufficient funds that a village such as 
Bancoumana would be able to collect for funding a topographic study required for 
bureaucratic purposes. In the course of the preliminary phase, however, the involvement 
of actors such as the representatives of the three lineages and village notables 
designated as ‘land owners in traditional law’ (actors not recognized by state law, for 
lack of a better translation) has been crucial. As anticipated above (page 67), a 
committee was set up, representing these figures and confronting municipal officials 
and representatives of the local state agencies and services (the so-called services 
techniques).  
                                                 
26 For a detailed example in the case of the plotting of Sanankoroba, a village in the peri-urban area of 
Bamako (approximately 25 km from the Capital), see Djiré (2007). 
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The committee was presided over by the head of my host compound, Nanamori Camara 
(see Chapter Three), one of the oldest and most respected members of the Soridiana 
lineage (at the time, Nanamori was the third man in order of seniority within Soridiana). 
The most immediate task of the committee was to advise topographers on the mapping 
of the allotment, notably on the shaping of compounds into blocks. The committee had 
to decide which compounds would be affected by such operations and how they would 
have to be compensated. The existing passages and little streets dividing one compound 
from the other and connecting different areas of the village were to be laid out in a grid 
plan and the series of new perpendicular streets, partly deriving from the existing paths, 
were meant to crisscross the three roads intersecting in the village – the main road 
Bamako-Siguiri (Guinea) and two secondary roads towards Sibi and Niamé (see the 
map on page 131).  
Another main task of the committee was to compensate those whose compounds would 
be affected by the operation with new land plots in a different part of the village. A 
resettlement area (zone de recasement) was foreseen at the northern edge of the village, 
along the road towards Sibi. According to all my informants, however, the committee 
members went beyond that principle of compensation, by establishing that, more 
generally, each married man residing in Bancoumana had a right (without charge) to 
one plot of land, 20x25 m in size, regardless of the number of his wives. Although I 
have not been able to check this information, it is plausible that the ‘married men’ to 
whom my informants were referring were indeed the chefs de famille as defined in 
Chapter Six, i.e. those married men paying the head tax for their dependents (these are 
on average twice as numerous as Bancoumana’s compounds, see page 191).  
Because in the normal settlement pattern several nuclear families share the same 
compound (see Chapter Three), the committee established that each compound should 
be measured and the measurement divided according to the number of chefs de famille: 
if it resulted that the compound had less than 500 m2 (20x25 m) per chef de famille, a 
proportionate extension of land ought to be allocated in the resettlement area. If a 
compound was reshaped in laying out the block, then the land would be reallocated to 
the family in the resettlement area on the same general principle. The secretary general 
of the municipality and one municipal councillor were in charge of revising data from 
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the last national census, dating back several years (see Chapter Six), to establish the 
exact number of compounds (cours) and chefs de famille (each defining a ménage in 
Malian census nomenclature).  
Apart from the resettlement area, two other new village areas were planned. The first 
was a cité des ressortissants (migrants’ quarter). The Mayor wanted a special area on 
the fastest expanding edge of the village – towards east, where the municipality building 
is also situated – to be reserved for plots that the international migrants financing the 
entire operation had bought in advance. Within such area, a ‘commercial zone’ was also 
envisaged but not further detailed.27 Finally, a series of plots in a third area were to be 
allocated by the municipality following the waiting list mentioned above, which 
included many Bamako migrants. As we have seen, the price of 100,000 CFA Francs to 
be given in advance for each of the land plots in this area would have contributed to 
financing the entire operation. 
Three months after the commencement of the work of the topographers, drawing plans 
and demarcating the land for measurement as advised by the committee, one part of the 
committee, including its president Nanamori, withdrew its support for the municipality 
and the whole project collapsed. A violent confrontation took place among different 
factions of ‘autochthonous’ people (see Chapter Four), pitting the Soridiana lineage 
against the other two. Markers were taken off, plans were destroyed and technicians 
driven away.  
Apart from being told of these actions, I was not able to learn further details. All my 
informants referred to this incident in terms of an uprising involving the destruction of 
documents and the clearing of markers from land. The silences my questions met with 
at different times with different informants clearly suggest that, as in the case of the 
‘revolt’ for the rice plain, this is a taboo subject. Most informants speak freely and from 
various angles, of what was envisaged by the project of plotting and, even more 
fluently, of their expectations and their views on the aesthetics of plotting the land. But 
                                                 
27 When asked about this point, the president of the Paris migrants’ association expressed a concern that 
such a plan might fuel envy between villagers and migrants. 
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any account of what happened when the project collapsed, and why, leads to an abrupt 
end of the discussion by reference to the popular uprising in the terms reported above.  
Silence about what happened – beyond the destruction of documents, markers and the 
driving away of technicians – may indicate the existence of serious divisions among 
autochthonous people who are still living today in the same community. Various 
hypotheses on why the Soridiana lineage suddenly withdrew its support could then be 
advanced, although most of them could not be discussed with the majority of my 
informants. Conversations that I progressively collected in the course of fieldwork 
pointed clearly at either a sudden or strategic change of attitudes of the Soridiana 
lineage as voiced by its headman ‘El Hadji’ Messere Camara.  
According to most people I spoke with, the withdrawal was simply a matter of personal 
vengeance of Messere against the Mayor Adama Camara for having unexpectedly 
betrayed his son (Oumar Camara) who was elected in the same party and should have 
become Mayor, according to an understanding between the two. Right after having been 
elected councillor, Adama resigned from the party and successfully ran for the office of 
Mayor as an independent candidate.28 
Other informants’ suggestions are less personal and direct, arguing that both Messere 
and his lineage had granted their support to plotting in return for the Mayor’s promise to 
endorse Messere’s claim to succeed as village chief, by changing the custom that 
reserves chieftaincy to the Farana lineage by a system of ‘taking turns’ among the most 
senior members of the three lineages (see also Chapter Four). Finally, a third version 
presents Soridiana’s withdrawal as caused by the disagreements of other lineages on all 
the claims and requests of compensation that Soridiana members advanced in the 
committee in charge of redistributing plotted land.  
What is missing in this picture – and which I will now turn to explore – is how the 
supporters of the project of squaring Bancoumana’s land into a grid plan, including 
urban and transnational migrants, viewed such scheme and how they reacted to its 
collapse. 
                                                 
28 In Malian municipal elections the Mayor is chosen among the councillors and by their vote. 
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The decentralized funding of the municipality and migrants’ agenda 
Recourse to migrants’ money, either from single individuals or from migrant 
associations, is a common way to finance many actions of ‘development’ in 
Bancoumana – called projets in local jargon. The migrant association in Bamako, for 
example, is regularly asked by the village council to pay the amount of money that the 
village is in turn asked for by NGOs or ‘donor’ agencies offering to bring a project to 
the village. Such consideration is presented by most NGOs as a necessary sign of 
participation of the local population; it usually consists of ten percent of the total 
budget, but amounts vary depending on the investment and can be also paid in kind.  
In some cases, the village council manages to replace such monetary contribution by 
manual labour for the construction of a building and by the right to use some land, 
should the project need a place to be situated. In such instances, age groups (see Chapter 
Four) can be asked to construct the building or to provide workforce of some other kind 
(kari baara, see page 165). During my fieldwork, both a shea butter factory and a 
micro-credit bank were started by Malian NGOs operating in Bancoumana through such 
an arrangement. In other cases, however, the village council or the municipality simply 
requests migrant associations or individual migrants to provide the sum of money which 
the village is asked to raise among inhabitants as proof of their participation. This was, 
for example, the case for a project of water conveyance (started during my fieldwork, 
but never realized) and of the refurbishment of the health centre, to which I was told 
urban migrants contributed. 
In the context of limited public funds, rural municipalities such as Bancoumana – just 
like the Malian state on a larger scale – turn to migrants’ associations in order to fund 
many of their schemes or, as is increasingly the case, in order to attract development 
projects by flagging up the possibility of involving migrants in operations of ‘co-
development.’ In other words, the function of public institutions like the municipality of 
Bancoumana seems to have shifted towards the role of brokering between desired 
development projects and migrants’ associations supplying capital for said projects. The 
Mayor’s skills are valued accordingly, so that the best rewarded qualities are 
connectedness and capacity to attract donors, and the village migrants among them. It is 
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therefore not surprising that both Mayors elected so far in Bancoumana are 
entrepreneurs with a similar ability to connect the village to the outside. 
On the other hand, external ‘donor’ agencies, like the migrants mentioned earlier, have 
their own agenda and private interests, which clearly emerged in the village plotting 
affair. A decade after the advent of ‘democracy’ (with the overthrow of President Traore 
in 1991), elective municipalities were created by the decentralization reform, in 1999, 
and became progressively involved in land matters. Despite the fact that the central state 
did not intend to transfer power in this domain to the newly established municipalities 
(it retained, for example, the principle of domanialité mentioned on page 66 above) 
Bancoumana migrants and many others knew that the biggest opportunity to acquire 
land had just presented itself. The mix of money, influence on the locality and 
connections to the central administration of the state, which these people possessed in 
variable proportions, would clearly impact on the way land could have been acquired 
and redistributed by a plotting procedure. 
Like any other group of people involved in the plotting project, migrants had their own 
views on what the goals of that process were and how they could profit from it. When 
sharing with me his views on the plotting affair, Chaka Camara (the President of the 
Bancoumana migrants to France) first emphasized the infrastructural advantages of the 
project, but then turned to an interesting discussion of the social consequences – 
positive in his view – of such a reorganization of the habitable space. Overall, I was 
struck by the squared aesthetics that Camara like many others seemed to attach to 
plotting; in his particular case, however, I was more surprised to learn that the square 
aesthetics was valued because it was thought to create new – in his view, more desirable 
– models of sociality. 
In Camara’s view, a primary aim of a successful plotting procedure would be to enable 
further infrastructural developments beyond blocks and intersecting roads. He 
mentioned the examples of public lighting, which would likely accompany electricity 
supply for private use. He also mentioned the sewage system, which would likely 
accompany a system of potable water supply. Both – he said – would be possible in the 
village provided that the territory had been squared into a regular series of blocks 
divided by intersecting roads, able to be used by vehicular traffic, in an urban style. He 
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pointed out that opportunities for attracting donors willing to fund ‘developments’ in the 
village had been already missed because plotting had not been realized. Camara 
suggested that a squared ‘urban look,’ combined with the remarkable size of the 
Bancoumana population, would increase the chances of drawing donors’ attention to the 
necessity and urgency of these and other infrastructural developments.  
Having addressed the idea of plotting the village space in order to bring modern 
facilities and infrastructure (a recurrent belief among my informants), Chaka shifted to 
his next concern: 
It is mostly a question of having a nice house. Otherwise you cannot even bring in a 
friend. If you come to the village for a weekend you may want to bring a mate and 
relax, but there is neither a nice room where he can sleep nor a quiet place where you 
can rest. 
His vision of a ‘nice’ and ‘quiet’ house evokes, not simply square aesthetics, but 
separation from the noisy sociability of most Bancoumana’s compounds (of the kind 
described in Chapter Three).  
Having spent more than three decades in Paris as a car-factory worker, Chaka is now 
retired. Together with his wife and four children, he divides his time mainly between 
Paris and Bamako, where he owns three houses, in part used by his siblings, and in part 
rented out. But he also comes regularly, usually on weekends, to Bancoumana where he 
was born and raised and where his extended family lives. His family compound is 
located in Bali, a hamlet a few kilometres east of the village (see Chapter Four). 
In Bancoumana, Chaka has a plot on the eastern edge of the village (the most recently 
constructed), which was entrusted to him more than two decades ago by Soridiana 
headman El Hadji Messere – in recognition of the offering of the customary ten kola 
nuts, as with any land seeker. On that land, Chaka has built a long house in concrete, 
consisting of six rooms in a row, which he leases to the group of doctors working for 
the malaria project hosted by Bancoumana’s heath centre (see page 38). An additional 
room is kept for Chaka’s usage, when he comes to the village. Chaka spends his nights 
in the family compound in Bali and the larger part of the day in Bancoumana, 
commuting in his car between his six-room house and his chatting places on the market 
square. As with many compounds in Bancoumana, the courtyard is enclosed by a low 
mud-wall.  
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In the same conversation, Chaka went on to compare his situation to that of Modibo 
Camara, the wealthy and successful urban migrant already mentioned as one of the 
members of the migrants’ association in Bamako (page 70). Modibo built a large 
independent house in concrete, not far from the one rented by Chaka on the eastern edge 
of the village. Chaka admired both the fact that Modibo was regularly visiting his 
family in Bancoumana like himself, and the fact that he had built such a beautiful 
independent house where he was able to spend the night in comfort.  
Modibo’s house consists of one apartment for his own use – a bedroom, a detached 
bathroom and a living room equipped with colour TV, very frequently used in his 
absence by an open group of siblings and friends – and two guest-rooms, where both the 
driver and the housekeeper (the nearby shop owner Maiga, see also page 37) sleep when 
Modibo is not present. The house is built on a spacious lot, including a garden farmed 
by the housekeeper, some young trees and a shaded chatting space under a hut, all 
enclosed by an unusually high concrete wall with two iron gates, one for the car and the 
other for pedestrians.  
Modibo comes quite regularly to Bancoumana at weekends. He arrives by car with his 
driver and spends the day between his family compound, in the central part of the 
village, and his modern house at the edge of the village, where he sleeps at night. He 
always circulates in his car which can be seen going back and forth several times during 
the day on the main village road.29 Most evenings, when Modibo returns after visits to 
his extended family compound, he finds people gathered in front of his house enjoying 
the food, tea and hospitality that he provides until late every weekend. One or two 
women are hired to cook rice with some meat (bought the same day at the market), tea 
is prepared by the gatekeeper Maiga and the driver, recorded music is played loudly in 
one corner of the courtyard by a group of youths hired by Modibo. Both the 
performance and the hi-fi system are powered by his petrol-propelled power generator – 
a luxury in Bancoumana, because of the cost of fuel. All this constitutes a very different 
kind of sociality from the one experienced in an extended family compound – no matter 
                                                 
29 Spending most part of the day moving around the village, driving around – often in a new, shiny 
vehicle, car or motorbike – is a habit common among the migrants I met in Bancoumana visiting or 
temporary returning to the village.  
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how many wealthy migrants may be part of it. Chaka might have been referring to this 
kind of sociality when comparing its situation to that – to be aspired to, in his view – of 
Modibo. 
Expectations of other citizens  
Lamine Tounkara served as municipality secretary general in Bancoumana from 1999 – 
when the municipality was instituted – until 2006. He was born in Kenyeroba, the 
nearby Keita village that is part of Bancoumana municipality, and lives today in nearby 
Kangaba serving as the district secretary general. In 2006, he had to leave Bancoumana 
as a consequence of both his bitter relationship with the new Mayor Traore, who was 
elected in 2004, and the feeling of being unsafe in Bancoumana, after the failure of the 
land plotting project and the consequent tensions created. In his opinion, the primary 
goal of plotting was to change the way housing land plots were increasingly marketed in 
recent times. As he explained to me, he did everything to convince the village elders 
that plotting was their chance to market the land ‘in good order,’ putting an end to land 
sales increasingly concluded in ‘secret, anarchic and illegal ways’ at times of financial 
shortages before yields (période de sodure).  
According to Tounkara, plotting would have increased the value of land, as a 
consequence of the fact of becoming accessible to people in Bamako and to 
transnational migrants; then, the need for cash that was driving people to sell the land 
for little money, at predictable times (of financial shortage) and often without informing 
their kin, could have been satisfied more effectively by the more public and secure way 
of marketing plotted land. 
Tounkara himself wanted to set an example by telling the elders that he himself would 
not have bought any land in Bancoumana until the plotting procedure concluded. He 
described to me how having served six years in a village without having been offered 
any land (by acquiring it for money) may sound very odd; it signifies, in his view and 
the view of his entourage, that a problem has occurred.  
At the time of the plotting, he informed the elder headmen of Bancoumana that the 
‘only’ reward for his involvement in such a delicate procedure – in which land is 
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redistributed with the necessary involvement of the municipality – would have been in 
four adjacent plots should the procedure reach its final stage. He then told me that he 
had planned, after the end of the project, to sell two plots in order to fund the 
construction of a building on the other two. Instead, after the failure of the project, 
Tounkara had been forced to move to Kangaba when he started to feel unsafe in 
Bancoumana.  
However, Tounkara made clear – to the elders at the time of the plotting and to me a 
few years later – that because everybody knew that he could have easily afforded to buy 
some land in the village, and that he would hardly be refused, given his position as 
public official, he meant to refuse explicitly the ‘illegal’ way of marketing land. By this 
attitude, he was aiming to promote the plotting project. Towards the end of the same 
conversation, however, he told me that, after the failure of the plotting project, he asked 
my host and village first councillor Makan Camara for some land, but he then had to 
leave the village to take up service in Kangaba at the district bureau. 
Conclusion 
The analysis conducted in this chapter has addressed two sets of developments of 
Bancoumana’s land, with a particular emphasis on the political and economic context in 
which they took place. A closer look to the implementation of such plans, including the 
unexpected consequences of their ‘failure’ in the case of the rice plain, revealed an 
ambivalent attitude of the village with regard to the ways some components are 
eventually resisted while others succeed: solidarity towards the exterior – either in 
receiving or rejecting development initiatives – is paralleled by internal fragmentation. 
In both cases, however, the inward-facing and the outward-facing side of the village 
cannot be neatly distinguished: indeed, crucial roles connecting the village to wider 
instances were played by people such as local project agents, state representatives, 
urban and transnational migrants. 
A major similarity between the two cases consisted in their having caused a great deal 
of conflict both among different factions in the village and against project staff. Conflict 
among different village factions was engendered by the prospected reallocation of land 
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by project agents, as well as by anxieties concerning its alienation to foreign people – a 
theme that we will see re-emerging in Chapter Four. The revolts that marked the decline 
of both developments, however, mainly targeted the bureaucracy of the projects, 
involving the destruction of plans and documents and physical confrontations which 
resulted in the expulsion of technicians. Both originated from people claiming to have 
been disadvantaged in prospected land distribution or to have been denied compensation 
for land allegedly belonging to them.  
Revolts also expressed the fear that bureaucrats would be ‘captured’ by distant interests: 
should the projects succeed, land would have been allocated in unfair and undesirable 
ways, because such people were part of moral and monetary economies different from 
the one largely based on subsistence-oriented agriculture. Tensions between different 
factions of the village were brought to the surface – and, to a certain degree, 
exacerbated – by both developments; especially in the case of the rice plain, however, 
antipathy was then redirected against project agents and the bureaucratic apparatus, and 
solidarity re-established between the initially warring factions. Such dynamics 
illustrates a ‘segmentary’ logic, by which tensions among village factions are 
constructed as an expression of complementary opposition, with the result of redirecting 
disagreement against a strategically defined group of ‘outsiders,’ while projecting 
solidarity among a community of ‘insiders,’ imagined along similar lines (see also 
Chapter Four).  
A major difference, I argue in turn, has been represented by a shift in the specific 
domain that the state (among other agencies) attempted to control through the 
government of land. The developments described in this chapter targeted different types 
of land: the first type being reserved for agricultural production, the second for 
habitation, hence related to the reproductive domain. In the two decades separating the 
relative events, the agenda of the Malian state shifted accordingly from an emphasis on 
controlling domestic production (agriculture) to the control of a an increasingly mobile 
population (migration). The latter includes efforts by the state and other ‘developers’ to 
channel migrants’ money towards the purchase of land and, more generally, to frame 
migrant people as ‘co-developers’ of their places of origin. Such a shift in the agenda of 
the state in governing land reflects the new functions that Mali acquired in a wider 
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political economy since the 1990s: the way the state relates to the ‘outside’ (i.e. its role 
in larger, more globalized economies) shifted from the supply of agricultural produce to 
that of migrant labour. 
So far, in rural Mali, the state has mostly had an indirect control of land. Both housing 
and agricultural land have never been directly taxed and this is still the case today (for 
all lands not registered in the cadastre). As we will see in greater detail in Chapter Six, 
taxes are paid per capita and on a variety of movable objects of property like ploughs, 
tractors, oxen, cows, donkeys, carts, bicycles, motorbikes, rifles and the like, but not on 
land. Moreover, with the establishment of municipalities in the late 1990s 
(decentralization), the state has also carefully avoided drawing official borders between 
the newly established municipalities. In fact, such an act would have resulted in endless 
disputes among villages and other polities, ultimately contesting the authority of the 
state over the land. If the difficulties in taxing land are related to the resistance against 
bureaucratic control, this does not imply that attempts to control land were not pursued 
by other means: the ‘development’ of agriculture and that of habitation. 
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Chapter Three 
The Messerejanna compound 
Introduction 
Descent is an important organisational principle of domestic life in Bancoumana. As in 
other parts of the world (Laslett and Wall 1972; Launay 1978; Hart 1982, 1985), and 
along with other aspects related to kinship and genealogy (lifecycle, seniority, gender 
and the like), the fact of integrating one or another group of descendants has important 
consequences on one’s position within the household, entailing different sets of 
constraints and opportunities in life. This chapter explores the domestic setting of the 
Messerejanna compound, the living quarters of my hosts in Bancoumana, with a focus 
on the way its inhabitants group for various purposes. I analyse the ways descent is 
employed as a device for mobilising the household workforce, organizing everyday 
activities and building cooperative relations. Moreover, the analysis identifies a tension 
– and a room for strategic manoeuvre – between maternal and paternal groups of 
patrilineal descendants. 
Crucial insights on grouping dynamics are firstly presented through the analysis of the 
main spaces and activities in the courtyard, focusing on the use and disposition of 
buildings, and on daily, ordinary practices related to the preparation and consumption of 
food. In contrast to what we have seen in the previous chapter, where the village space 
was imagined, in operations of land development, as organized in square plots, 
associated with concrete houses and simple family structures (exemplified by the 
restricted sociality of migrants like Chaka and Modibo), this chapter illustrates the 
existing and far more complex modes of organizing space and kinship relations in an 
actual compound in Bancoumana. 
In the Messerejanna compound, there are places for sharing food, for greeting each 
other, for husking cereal, for playing, chatting and working both inside and outside the 
courtyard. A detailed description of household spaces and the way they are used shows 
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that, beyond serving particular purposes, domestic spaces incorporate and reflect social 
relations (Moore 1986). A closer look at the organization of productive activities 
(farming, collecting wood, building houses, and the like) suggests that such ordinary 
practices are mainly conducted by family sub-groups organised on the principle of 
descent. Moreover, the often gendered nature of domestic places and their codified use 
express crucial distinctions among various members of the compound.  
By introducing the people of Messerejanna, the second part of the chapter illustrates 
important inequalities. There are differences between the various branches of the 
family, as well as between individuals positioned differently, in accessing opportunities. 
Descent, however, does not univocally determine position, nor the groups established 
upon such organising principle are fixed and bounded entities (see Cohen and Comaroff 
1976). Approximately 50 residents of the compound, spanning over three adult 
generations, can be grouped into two or three descent groups and a variety of sub-
groups, depending on the perspective individuals take on patrilineal descent. While all 
being part of the same compound, descendants of the same mother constitute a group 
called babon (house of the mother), and those of the same father identify themselves in 
a fabon (house of the father).  
When identifying his or her relationship to the previous generations, every compound 
member simultaneously belongs to multiple groups and sub-groups. When grouping, 
individuals can draw on two opposite feelings: badenya – being the children of the same 
mother, an expression of kinship; or, alternatively, fadenya – evoking a sentiment of 
rivalry among the children of the different wives of one father (see also page 31 above). 
The life histories provided in this chapter show that compound members make a 
strategic use of these different ways of grouping and describing themselves when 
framing particular claims. They enact different strategies and they clearly enjoy 
different opportunities to work or study, marry sooner or later, migrate or stay, cultivate 
and farm or do business and the like.  
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 ‘The house of Messere’ 
Every compound in Bancoumana (lu, pl. luw) is known by the name of a headman, 
sometimes a living elder man, but more frequently an ancestor of the resident family 
members. Messere ka lu, or Messerejanna as stated by the plaque at the entrance of the 
courtyard, is ‘the house of Messere the tall.’ It is inhabited by the descendants of the 
late Messere Camara, more precisely, by his patrilineal descendants (all those resident 
in Bancoumana) and their affines.
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Map 1. The Messerejanna compound 
Three groups of patrilineal descendants are identified by different colours. A line separates the two main family subgroups 
headed by patriarchs Nanamori (100) and Makan (300). The three-digit number below each name indicates the marital and 
filial status (but for the two patriarchs, husband and wife bear the same number for the sake of simplicity). For example, 
Yacouba (like his wife Maimouna) bears the number 122, because he is a member of the first patrilineage [Nanamori (100)], 
child of his second wife [Kendia (120)] and second in order of seniority, following his full brother Modibo (121). The brown 
symbol indicates piles of firewood as discussed in the text. 
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 Figure 4. Husking area and other spaces in the Messerejanna compound
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Located in the oldest part of the village (south), Messerejanna is bordered by three other 
family compounds (see Map 1), which are said to have been united until Messere and 
his brothers established separate compounds.30 Similar to other courtyards in this area, 
Messerejanna is shaped as an irregular oval, measuring 50 to 70 m. The space is 
enclosed by a series of short mud walls connecting or simply surrounding many 
buildings of varying sizes and functions. There are houses, kitchens, toilets, storerooms, 
granaries, and roof shelters for chickens, sheep and goats. Clusters of tall trees located 
at opposite sides of the courtyard shade the areas where women gather for the husking 
of corn and cereals (see Figure 4).  
As can be observed in Map 1 above, the majority of Messerejanna buildings are houses 
of either circular or square shape (named and numbered after their occupant).31 The 
disposition of houses in the compound tends to reflect the two ways of grouping 
addressed in this chapter: by maternal and paternal groups of patrilineal descendants 
referred to as ‘the house of the mother’ (babon) and ‘the house of the father’ (fabon). 
The use and disposition of facilities such as kitchens and toilets further substantiates this 
observation, underlying the significance that everyday activities and material practices 
have for the formation of groups. Let us start here from the use and disposition of 
buildings in the courtyard.  
Houses are numerous because they are individual: every married person, man or 
woman, has one. Recently married couples may share the same habitation for some 
time: this is the case of Lanceni and Maman [311], in the upper left side of the map. 
House construction is a strongly emphasized marital duty (especially when children are 
born), thus it is normal for the spouses to live in two close, but separate buildings as 
soon as the husband can afford the construction. In a polygamous setting like 
Bancoumana, this spatial organization leads over time to the formation of clusters of 
houses within the same courtyard, as can be observed in the disposition of the 
                                                 
30 Although they might have been founded at different times, today in Bancoumana, there are six 
compounds (including the four mentioned here) claiming to have split from ‘one [common] kitchen’ (gwa 
kelen): the association between kitchens and maternal groups, symbolizing common dwelling, is 
explained on page 90 below. 
31 In some cases, these could be called huts (small dwellings made of natural material such as clay, wood 
and straw), although I prefer to employ generally the term houses, translating the uniform term bon in 
Mandenkakan. 
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households of the two patriarchs Nanamori (three spouses) and Makan (two spouses), 
and of their eldest resident son Abou kunba (two spouses). The three patrilineages are 
highlighted in different colours in Map 1. Furthermore, as suggested by the dotted line 
crossing the middle of the compound in Map 1, the spaces belonging to the two 
patriarchs and their descendants are quite clearly distinguishable, Nanamori’s branch 
inhabiting the north-west side of the compound, while Makan’s the south-east.  
There are two exceptions to this pattern in Messerejanna, deserving further explanation. 
Lanceni [311], who has been already mentioned, is the son of Makan [300], but resides 
on Nanamori’s side of the courtyard. This can be explained by the fact that he was 
newly married at the time this map refers to: in fact, the spouses were given a spare 
house (which Lanceni, a skilled mason, refurbished) rather than building one of their 
own. The second exception is Djeneba and Kalou’s house [111], in the south-east corner 
of the map. Their case is explained by a more complex set of factors, including the fact 
that Kalou is not a resident member in the compound (he migrated to Spain) and that 
Djeneba has a tense relationship with her maternal group (indeed, the whole of 
Nanamori’s branch of the family). While the example of Lanceni constitutes an 
exception to a seemingly well-defined pattern of settlement, the case of Djeneba and 
Kalou shows the extent to which principles can be adapted to practical considerations 
(instead of being rigidly applied). Even considering exceptions and flexibility, however, 
the disposition of houses at the two sides of the compound suggests a visible separation 
between the two patrilineages of Nanamori and Makan. 
Understanding patterns of habitation and use of the courtyard is facilitated by 
considering that a daughter-in-law normally shares the same kitchen facilities with her 
husband’s mother and her unmarried daughters if still residing in the compound.32 This 
fact reinforces the spatial and more generally material dimension of maternal groups of 
uterine brothers, their spouses and children (babon), all being attached to the same 
mother (ba). The disposition of kitchens can be observed in Map 1 as well as that of 
their indispensable fuel – firewood – whose collection is both a marital and filial duty.  
                                                 
32 Young girls are often sent to relatives in town, coming back to the village only at the age of marriage, 
when they will enter their husbands’ compounds. 
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Firewood is stocked outside kitchens for everyday use and shared by groups of women 
attached to one mother as described above.33 The collection of this fuel is indispensable 
for cooking everyday (and warming houses at cold times). Wood is cut in relatively 
distant areas of the bush and transported by donkey cart to the compound, where it is 
stacked and seasoned, drying after exposure to the weather. These activities are 
performed by every working man in the compound independently: each son and/or 
husband is expected to provide the kitchen shared by his mother and wife with 
firewood. In order to assure the necessary provision of dry wood, this fuel is collected 
several times a year and more intensely around the beginning of the wet season, when 
little time will be left for individual, non-agricultural work such as this. 
Finally, the connection between maternal grouping and the organization of everyday 
working activities around kitchens in the compound corresponds to the denomination of 
maternal groups: apart from babon (‘the house of the mother’), a group of uterine 
brothers is also called gwa, meaning kitchen, fireplace. Other chapters in the thesis will 
illustrate how this term also designates one level of the ‘lineage structure’ of 
Bancoumana (see in particular Chapter Six) as well as the political institution of the 
group of elders called gwa-tiguiw (the suffix -tiguiw meaning headmen).  
As they do kitchens, house clusters also share toilet facilities. These are roofless spaces, 
usually built on the edge of the enclosure wall, allowing bath water draining outside the 
toilet area. Toilet walls, however, are purposefully built as high as an average person’s 
shoulders, not concealing the entire figure of a standing adult, so that it is difficult to 
escape the nearly constant visibility of communal life in the compound. Just as by the 
presence of personal firewood stocks, the privileged status of the two patriarchs – 
Nanamori and Makan – is signalled by the fact that both have ‘modern’ cement toilets 
(squared), with high walls hiding the entire body.34 
                                                 
33 It can be observed in Map 1 that the two patriarchs – Nanamori and Makan – both have a provision of 
firewood next to their houses. This is used for warming their dwellings at cold times, especially at night 
and in the early morning, and for preparing hot drinks such as herbal infusions and soluble coffee. 
34 Ironically, the construction of the toilets of the two patriarchs of Messerejanna was funded by Plan 
International, an NGO self-portrayed in its website as a ‘children’s development organization.’ 
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Daughters-in-law take turns sweeping the toilet grounds and heating and bringing 
bathwater to all the toilet users two or more times a day. Women also sweep the interior 
and the exterior of houses and the shaded spaces several times a day. 
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Figure 5. Compound work 
Clockwise: sweeping the ground, preparing shea butter and beating millet.
93 
 
House uses and interiors 
The size and internal layout of houses differ among compound members and typically 
vary according to one’s gender and age. Among the over twenty houses in 
Messerejanna, only those of the two patriarchs – Nanamori and Makan – consist of 
three rooms, completed by a large shaded space in the front (a cover of stems and straw 
suspended over a structure of branches). Both the exterior and the interior of 
Nanamori’s and Makan’s houses look very similar. Apart from being of comparable 
size (three to four times a single room), they consist of a solid construction of banco 
(mud-bricks plastered with adobe),35 roofed with corrugated iron sheets. These houses 
are also clearly identifiable by the iron entrance door (all others have wooden doors), 
invariably locked when the occupants absent themselves from the compound, usually 
heading to the mosque for the evening prayer or to chatting places bordering the market 
square.  
The internal space of the two elder men’s houses in Messerejanna is organized in three 
rooms. One is a private room, furnished by a wooden bed with a straw mattress topped 
by a mosquito net. Clothes, personal belongings and money (in cash) are kept in the 
compartments of old furniture leaning against the wall, or in trunks and other containers 
leaning on the floor. Apart from its occupant, the room is entered by no other person 
than one of his wives sweeping the ground. As with the adjacent storage room, the 
private room is extremely dark: daylight enters from an iron shutter serving as window, 
too tiny to prevent a man (and high enough to prevent a child) from getting through. 
The second room is slightly smaller and serves for storing food provisions and for 
keeping agricultural work tools: hoes, machetes, pickaxes, shovels, etc. Other objects 
are kept in the room, so that both their use and their user is necessarily acknowledged 
by the elder: these are valuable personal possessions of the people of his patrilineage, 
such as bicycles and motorbikes, and important items for shared use, such as a motor-
pump used to irrigate onion fields (see Chapter Two). While cereals for preparation of 
everyday meals are kept in separate granaries, with the keys kept solely by the 
                                                 
35 Banco is the term coined by the French (possibly from some local language), the actual term in 
Mandenkakan is bogo. 
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compound headman, the storage room of both elder men in Messerejanna contains extra 
stock, to which the respective wives and daughters-in-law have access. Salt and sugar 
are bought at the market and stocked in the storage room, separately for each of the two 
patriarchs.  
The third room of the male elders’ houses in Messerejanna is the entrance room or 
vestibule. This more lighted and ventilated space can be inhabited during the day. Every 
morning, all adult residents of the compound (including elder women) are expected to 
enter this space to greet the elders and receiving their blessings for the day. Later in the 
day, the vestibules are used for prayer or simply as sitting places, where guests are 
received and conversations take place. While all other indoor spaces of the houses in the 
courtyard are rather intimate spaces, elders’ vestibules are suitable places for 
conversation, also being more discreet than the shaded spaces in the courtyard. They are 
also unique to the elders: the houses of younger, working-age people have no such 
spaces. 
In contrast to elder people, the working men and women of the compound do not 
inhabit their houses during the day, save occasionally for daily prayers or in case of 
illness. Apart from the fact that this category of people is normally busy with working 
activities inside or outside the courtyard, houses with no vestibule are inappropriate 
places for conversation and even for taking a rest during the day. People do that under 
the shade of a tree or in places specially conceived like the shaded spaces in front of 
men’s houses. As previously noted, shaded spaces are simple structures of thick 
branches stuck in the ground, topped by thinner branches and covered with stems and 
straw, often occupying a space as large as the house in front of which they are built (see 
Map 1). This area may also be enclosed by screens of stems or of straw and used for 
sleeping outside during the hottest part of the dry season. During the day, sheds 
constitute a place more open and social than the house, but similarly personal. Sitting in 
a shaded space such as this is considered almost a required condition for leisure and 
conversation in the village space (dugu kono), which in this way is clearly distinguished 
from the fields and bush. 
In the same way as for the two patriarchs, the houses of three elder women in 
Messerejanna are equipped with an entrance room, but they have no storage rooms. The 
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food provisions which these women often have in comparable quantity to men (sacks of 
cereals, peanuts and shea nuts) are stored in their sleeping room together with all other 
belongings. The entrance room does not serve as a sitting and chatting space – as in 
elder men’s houses; instead, it is used as a sleeping room for the grandchildren. As can 
be seen in Map 1, the houses of the two oldest wives of compound headman Nanamori 
are equipped with vestibules [Kendia (110) and Kendia (120)], while a third woman on 
the left of the map [Fanta (210)] has two buildings, one of which serves as a sleeping 
room at the grandchildren’s disposal.  
Elder women’s vestibules as well as the front of their houses are very social spaces, 
especially for women taking a rest after their turn in the kitchen and for children getting 
together with their siblings. There, or around the external kitchen space, children eat 
together with their grandmother and mothers when they are in the courtyard (as they 
may have lunch in the fields when farming). Children sleep together in the 
grandmother’s house, unless they are too young or too old: under the age of 4-5, they 
sleep in their same sex parent’s house; from 10-12, they may share a room with siblings 
of the same sex. It is within such groups of women and children where the relations of 
uterine brotherhood (badenya) sustaining maternal groups are cultivated. This feeling of 
bonding, accompanied by a duty of cooperation, is then countered by the other aspects 
of brotherhood, fadenya, entailing a sense of competition among half-brothers. 
Food preparation and commensality 
At two different sides of the Messerejanna compound there are small areas of shading 
trees, where women beat cereals (one is pictured in Figure 4 above). The sound of 
mortars resonates at almost any time in the courtyard. Mortars and pestles of different 
sizes are amassed in the husking area. During the day, this space is always populated – 
if not by women, then by children playing. This area is also often loud, because of 
women singing, chatting and speaking without restraint: while beating cereals, women 
often indirectly address their husbands or the compound’s men in general, who can hear 
women’s discussions but are not allowed to reply in such circumstances. 
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Mortars reflect different times and eras of the compound’s life, because every new bride 
at the time of marriage brings in one new set of mortar and pestle with her bridal 
trousseau. These tools are important because many ingredients of Mande cuisine need to 
be crushed before use (some dishes may also have the same ingredients only crushed in 
different ways): leaves to make sauces, fish to be prepared in fish-balls, shea nuts for 
making butter etc. In such work, a married woman is helped to a great extent by her 
sisters-in-law (husband’s unmarried younger sisters) and also – especially for a period 
after marriage – by her own younger sisters or peers, who can come in their older 
sister’s compound to offer help to the new wife in both domestic and agricultural 
activities. 
Cooking is a strictly female domain. The preparation of common meals requires all 
married women of working age (five in the compound) to perform kitchen duties two 
days in a row. Beside communal meals, however, each maternal group also provides 
some extra food, especially at night. Thus, many women, including those who are not in 
charge of common meals anymore, spend some time in the kitchen every day preparing 
extra food for their children and mothers-in-law. Hence, if the husking areas are very 
social places during the day, the area around external kitchens and mothers’ houses are 
so at night.  
The woman in charge of the communal kitchen wakes up before sunrise to prepare the 
millet soup (moni) that is consumed for breakfast. It is then divided into several bowls. 
One is brought to the group of working men (those who will set off for the fields), 
gathered in one group comprising the two patrilineages. The meal is consumed rather 
quickly and silently, since it is normally impolite to have a discussion while eating. 
Eating will not commence until the most senior person in the group has begun, or has 
invited others to do so: ‘ai bissimila.’ Younger brothers serve themselves after their 
older siblings (and sons after fathers) and do not eat faster than the rhythm of their 
elders, in a sign of respect; moreover, they will eat only moderately and stand up before 
the others, thanking God – ‘a barika,’ to which everybody replies: ‘a barika ye Allah 
ye,’ i.e. ‘thanks be to God.’ Water is drunk afterwards from one or more common 
bowls. 
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In Messerejanna, the working men’s breakfast is served every morning in front of 
Makan’s house (see Map 1). During the farming season, it is in this place and directly 
after the consumption of the meal that the working program of the day is decided. 
Under discussion may be what to do in which field – for example, whether some will go 
planting in one field and others will plough another or whether a field needs to be 
weeded by all working together. Such decisions may depend on the weather and on the 
number of people available for work on a particular day.  
Other eating groups in the morning are those gathering in front of the elder women’s 
houses or inside their vestibule during the coldest season. Grandmothers provide their 
grandchildren and daughters-in-law with boiled rice soup (seri), fried millet-balls and 
some leftovers warmed from the night before. Mothers-in-law cook or heat these things 
inside their kitchens (the early morning is considered too cold for the use of external 
kitchens) while feeding the youngest children. 
Because commensality is such a central element of life in a compound, the eldest only 
can normally eat alone or perhaps with the only company of a beloved grandchild: a 
distinguishing sign of seniority. As for the opportunity to have discreet conversations in 
the vestibule, the possibility to eat separately starkly contrasts with the near constant 
companionship among younger members of the compound.  
When, during the farming season, men spend their day on the fields (from about 7:30 
am to 3 pm), the lunch is brought there. Those women who are not themselves farming 
bring the bowls, carried on the head in the late mornings. Such tasks may also be left to 
some unmarried daughters of the compound, when they are not at school. Although they 
help their mothers and sisters-in-law, in fact, unmarried daughters do not have a turn in 
the kitchen and, most importantly, they do not have to go farming or to contribute to 
other productive activities in the interest of husbands or mothers-in-law. Unlike the 
unmarried daughters of the compound, married women go to farm gardens and peanut 
fields every day, unless engaged in other domestic activities, such as sweeping and 
washing clothes, duties which every woman performs in the courtyard for her nuclear 
family. 
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‘The people of Messere’ 
Messerejanna – ‘the people of Messere the tall’ – comprises more than 50 compound 
residents, spanning over three generations. Compound headman Nanamori Camara is 
the second of nine sons born to the late Messere and his three wives (genealogies will 
be provided on pages 102 and 106 below). He was 84 years old at the time of my 
fieldwork. Since the death of his father in 1959, Nanamori has been the head of the 
family. Assuming patriarchal responsibilities at a rather young age – 33 years old – 
allowed Nanamori the privilege of delegating agricultural work and duties to his 
younger brothers, while himself starting a small business in the market square. This has 
created some resentment among his classificatory sons, who constitute the bulk of the 
workforce in the compound and once explained his remarkable thinness to me as the 
evident sign that he never had to work like his younger brothers. 
Today, of the nine sons, only Nanamori and his younger brother Makan are still living 
in Messere’s compound in Bancoumana. Two others had settled there but have since 
died. The rest of the siblings moved from Bancoumana to Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
during the 1950s and 1960s, like many other farmers from the West African savannah 
who migrated in that period to integrate into the workforces of large plantations of 
peanuts in Senegal, and of coffee and cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire. Their descendants still 
reside in those countries, although only one of the seven brothers of Nanamori and 
Makan is still alive: Seydou, settled in Côte d’Ivoire in the compound of his late older 
brother Mamourou (see Figure 7 and below). Shortly after my departure from the field-
site, the two sides of the family settled in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire celebrated a somewhat 
infrequent marriage between classificatory siblings. Getting married on his first visit 
since his departure for Europe eight years before, one of Nanamori’s sons married one 
of Mamourou’s daughters, who moved to the Bancoumana compound from Côte 
d’Ivoire.  
Messerejanna is relatively populous compound by Bancoumana standards. The average 
population density in the village is in fact 19 individuals per compound.36 This figure 
rises to 28 individuals per compound, considering only the families of reputed ‘first-
                                                 
36 Source: my census data, showing 8,387 residents in 446 compounds. 
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settler’ descent (according to a distinction explained in Chapter Four). However, 
Messerejanna is still considerably more populous than that: it is one of the fewer than 
30 families in Bancoumana which have more than 50 resident members (among these, 
six have more than 100 members). Therefore, the fact that Messerejanna is an 
‘autochthonous’ family explains only in part its remarkable size; further elements 
addressed later in the thesis will suggest that the people of Messere are, perhaps not 
rich, but a relatively powerful and prestigious group.  
As typified in West African anthropological literature by the idea of ‘wealth-in-people’ 
(Miers and Kopytoff 1977, Guyer 1995), a headman who manages to keep united a 
large extended family within his compound is seen as a very powerful and prominent 
person, controlling a large group of people who, as it is said in Mande, ‘all work for 
him.’ Messerejanna headman Nanamori clearly is an influential person when judged by 
this standard. At the time of my fieldwork, Nanamori was the headman of 
Manfindensela, a wider lineage group (gwa) comprising six compounds: a rather 
unsurprising position, considering his age and ‘autochthonous’ status. His power and 
political standing, however, seem to have greatly increased during the years following 
my departure from the field-site, when Nanamori first succeeded as the headman of 
Soridiana, one of the three lineages comprising Bancoumana and then, in June 2011, 
became village chief.  
Family sub-groups: different strategies and opportunities 
Eight elder people, two men and six women, make up the oldest generation of 
Messerejanna’s residents (see pages 102 and 106 for their genealogy). They are 
Nanamori and his three wives, his younger half-brother Makan and his two wives, and 
the wife of a third and deceased younger brother of Nanamori – Massama – called 
Fanta. Similar to what was observed in the analysis of residential and associational 
patterns, sub-groups of household members can organize themselves in two or three 
descent groups, depending on the perspective one takes on patrilineal descent.  
In fact, if one looks at the sons of Messere – the present generation of classificatory 
fathers in the compound – three groups are likely to emerge: namely, the descendants of 
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Nanamori, Makan and the late Massama. Such a view of patrilineal descent identifies a 
group called ‘the house of the father’ (fabon). However, both Nanamori and Massama 
were born from the same mother (first wife of the late Messere), while Makan was born 
from the second wife. Hence, when people identify on the basis of these maternal 
groups of patrilineal descent (babon, ‘the house of the mother’), two groups rather than 
three are likely to emerge: one headed by Nanamori, including Massama’s descendants, 
and the other by Makan. Compound members do in fact make a strategic use of these 
different ways of grouping and describing themselves when framing particular claims. 
This also happens at all lineage levels, notably in defining family headmen and other 
authorities in lineage politics, where strategic grouping of same-mother descendants as 
opposed to same-father descendants matters in similar ways.  
The descendants of Nanamori and Makan have played different roles in family life and 
economy and clearly have had different opportunities. As I will now turn to show, 
considering those who farm the land as opposed to family members who have been 
given permission to migrate demonstrates a certain imbalance: for example, while three 
out of four of Makan’s sons farm, only one out of five of Nanamori’s sons does. Let me 
illustrate this point in some more detail.
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Figure 6. Nanamori Camara (crossing women working in the courtyard)
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Figure 7. Genealogy of Nanamori’s branch of the Messerejanna family.  
People residing in the compound (at least during the farming season) are indicated in black; non-residents (because of marriage or migration) in white. Barred symbols indicate deceased people. 
The numbers in squared brackets allow locating people in Map 1 above. The other branches of the family, descending from the two other wives of Messere Jan, are shown in Figure 9 below. For 
the sake of simplicity, only the people mentioned in the text are named in the genealogy. 
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Nanamori’s branch 
The two and only transnational migrants in the family, Kalou and Daouda, are both sons 
of Nanamori. Their oldest brother, Modibo [121], spent years in Libya, but was 
eventually pressured by his father to assume the responsible role of the firstborn son, to 
return instead of continuing on to Europe. Moreover, the only university student, 
Bakari, is the youngest and most beloved son of Nanamori; recently, he could afford to 
buy a motorbike by living in his sisters’ house in Bamako through saving for his 
expenses as a student.37 Hence only one of Nanamori’s sons, Yacouba [122], is a 
permanent resident and farmer in the compound. 
While migration is often motivated by one’s unfavourable position within the family, it 
is also sometimes constrained thereby. As clearly typified in the epic oral tradition – 
from the epics of Soudiata Keita to village foundation stories (see Chapter Four) – it is 
the younger brother who migrates, while the older brother takes on familial 
responsibilities (Jansen and Zobel 1996). However, given the hierarchical divisions of 
roles within the family, important motivators for younger brother to migrate also 
constitute an objective constraint on older brothers to take the same action. The case of 
Modibo, the firstborn and future head of Nanamori’s lineage, who has been successfully 
pressured to abandon his project to migrate to Europe, is not only revealing of important 
tensions between Nanamori’s and Makan’s descent groups, but it also emphasizes 
important structural constraints for the compound as a whole. 
As a young migrant in Libya, Modibo envisaged the opportunity to turn that experience 
into a longer and more dangerous project, but he had to return to Mali after having been 
successfully discouraged by the family in Bancoumana. Individual motivations, here, 
have intersected with compound and sub-compound group strategies. Moreover, the 
‘structural’ constraints that are usually balanced against individual motivations seem to 
have been of different and contrasting order in the case of Modibo: while he was pushed 
by conventional structural-economic forces to migrate, he was also expected to take on 
the role and responsibilities of future family head. 
                                                 
37 University students normally receive a monthly stipend from the government. 
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Modibo is now settled in Bamako where he has to run separate businesses in order to 
survive: trading bananas in the early morning and running a small shop in the central 
market until late in the day. Although he is not well-off at all, the fact of working with 
money engenders some envy in his younger brothers farming in Bancoumana. Like 
many urban migrants, Modibo finds it especially troubling keeping contact with the 
world of the village, particularly because of gossip or misconceptions about the town 
and the un-matchable expectations (especially of financial support) to which urban 
migrants are held. For this reasons, Modibo visits Bancoumana mainly for festivities, 
rarely paying more than occasional visits. Two of his daughters live in the compound, 
where they are raised by their grandmother while going to school in Bancoumana. 
During our conversations, Modibo expressed his frustration at not being allowed to 
migrate; unless at a high social price, as his father would never give his consent. He also 
spoke resentfully of Kalou and Daouda, his younger brothers, who have migrated to 
Spain and Italy respectively, but who are providing very little support for the family and 
‘behaving like children,’ because they are incapable of saving money for durable 
projects, such as the house in the suburbs of Bamako, which Modibo has been building 
for many years, having received no support from Kalou (his classificatory brother) and 
only modest help from Daouda (his uterine brother), who recently bought the door and 
window frames. 
Hence, among the sons of Nanamori, at least three – two from Europe and one from 
Bamako – are in positions of supporting the family, especially in cases of sudden and 
important events or particular occasions. In June 2008, for example, at a very intense 
period of ploughing the fields on the beginning of the farming season (before the heavy 
rains start), the only adult ox of the family fell ill and had to be killed and the meat sold 
for a small amount of money. As it was necessary to raise 120,000 CFA Francs 
(approximately £160) in few days, as well as pay for half a day of tractor ploughing 
(25,000 CFA Francs, £34), both migrant sons – Kalou and Daouda – sent the necessary 
money. More pleasant occasions during which migrants’ remittances are expected are 
religious festivities (a sack of sugar for the Ramadan fast, a goat for the greater Eid or 
Tabaski) or celebrations such as marriages.
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Figure 8. Makan Camara (on his way to the Mosque for the Friday prayer)
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Figure 9. Genealogies of Makan’s and Seydou’s branches of Messerejanna 
As in Figure 7 above, black symbols indicate compound residents and the numbers in squared brackets allow locating people in Map 1. White symbols indicate non-resident people (either because 
of marriage or migration). Barred symbols indicate deceased people. For the sake of simplicity, only the people mentioned in the text are named in the genealogy.
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Makan’s branch 
Makan’s sons appear to have fewer opportunities: not only for migration – it is very 
unlikely that one of their half-brothers would finance any travels – but also in obtaining 
Nanamori’s consent (in form of blessing, dubabu) for carrying on particular businesses 
which may subtract time from the work of the compound. The eldest of Makan’s sons, 
Messere, joined the army and settled in Segou (a town 200 km north-east of Bamako). 
He benefits from both a salary and the opportunities of formal employment in the army. 
A few years ago, for example, he went to Liberia as part of the Malian army contingent 
mobilized against Charles Taylor; with the money saved from this occasion he could 
afford to buy a motor-pump (for irrigating the onion crop, as described in Chapter 
Two), a black and white television and a battery for the compound in Bancoumana. 
More recently, during my fieldwork, he went to Germany for two months as part of an 
army training in mechanics, a move that could have lasted for several years; however he 
did not pass the first selection.  
Messere provides important support to Makan’s branch of Messerejanna. The extent of 
his actions, however, is limited, both by the fact that he is unlikely to be promoted in the 
Malian army and by his having married a second wife (he also has two children). Over 
the years, however, his support to the family in Bancoumana has not been only 
financial. In fact, he paid for the education of his youngest brother Adama, who joined 
him and his wife in the military camp in Segou where he was completing his secondary 
education. Messere’s support to his younger brother’s education is in stark contrast to 
the behaviour of his brother Modibo [121]: as we have seen above (page 104), rather 
than supporting the family by hosting in Bamako his younger brothers, Modibo had in 
fact sent two of his school-aged daughters to be raised in his home compound in 
Bancoumana.  
Once he graduated, Adama moved to Bamako and finished high school, lodging with 
other relatives: first with his older sister Oumou, and then with his father’s younger 
sister Naba, whose house was nearer the school (see genealogy in Figure 9). Adama and 
Bakari – Nanamori’s youngest son – are today the only schooled family members and 
the only fluent French speakers. Despite that, Adama has not missed a single farming 
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season in Bancoumana and, even at other times of the year, he is an active member of 
the compound.  
Until recently, Lanceni, the brother in between Messere and Adama, was living in 
Bamako in the house of his older sister Sitan (see genealogy in Figure 9). He was 
working as a skilled builder for a daily salary of 1,500 CFA Francs (£2): a sum covering 
little beside his basics living expenses, considering that every day he needed to subtract 
one third of such salary for the transport and another third for food. During my 
fieldwork, he returned to Bancoumana to get married and, since then, he had to take on 
the duty of supporting his mother, residing and farming for the compound. Now that he 
is married in Bancoumana, Lanceni works as a builder only during the non-farming 
season, when he leaves for Kayes: a town in western Mali, where the building sector 
boomed as a consequence of migrants’ remittances from France. After four or five 
consecutive months working in better conditions and for a better salary than in Bamako, 
he returns to the village for the farming season. Many other villagers of his age either do 
the same thing as him or during the dry season perform other income-generating 
activities, like farming onion (see Chapter Two). 
With the marriage of Lanceni during my fieldwork, a new maternal group was 
constituted around the figure of his mother Karidia (see the genealogy in Figure 9). In 
fact, before his marriage and return into the compound, neither of his brothers (Messere 
and Adama) was settled in Bancoumana. This situation was slightly unusual, because 
mothers, who are often in the position to influence the decisions concerning their sons, 
generally tend to keep at least one married son at home, in order both to control and be 
supported by dependent kin (son, daughter in law and their children). Karidia tolerated, 
for a limited period of time, the absence of all her three sons. In fact, she relied on both 
their financial support and the work of an adult unmarried daughter, Awa (who is 
Lanceni’s twin). Because she was afflicted by deafness during her teen years and did 
not get married, Awa actually provided her mother with the work of a daughter-in-law, 
while also being able to support her financially as a successful food-seller in the market 
place. In comparison to the other women of the compound, Awa enjoys the freedom of 
not having marital obligations, such as her service in the communal kitchen, and child-
rearing obligations.  
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When Lanceni’s marriage took place, his wife Maman [311] entered the compound, 
allowing a maternal group to be properly constituted around her mother-in-law Karidia. 
Awa is of course very much part of the group, which, to all purposes, works typically as 
expected: the married son is responsible for constructing buildings (houses, kitchens, 
goat and chicken shelters), and cutting and transporting the firewood; his wife, helped 
by her unmarried sisters-in-law, will have her turn in the communal kitchen and will be 
responsible for most of the domestic activities (husking, cooking, cleaning, washing, 
sweeping, child rearing), while allotting the time needed for farming, collecting fruit, 
doing some commerce at the market. Such activities are, however, often carried on in 
association with others and not in the exclusive interest of the maternal group. Instead, 
her mother-in-law will spend most time farming (both gardens and peanuts’ fields), 
providing extra food (cereals and fish, during the dry season) and rearing children. 
Makan’s lineage is completed by the oldest of his second wife’s sons Bourama [321]. 
He grew up in Bancoumana where he always farmed for the compound. Despite his 
young age (29 at the time of my fieldwork), and because his only older brother Messere 
is absent (in Segou), Bourama has seniority. I will try to illustrate below in relation to 
his older sibling Abou, the most senior member of his generation, the ways in which 
such position of senior descendant among the compound residents is embodied. In July 
2008, Bourama was invited by a development project to spend one month in France and 
he had to broach the subject in a gingerly and strategic manner with the compound 
headmen so not to receive a firm refusal by him: although he was accused of ‘just 
wanting to escape the farming season,’ he was able to leave with Nanamori’s blessing. 
His participation in a development project (a touristic camp on the river) is also raising 
some concerns, because of the time it takes away from Bourama’s participation to the 
compound labour. 
The branch of the late Massama 
Massama – the youngest of the present generation of classificatory fathers – died about 
ten years ago. His wife Fanta [210] is still alive and resides in the compound, together 
with a part of their descendants (see genealogy in Figure 7). In similar cases, where the 
wife outlives the husband, it is a common occurrence for a younger brother to inherit 
110 
 
the wife of the deceased.38 However, the two surviving brothers of the deceased were 
both older brothers. Therefore, neither Nanamori (the uterine brother) nor Makan (the 
classificatory brother) could remarry Fanta, taking support of her and ‘including’ her 
descendants. These facts help to interpret the relative autonomy of this branch of 
Messerejanna from the two patrilineages of Nanamori and Makan. 
As can be noted in Figure 7, Massama left four sons (and three daughters): two from the 
marriage with Fanta (Abou [211] and Mamourou) and two from a deceased second wife 
(Oumar and Adama). The last two have lost contact with Messerejanna, having 
migrated to northern Africa a few years before my fieldwork. Of the two sons of Fanta, 
Abou resides in the compound, while Mamourou has moved to Bamako. Although he 
never visited Bancoumana during my fieldwork, two of his sons (Bois and Bakari) are 
still being raised in the compound, and contribute to the workforce.  
In comparison to the rest of the members of his generation, Massama’s first son Abou 
(called kunba, i.e. the older) seems to enjoy relative autonomy from his classificatory 
fathers Nanamori and Makan. He is well respected and trusted by his brothers and he is 
allowed a fair amount of independence, particularly concerning agricultural activities, 
which Abou manages in cooperation with his youngest classificatory father Makan.39 
To a certain extent, Abou has taken on his late father’s role: despite the fact that his two 
classificatory fathers are still living in the compound and that they are one generation 
above him, neither of them could have inherited Massama’s wife Fanta, so the 
obligation to care for her was taken by Abou himself, hence figuring as his father’s 
successor.40 From the alternative point of view of maternal patrilineal descent 
considered above, however, he can be considered part of the group of Nanamori’s 
descendants, because his father, Massama, was born from the same mother as 
Nanamori.  
                                                 
38 The levirate allows the widow to stay in the compound close to her children (and supported by both her 
sons and mothers-in-law) while reaching her seniority in a religiously accepted way. In fact, for a woman 
to die unmarried is seen as inappropriate by religious customs. 
39 Abou’s farming skills and social standing will be further analysed in Chapter Five in relation to his role 
in age groups associations. See in particular page 182ff. 
40 As it will be explained in Chapter Six, unlike all other members of his generation, Abou also pays the 
head-tax for his dependents (including his mother Fanta). This is another sign that his lineage is not 
entirely dependent on Nanamori’s. 
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The particular status that Abou seems to enjoy within the compound may be explained 
from various vantage points. Certainly, part of his autonomy stems from the possibility 
he has of choosing strategically between being included in the group of Nanamori’s 
descendants, as opposed to Makan’s descendants, or figuring as the representative of a 
third group: identifying, in the first case, in a babon group and, in the second, in a fabon 
(see on page 100). Other elements seem to be salient as well. For example, he is the 
eldest of his generation and so the principle heir after his classificatory father Makan. In 
addition, he is widely renowned as a successful farmer; he is respected as a husband of 
two wives and a father of thirteen children; he is a very active member of his age group 
(see Chapter Five). All these aspects seem to indicate that his particular status can be 
explained as a combination of both subjective and objective elements contributing to the 
social construction of his seniority 
Abou, who was born in 1964, is the oldest among his classificatory brothers and 
therefore the headman of the compound’s workforce mainly represented by his 
generation. In relation to his younger brothers, he appears to enjoy a very well respected 
status of seniority. This is, of course, supported by the genealogical fact of being the 
oldest brother, but a series of other elements show that his seniority, although 
necessarily entailing mature age, is constructed in rather more sophisticated ways. 
Abou’s seniority may be amplified by the unusual age gap between him and his closest 
brothers residing in the compound: Yacouba (son of Nanamori, see genealogy in Figure 
7) immediately follows Abou in order of seniority, but was born nine years after, in 
1973; the following compound resident in order of seniority – Bourama – was born in 
1980, thus he has 16 years of difference.  
Other elements apart from age signals Abou’s senior status. For example he is the first 
in his generation to marry two wives and is the father of a considerable number of 
children (almost one half of all resident children). He has also been a successful 
migrant, working for several years in Libya during the 1980s, and coming back to 
Bancoumana, where – like others having passed the rite of passage of migration – he is 
credited with knowledge of life and experience.  
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Compound workforce 
The compound workforce is mainly provided by the generation below that of the three 
classificatory fathers – Nanamori, Makan and the late Massama. Some of their sons are 
adult men, married, residing in and working for the compound with their nuclear 
families (four out of 14: Abou, Yacouba, Bourama and Lanceni). Some have their 
spouses and children in the compound while being on migration (Kalou); some others 
are younger and unmarried (Bakari and Adama). The rest of the sons of the three 
patriarchs, however, is not actually part of the compound workforce, since they are 
settled in Bamako (two people) or elsewhere (five people), some married and some 
others not. Most married sons (five out of eight) have their wives and children in the 
compound. They all reside and work there, except for Kalou who is on migration in 
Spain. Two other sons (Bakari and Adama), aged about 20, are unmarried students, 
living for most of the time in Bamako, but returning to Bancoumana for the farming 
season. A third unmarried young man – Bourama, nicknamed ‘Byebye’ – lives in and 
works for the compound, although his case is peculiar because he is related to the 
family from the maternal side.  
Although Byebye [101] is one generation below the classificatory sons of the 
compound, to some extent he is considered to be one of them. In reality, he is the son of 
a daughter of Nanamori, who divorced from Byebye’s father and then married a second 
time. A few years ago, when he reached the age of a young boy, he decided to move 
into his mother’s native compound. Here, he is more likely to be considered one of the 
sons, instead of a grandchild. It is not only because of his age (18 years old), but also 
because his genealogical position is somehow weaker than that of his mother’s brothers, 
that Byebye is given a lot of work, farming like an adult and yet told what to do like a 
boy. His situation is also biased by the fact that – as I gradually came to understand – it 
is very unlikely that his descendants would be allowed to settle within his mother 
brothers’ compound, where he decided to settle for the time being: should, in the future, 
one of his sons take the office of the headmen of the compound, rule would pass 
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through the mother’s line.41 The expected course of things will be, instead, that when 
Byebye gets married, he will be given a piece of land (either by the paternal or maternal 
side of the family), where he can settle in a new domestic space. 
In the same workforce-generation, there are six wives. Only the oldest brother, Abou, 
has two wives, while his younger brothers have one each. Two other women, unmarried 
daughters of Makan, could also be counted in this generation. One is Awa, who is 
Lanceni’s twin and, as mentioned before, has not yet found a husband. The other is 
Korotimi, aged about 15, who is also affected by a health problem (epilepsy) and works 
for her mother Senedia [320] and her sister in law Fanta [321]. 
Child workforce 
The third and last generation of compound residents is made up of about 30 children, 
among whom only the eldest three participate in agricultural and related activities (Bois 
Massama, Sidi and Bakari, see Figure 7). While Sidi is Abou’s own son, the two others 
are the children of his younger brother residing in Bamako, as mentioned above (page 
110).  
In Bancoumana, young boys carry on important work not performed by adults. The 
work of children is not only a help for adults, but it is also a constitutive element of 
childhood, a normal part of their education and a process of socialization. The fact that 
all the children aged six to 14 are in principle obliged to go to school – eight hours a 
day, five days per week, from October to June – has important repercussions. The 
obligation to go to school, however, is neither followed by everybody nor practically 
enforceable, given the very poor existing school infrastructure (see Chapter One, page 
34). Moreover, children do work during school holidays (and some may work during 
time off the school), which tend to be fixed by the Ministry of Education every year 
according to the farming calendar.  
                                                 
41 The nickname ‘Byebye’ sounds ironic to this extent. However, it was explained to me by saying that 
Bourama often disappeared when his older brothers wanted to charge him with work: an understandable 
behavior considered that he was given more work than all. 
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One of the main jobs carried on by children is to look after animals. Young boys 
(approximately five to ten years old), for example, are responsible for leading sheep and 
goats to pasture around the compound during the dry season. Then, during the farming 
season, they drive them off the cultivated land or they tether them in shaded spaces 
where they are fed. Older boys (approximately ten to 15 years old) drive cows and oxen 
to more remote pastures, looking after them the entire day, particularly during the 
farming season, when animals should be kept off cultivated land. Every morning and 
evening, herds have to be driven in and out of the enclosures and cows have to be 
milked. All these activities are carried out by children.  
Children are also sent to oversee the fields where mangoes (or other fruit) mature in 
order to discourage thieves, while their older brothers appear at particular times to 
bargain with the women who collect fruit and sell them at the market. Other young boys 
are sent to oversee rice and millet fields, keeping off and hunting birds with their slings, 
for an entire month before harvesting. Both these surveillance activities – in particular 
the latter – begin every day at sunrise (6 am) and end at sunset (7 pm). 
A summary of the workforce composition in Messerejanna would be the following. Out 
of 51 residents, there are about 13 adults, six men and seven women, in the generation 
that is currently spending considerable working-time in the interest of the compound. 
Considering that four members of the youngest generation (Byebye, Bois, Sidi and 
Bakari) also provide significant work, the active workforce represents one third of the 
compound population. As shown in the genealogies in Figure 7 and Figure 9, however, 
such resident workforce represents only a fraction of the living daughters and sons of 
Nanamori, Makan and Massama, many of whom reside elsewhere because of marriage 
or migration. In fact, of the 14 living sons, only eight reside in the compound during the 
farming season at least; of 27 daughters, three are still unmarried and living in the 
compound, while six daughters-in-law have entered.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the domestic setting of Messerejanna, the living quarter of 
my hosts in Bancoumana. It described the main spaces in the courtyard and their use by 
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residents engaging in ordinary activities, crucial for the functioning of the domestic 
domain, such as food preparation and commensality. The analysis of this material has 
illuminated grouping dynamics by focusing, in particular, on sub-groups of paternal and 
maternal patrilineal descendants (fabon and babon) and on the corresponding, opposite 
feelings of mother-childness and father-childness (badenya and fadenya).  
Through the analysis of the different branches of ‘the people of Messere,’ we have seen 
that family subgroups trace their descent according to two or three descent lines 
depending on the particular view that is taken of patrilineal descent. The life histories 
provided clearly illustrate that position in the household – in genealogical and related 
terms, such as lifecycle, seniority, gender, and the like – entails very different sets of 
constraints and opportunities.  
Groups of uterine, paternal and classificatory siblings emerging from the analysis of the 
genealogy of the three branches of Messerejanna are consistent with the groups 
previously identified in relation to the use of space and the organization of domestic 
activities (page 90). This demonstrates that descent, along with other elements 
determining one’s position within the household, matters in important ways for the 
organization of the domestic domain. However, rather than being defined by abstract 
rules (of descent or other principles), the domestic domain is constructed around 
material practices and activities like those described in this chapter: some of them 
consist of productive activities, like food preparation and wood collection; others are 
less directly so, for example commensality and the disposition of houses in space, but 
consist of practices similarly important for the organization of compound life. 
The material presented in this chapter shows that a compound and a family like 
Messerejanna are composite entities, made of individuals simultaneously integrating 
different sub-groups, notably the maternal and paternal patrilineal descent groups 
becoming visible in relation to the different activities and practices defining the 
domestic space. Moreover, compound members make a strategic use of these different 
ways of grouping and describing themselves when framing a particular claim. For these 
two combined reasons, a compound like Messerejanna would be only inadequately 
represented as a homogeneous entity: the activities occasionally spoken as 
characterizing one same domestic domain – that of the household or the compound as a 
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homogeneous entity – are in fact carried out by a combination of smaller groups, whose 
functioning leaves some room to individual strategy and accommodates practical 
considerations.  
The exceptional positioning of Djeneba’s house, reflecting the tense relationship with 
her in-laws, provided one case of adaptation of settlement principles to practical 
considerations. Another such case, showing the more strategic facet of grouping 
dynamics, was offered by Karidia tolerating the absence of all her male sons from 
Bancoumana (until the marriage of her son Lanceni). This was an unusual situation, in 
which no maternal group was constituted around an elder woman and it has been 
explained by the (equally rare) possibility for Karidia to rely on work and financial 
support of her adult but still unmarried daughter Awa. This was a crucial factor 
allowing her to afford to educate her cadet son Adama to university level in the distant 
town of Segou, supported by his oldest brother Messere.  
In the economy of Messerejanna, there are evident efforts to foster equality among the 
different sub-groups, especially among the uterine groups (of maternal patrilineal 
descendants). This is attested, for example, by the system of these groups’ taking turns 
in the compound’s common kitchen. It is also attested by patterns of commensality by 
which, for example, the working men of the compound belonging to different 
patrilineages eat together and discuss the work to be done on the fields every day. 
However, the individuals integrating such sub-groups, especially those of paternal 
descent, clearly find themselves in unequal positions and face different constraints and 
opportunities in life. 
In addressing the organization of the domestic domain, this chapter does not suggest 
that such a domain is bounded in any way. At various points, ruptures in the 
homogeneous organization and representation of domestic activities have been noticed. 
One such instance was provided by married women being helped by their kin and age 
mates (not residing in the compound) for the preparation of common meals. Another 
was the ‘invisible’ work of unmarried daughters, and even their financial support as 
showed in the case of Awa: allowing her brothers Adama and Lanceni to study and 
work abroad, her hard work contributed to alleviate the burden of collective labour 
already unfavourable to Makan’s branch of Messerejanna.  
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Chapter Four 
‘We All Are Foreigners’: political leadership, anteriority and 
the idiom of hospitality in accessing land 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on land as an attribute of political leadership, analysing how it is 
claimed, negotiated and accessed by groups and individuals in different circumstances. 
Through the historical narrative of Bancoumana’s foundation, it illustrates how the 
principle of prior arrival, or anteriority, in land occupation is used to create a distinction 
between two groups of villagers – ‘autochthonous’ and newcomers – with different 
power and opportunities in accessing land. Such a distinction constitutes the basis of a 
socially codified system of hospitality allowing first-comers to incorporate late-comers 
while regulating and, to a certain extent, negotiating the latter’s access to resources.  
On the one hand, the analysis highlights the crucial role played by idioms of 
dependency for understanding local political processes through which access to 
resources is negotiated; on the other, it demonstrates the powerful and enduring 
character of land as crucial attribute of political leadership in Mande and a symbol of its 
legitimacy. The multiple ways in which the sense of belonging to the ancestral land can 
be played by different people and the changing circumstances that can be 
accommodated in this process, also show the limits and the inconsistencies of 
conceiving the land univocally as a productive resource, a commodity and an object of 
property, as the state and other ‘developers’ often do (see Chapter Two). 
The difference between first-comers and late-comers is not clear-cut, but a subtly 
performed status distinction. The performance of the respective roles consists of 
employing a particular idiom of dependency and hospitality, a whole set of attitudes and 
behaviours. Similar to other status distinctions like slave descent, the one based on 
anteriority is employed in a cautious and circumstantial manner. After a few 
generations, the ‘facts’ of being descended from a late-comer or a slave become blurred, 
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especially since foreigners are not immediately recognizable by family name (like the 
descendants of captives, they can also take their host family name over time). Therefore, 
the possibility that some may discredit a family line by claiming the foreign origin of its 
ancestors is left open in many cases.  
More than a precise set of rules, hospitality is an idiom shared by both first-comers and 
late-comers in Bancoumana, with different but complementary interests. It is commonly 
agreed, in principle, that while first-comers aim at controlling their guests’ access to 
land and at incorporating them in their lineage, late-comers aim at gaining access to 
land and maintaining it in a legitimate and effective way. However, hospitality in 
practice can be more contested. Through a case study of a dispute involving two late-
comers, Traore and Diarra, it will be shown that this is merely one strategy employed by 
late-comers to secure their interests. Another way, not necessarily alternative to the 
former, is to resort to a written document called the attestation de vente, signed by the 
Mayor of the municipality. 
This leads to an analysis of one avenue through which village site land is perhaps 
becoming increasingly fungible (i.e. marketed in return for cash) and commoditised in 
Bancoumana. This is due to a variety of factors, which can be generally related to 
increasing demographic pressure: the population of Bancoumana has almost doubled in 
the last ten years.42 Among the factors explaining this demographic boom, there are the 
village’s location (at only 60 km from the capital Bamako) on a road that was soon to be 
asphalted at the time my fieldwork took place, the presence of commercial opportunities 
attracting new settlers (especially the weekly market fair) and, finally, the establishment 
of important public services and infrastructure requiring bureaucratic staff, like the 
municipality, the school, the health centre and various development projects (see also 
Chapter One).  
People always say that it was these categories of people (shopkeepers, bureaucrats, 
schoolteachers and the like) who had first started to buy land in return for cash in 
                                                 
42 Last available national census (RGPH 1998) shows for the whole municipality of Bancoumana 
(comprising 13 other villages): 19,138 residents. The number of residents in previous censuses was 
10,130 in 1978 and 8,571 in 1976. Between 1987 and 1998, the population grew at a rate of 5.6 percent 
per year. 
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Bancoumana. Initially they bought it from other foreigners, notably bureaucrats being 
transferred to another village selling to their successors the land that had merely been 
entrusted to them by their hosts. It then became common also for more ‘autochthonous’ 
people to sell land to strangers. In this way, the idiom of hospitality became connected 
in a more complex way to the sale of land in return for money. As the case of Traore 
and Diarra I examine below will show, although it is uncommon to buy land from one’s 
direct host, who has instead an obligation to provide the foreigner with land, the host’s 
indirect involvement in his guest’s land purchase normally does add an important 
element of security to the transaction, making the sale more publically acknowledged.  
Since the establishment of the local municipality in the late 1990s, some of such 
transactions were registered with the Mayor issuing a written attestation. Despite such 
an attestation, in the case examined, the land was successfully claimed back two 
decades later by an older brother of the seller, who claimed to have been absent and 
unaware of the sale. What played a crucial role in influencing the final outcome was the 
above mentioned participation – or lack of participation – of the litigants’ hosts at the 
time of the sale (and, later, when the dispute took place). 
Traore, a retired bureaucrat, had bought the land at the time without the involvement of 
his host, who was for this reason unable to undertake an effective defence. Diarra’s 
older brother, a more ‘embedded’ late-comer than Traore, was successful in invoking 
his host lineage support during the dispute and got his land back.  
Despite the fact that this dispute involved two late-comers – one of whom was literate 
and resorted to an attestation de vente – in this instance, first-comers’ support and 
hospitality proved to be more effective. Negotiation of status and relations of 
dependence took precedence over written documents. As we shall see, the increasing 
involvement of the Mayor and the municipality does not necessarily imply greater 
control by the state in land matters.  
Incorporation through hospitality 
The first piece of information I received in Bancoumana on the subject of land 
conveyed the idea that its control pertains to ‘those who cleared the bush’ (mogow 
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minna ye tou teké) or to ‘those who (first) settled’ (mogow min nana ka sigi yan, 
literally ‘the people who came to sit down here’). By such expressions, referring to a 
real or imagined original occupation of land, people express a general agreement that 
anteriority confers special rights over land. Although the definition of first-comership 
becomes problematic and subject to a certain degree of contention, the distinction 
between first-comers and late-comers was central to the way many of my informants 
approached land issues during my fieldwork. Thus, it seems worth starting from the 
uses of – and the meaning attached to – this dichotomy. 
When I approached the theme of land, people told me that the territory used by 
Bancoumana villagers belonged to the lineages of first-comer descent.43 While land is 
designated by the expression dugu-kolo (literally, ‘the bones of the village’),44 the 
headmen of the first-comers’ lineages are called dugukolotiguis, a term that expresses 
material and spiritual control of the land, implying a power to redistribute and hence a 
chieftaincy over the land (the suffix -tigui means chief or headman). Late-comers 
(dunanw, foreigners) are entitled to a piece of land only through their participation in 
the particular system of ‘hospitality’ (jatiguiya), which incorporates them into a host 
lineage of first-comers, while at the same time serving as a reminder of their 
‘foreignness’ through the generations. 
Accordingly, one element emphasising first-comer status is the right to have guests, that 
is the publically recognized capacity to attract foreigners and to become their host, 
incorporating their relatives and descendants through fictive kin relationships. In the 
locality, the descendants of first-comers are definitely more likely to play the role of 
jatiguiw (hosts to foreigners), although there are rare cases of newcomers being the 
hosts of subsequent newcomers. Both will be indirectly attached to the host of the first, 
however, who is normally a first-comer.  
                                                 
43 In Mandenkakan there is no verb expressing ownership of the land. The verb to have, to own (nin be 
ale bolo, literally ‘this is in his/her hands’) which is employed for objects, it is not used in relation to the 
land; nor is the verb ka mara (to control, to rule, from which the patronymic Camara originates), which 
refers to the control of people rather than objects. 
44 While dugu means village in a spatial, territorial sense, the noun kolo indicates materiality and 
substance. When it stands alone, kolo means the structure of the human body, i.e. the bones. For the literal 
translation offered in the text, see Hampaté Ba (1972:77). See also Delafosse’s etymological dictionary 
(1929:141-3). 
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To make reference to one’s capacity for having many guests is one way of accounting 
for either individual or collective prosperity. But different kinds of success in hostship 
are achieved in distinct ways. A significant part of the social prestige of the Soridiana 
lineage head El Hadji Messere, for example, came from being the most successful 
jatigui of Bancoumana. He was the host of 47 out of the 280 late-comers’ compounds of 
the village. Of those late-comers’ compounds which were specifically nested within the 
ambit of his lineage, Soridiana, he was host to more than half.45 In contrast to his 
success in sheer weight of numbers, the Kolonwulena lineage as a whole was often 
spoken of as being particularly able to capture political offices and other income 
opportunities in the village because of the high number of literate foreigners it had been 
able to attract.46 
A welcoming attitude toward newcomers and their incorporation through an established 
system of hospitality can be explained in relation to a variety of historical, 
demographical or socio-economic circumstances. In a context characterized by warfare 
such as 19th century Mande, for example, foreigners might have represented a valuable 
resource for defensive reasons and perhaps also for the slave trade (Jansen 2005:261). 
Similarly, in a phase of consolidation of an agricultural hamlet into a permanent village 
settlement, subsequent-arrivals may have contributed to strengthening the settlement’s 
autonomy in respect of the inhabitants of the original locality (Lentz 2006:14). In other 
words, a general model of wealth-in-people is observable, although this concept needs 
to be adapted to acknowledge wider social, political and economic variables changing 
over time (Guyer 1995; Miers & Kopytoff 1977). A closer analysis of hospitality in the 
locality, however, suggests further observations. 
                                                 
45 Source: my census data. 
46 Although different informants generally perceived that Kolonwulena attracted more strangers while 
Soridiana did not, data collected in my survey shows a remarkable equilibrium: in fact, the Farana lineage 
has 92 guest compounds, Soridiana has 95, and Kolonwulena 91. However, when one looks at the 
proportion of first-comer and late-comer compounds within each lineage, the popular perception is 
confirmed: 70 percent of Kolonwulena’s compounds are late-comers, while the proportion decreases to 
62 and 58 percent respectively for Farana and Soridiana. 
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Guests and dependents in Bancoumana 
The socially well-codified system of hospitality (jatiguiya) in Bancoumana today 
regulates access to land as well as providing it. It limits access to land for late-comers 
and foreigners, defending the privileges of first-comers and even discouraging non-
productive usage of the land. In particular, it defends village land from being 
accumulated by urban and transnational migrants or by outsiders who may be interested 
in acquiring land for marketing and speculative purposes. The kind of thing this was 
intended to guard against can be seen in the case of a native of the nearby village of 
Samako who is ‘Spanish’ – as migrants to that country are usually called – and quite 
openly known as a cocaine dealer. During my fieldwork, he acquired a large plot of 
housing land in Bancoumana (about 50x80 m) and started investing the returns of his 
business in the building of a hotel, which was to be the first in the region.  
Moreover, both the social institution and the language of hospitality provide first-
comers with a way of dealing with increased fungibility of land and the growing need 
for cash: under some circumstances, in fact, a buyer may be presented – or may equally 
cast himself – as the seller’s guest or tutee. In this light, jatiguiya appears as the 
particular idiom – at times shared, at times contested – by which first-comers and late-
comers negotiate the use of land, both as a ‘productive resource’ (when labour is 
provided) and as an object whose control shows one’s membership and inclusion in the 
political community.  
By interpreting a context characterized by a need for cash on the one side and increased 
fungibility of the land on the other in terms of supply and demand, it might appear that 
there is a dichotomous opposition between first-comers, who have large holdings of 
land, and late-comers, who have money. Although this might indicate a trend, it is 
nonetheless too simplistic, especially since not all late-comers are equally rich. Late-
comers have arrived at a succession of different moments and under very different 
circumstances; not all can afford to buy land. First-comers, likewise, have variable 
incomes, and also have variable rights to land, depending on their level of political 
influence and leadership. When considering the foreigners’ claim to land in 
Bancoumana, we may ask whether ‘hospitality’ today plays not only a function of 
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incorporation of these people, but also provides a morally accepted idiom for 
commercialization and monetization of land.47 
However, despite the fact that hospitality may be given new and more monetary 
meanings, it seems that in Bancoumana, as in other parts of Africa, the land represents – 
still, or with renewed vigour – an important attribute of political leadership and a 
powerful symbol of its legitimacy (Berry 1993:111, 125; Goheen 1992:392). So just as 
land belongs to first-comers, political offices are said to be in principle reserved for the 
descendants of first-comers. This concern is particularly present in relation to those 
offices with the capacity to represent the village in the wider world, notably elective 
authorities such as the Mayor and the councillors.  
Monopolies of this kind, however, are more aspired-to than real. Bancoumana’s Mayor 
at the time of my fieldwork – Issa Traore – was not a first-comer descendant, a fact that 
greatly concerned many ‘autochthonous’ Camara headmen. A common way to depict 
one’s foreign status – as many people told me in conversations touching upon Mayor 
Issa Traore – is to say that one is not yankai, i.e. of ‘the people from here.’48 
Although it cannot be said, then, that foreigners and their descendants are in practice 
excluded from access to both land and political offices, the distinction between first-
comers and late-comers is relevant as a normative dimension, as was evident from my 
discussions with informants. Contradictorily, however, the distinction may often be 
invoked by late-comers themselves as a way to determine access to resources and public 
offices. By emphasizing their own late-comership, foreigners can claim membership of 
village society. To insist on one’s dependent status is a strategy for claiming 
membership, one that is commonly performed in Mande (Jansen and Zobel 1996). This 
is usually done by employing the language of kinship relations – no matter whether 
‘real’ or fictive – and by recalling reciprocal obligations. There is a complex repertoire 
of protocols to be employed by the various categories of dependent men (cadets, caste-
men, newcomers) according to different circumstances. All strategies aim at showing 
                                                 
47 A similar phenomenon has been observed by Jean Pierre Chauveau in the Gban region in Côte d’Ivoire 
with reference to the changing meaning of a comparable hosting institution called tutorat (Chauveau 
2006). 
48 An equivalent word referring to native status is dugulen, probably meaning ‘a son of the village’ or 
‘village people.’ 
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respect while providing the basis for claiming membership, material benefits and, most 
importantly, actual rights: for example, to the use of land, including its transmission and 
redistribution, or to political offices. 
Among the villagers, the statuses of first-comer and late-comer cannot easily be 
manipulated or explicitly contested. The general condition of dependency implied by 
being a foreigner and by other social positions, such as those of slave and caste, is rarely 
acknowledged in public or openly utilized. When addressing a newcomer, for example, 
a first-comer descendant would tend to foster a sense of membership by emphasizing 
that everyone has been a newcomer: an bee ye dunan ye, ‘we all are foreigners.’ 
However, should the same two parties confront each other in a dispute, the distinction 
between first-comers and late-comers will start to enter into the discussion.  
In conclusion, such distinctions are played out quite circumstantially, retaining their 
fluidity: they definitely matter, but they are never transformed into rigid social 
hierarchies of the kind often resulting from anthropological analysis (Amselle 
1996:758). There is neither now, nor has there ever been, a clear-cut system of social 
standing, like the one created by colonial administrators and ethnographers around West 
African ‘caste’ (nyamakalaya) and other distinctions.49 
Memory of one’s origin (ka bo, to originate) and genealogy (siya, life-line or lineage) is 
part of a social knowledge that is preserved and, to a limited extent, manipulated by 
senior generations. There exists the possibility of discrediting a family line or, more 
plausibly, of downplaying some individual’s pretensions, by claiming the dependent 
status of his ancestors. However, the opportunity to adopt such behaviour depends on 
circumstances, and as such the threat of social discredit will usually suffice.  
More than one adult informant discussing the relevance of genealogy expressed the idea 
that elders can make someone cry ‘by recalling his origins’ (ka bujuru fo). As another 
expression goes: ‘everybody knows the point at which he should stop’ (bee n’i a joyoro 
                                                 
49 For an in-depth analysis of colonial construction and western perceptions of the professional classes of 
artists and other occupationally defined specialists such as blacksmiths, potters, leatherworkers and bards 
(all referred to as nyamakalaw, in Mande), see Conrad and Frank (1995) and Amselle (1998). 
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don); otherwise, sooner or later, he will be put ‘at the same place as his personality’ (ka 
a n’a hakili iera nogona).  
Differentiations between (and within) the first-comer and late-comer categories 
As in most societies, strict genealogical rules and principles exist in Mande society, but 
these rarely align with practice. What makes the Bancoumana case perhaps more 
complex than others in Sub-Saharan Africa is the complex system of status 
differentiation which accompanies and parallels these rules of prior arrival, land 
ownership and descent. This has occasionally been referred to as a ‘caste’ system 
(differentiating between freemen, professional groups such as blacksmiths and 
leatherworkers, and slaves), but the extent to which manipulation is possible – always 
within the rules – would seem to make this definition accurate only in the loosest 
possible sense (see Chapter One). Flexible or not, the classification of people with 
particular patronymics according to the professions they practice (or traditionally 
practiced) makes the negotiation of rules and genealogical principles doubly complex. 
I here provide a brief statement of these rules as they are claimed to apply in the village, 
before demonstrating the negotiation of land and status that they occasion.  
Land, in principle, belongs to ‘noble’ Camara men of first-comer descent. The 
patronymic (djamu) Camara is a necessary but not sufficient distinguishing feature of 
such men. What further defines the highest status in society are two additional features: 
being of ‘noble’ descent (horon, free-man) and being a first-comer, i.e. descendant of 
original settlers. All three criteria, in combination, are in principle prerequisites for 
access to land and political office in Bancoumana.  
In fact, some people bearing the patronymic Camara are late-comers, having migrated to 
Bancoumana subsequent to its foundation and being unconnected to the founders other 
than via mythical ancestry (they claim to be descended from Kamandian Camara, one of 
the characters of the epics of Soundiata, see page 27 above). Others are slave 
descendants who have adopted their masters’ patronymic, but have not lost their lower 
status in society. And, finally, some people using Camara as their family name are caste 
men of a particular kind. These are known as Fune-Camara and are people considered 
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of particularly low status in society, having many traits in common with the more 
widely known professional groups dubbed as ‘caste’ in Mande and throughout West 
Africa more generally. The status of caste men other than Fune-Camara is usually 
indicated by the family name, although practices vary between regions. In the region of 
Bancoumana, for example, the patronymics Sinaba and Sinayogo are exclusively carried 
by blacksmiths, while the family name Kouyaté invariably identifies bards. 
Thus, the principle ‘the land belongs to first-comers’ must be understood in context. 
Three groups are distinguishable: a) those who are entitled to both land ownership and 
political office; b) those who have access to political office, but not to land ownership; 
and c) a third group of dependent men who are entitled to neither, including 
blacksmiths, bards, leatherworkers, religious experts (moriw) and slave descendants.50 
                                                 
50 Moriw (sing. mori, from Arabic marbūt or murābit) are religious experts, teachers and healers. They 
are also called marabouts, according to a French colonial denomination. 
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Claimed status First-comers Late-comers 
Legitimate claim Land and 
office 
Office First-comer 
status 
Dependency/inclusion 
in host family 
Patronymic Camara (124) Konate (19), 
Traore (12) 
Sinayogo (3), 
Sinaba (6), 
Diakité (3) 
Fune-Camara (5), 
slave descendants (4) 
Status / professional 
specialisation 
Noble Noble Caste 
(blacksmiths, 
moriw) 
Mediators, ceremony 
heads 
N Compounds 124 31 12 9 
Proportion of first-comers 
in same-patronymic group 
69% 18% 8% 5% 
Table 1. First-settlers’ descendants in Bancoumana 
The table shows the internal differentiations among Bancoumana’s 176 compounds of first-comer 
descent. As explained in the text, not all of these do openly claim such status, nor do they have identical 
rights over land and political offices. The number of compounds for each patronymic (djamu) figures into 
brackets. Source: my census data; N=446. 
 
As Table 1 shows, and as I stated earlier, only Camara people – and more precisely, 
only those among them who are of noble descent and first-comers – have a legitimate 
claim to both political office and land ownership. Some Traore and Konate families 
have access to political power but not to land. My discussion here focuses on the third 
category: those who are dependents on these families are also first-comers, but are not 
entitled to land or political power because they are neither of noble descent nor do they 
bear the Camara patronymic. By saying that they are late-comers, some of these groups 
are fudging their ‘true’ identity: that is, as slaves or caste people. Instead they are 
casting themselves as guests, showing that their dependence arises from their ‘foreigner’ 
status. Definitions are characteristically vague, however, with some among this latter 
group casting themselves in the first-comers group – as some blacksmiths and moriw 
compound did in my survey – and benefiting from this status when compared to both 
foreigners and Fune-Camara people.  
The late-comer Fune-Camara (also called funew) carry the same patronymic Camara all 
over Mande, but they are socially distinct from the Camara of noble status (horon). Just 
like bards (jeliw), one of the main professional specializations of funew is mediation and 
ceremony mastery. In contrast to bards, however, each fune family today tends to be 
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rigidly connected to one particular ‘master’ horon family: funew perform public 
speeches on behalf of the master’s family and are asked to mediate disputes; they also 
receive a share of sacrificial meat and they connect to all members of the master family 
by joking relationships which also put them in the position of ‘telling the truth’ to their 
masters (ka tina fo), implying that they can ask for something in a way that it cannot be 
denied.  
Historical enquires have suggested that they either immigrated to Mande in ancient 
times from Mecca or, more plausibly, that they were a group of nobles marginalized 
because of their Islamic religious identity in periods of disfavour towards Islam, such as 
that following the decline of the Mali Empire in the 15th century (Conrad 1995). Both 
hypotheses are supported by the popular term to address them as ‘Macca horon,’ i.e. the 
nobles from (or of) Mecca.51 The association of funew with foreigners and slave 
descendants is perceptibly stronger than it is with the professionalized groups called 
nyamakalaw (castes): despite their specialization, funew are not usually considered to be 
‘caste men.’ 
Unlike the blacksmith and moriw compounds figuring in Table 1, some other 
compounds of dependent people (nyamakalaw, moriw and slave descendants), preferred 
to categorise themselves as foreigners, even though some evidence suggests that these 
have been settled in Bancoumana since the time of its foundation. First-comer status, 
then, has become a proxy for high status to such an extent that being low status 
automatically connotes being a late-comer or foreigner. Therefore, the number of 
dependent people indicated in Table 1 is not as reliable as the rest of the data, because 
slave-descendants are not marked as such. Instead they usually carry their patron’s 
patronymic and their origin is publically acknowledged only in specific occasions. In 
private conversations, Fune-Camara tend to present themselves as Camara of foreigner 
origin and late-comers, and to make no mention of their fune status.  
On the basis of my informants’ knowledge, however, nine compounds can confidently 
be classified among the dependent families who settled at the time of founding, four 
                                                 
51 According to Diarra (1965), Bancoumana’s funew constitute a group of Camara people (whose status is 
not specified by the author) who immigrated, in the 1950s, from Faraba, a village south of the river. I had 
no confirmation of this fact during my fieldwork. 
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descendants of slaves and five funew (see Table 1). Dependent people, even if they are 
original settlers, tend to describe themselves as late-comers, since they do not want to 
publically acknowledge their dependent status. It is interesting to note, therefore, that 
both slave descendants and funew insisted on being described as foreigners (i.e. late-
comers) in my survey. In fact, their social distinction emerges only at specific 
occasions, such as when particular kinds of public speeches are made or when people of 
different status are asked to act as mediators. 
Further differentiation within the category of late-comers appeared in the course of a 
dispute described later in this chapter. 
Problems of first-comership: village foundation stories 
When the principle of pure occupation – the land belongs to first-comers – is 
realistically considered, a number of problems inevitably arise. Were villages such as 
Bancoumana always founded on no-man’s land? Did the settlement founders receive or 
conquer the bush land to be cleared and settled on? Did they acknowledge any relation 
of dependence on, or did they affirm their independence from, any other group of 
people? It is clear that the process of village formation – similar to the processes of 
fission and fusion by which compounds split up and new compounds are created – 
operates through ‘autochthonization’ of foreigners as new foreigners are incorporated.  
To a certain extent, newcomers can in fact ‘autochtonize’ themselves by hosting and 
creating new relations of dependence with subsequent newcomers. In the eyes of the 
latter, the former can legitimate their higher status through a series of narratives of first-
comership and original occupation of the land: aw bee ye dunanw ye, ‘we all are 
foreigners.’  
Property rights reflect relations of force but also need to be strengthened by persuasion, 
as lawyer Carol Rose has argued (Rose 1994). Force or violence per se cannot provide 
the legitimacy that is needed for continuous access to a resource. In other words, land 
claims – just like comparable claims to power and resources – are, to a certain extent, 
founded on persuasion and plausible narratives. In Mande, such a function is provided 
by village foundation histories as they are presented by oral accounts. Like similar 
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narratives elsewhere, these histories often legitimize the contemporary status quo 
(Jansen 1996; Lentz 2000). But that status quo may be more contested than such a 
statement implies.  
One of the most striking recurrences in these stories is the migration-and-settlement 
pattern: the founders of a new village are typically reported to be younger brothers 
fleeing either the unjust behaviour of an older brother or warfare, and settling in a new 
locality after a journey through a variable number of hospitable villages that offered 
them protection and refuge. These histories are narrated by members of the senior 
generation for a variety of purposes, notably to ‘reveal’ landmarks, to justify the 
distribution of land or to advance particular land claims. It is therefore almost inevitable 
that the disparate versions of such stories recounted by different village groups rarely 
coincide. 
Village foundation histories illustrate the tension between first-comers and late-comers 
and, in particular, show how settlement narratives provide a practical solution to the 
logical problems posed by first-comership. The following history of the founding of 
Bancoumana exemplifies that tension. It draws on the few available literary and archival 
resources, as well as on oral accounts collected during my fieldwork.52 
                                                 
52 Apart from my elder informants credited in note 10, useful information concerning the foundation of 
Bancoumana and other Camara settlements were provided in a conference on the origins of Sibi given by 
anthropologist Seydou Camara (himself a native of Bancoumana) at the Centre Culturel Français in 
Bamako (November 30th, 2008), as well as in personal communications with the conference speaker. All 
other literary and archival resources are acknowledged in the text. 
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Map 2. The Mande area, south-west of Bamako 
Source: Institut Geographique National (Paris), 1964. Scale: 1/1.000.000. Some villages have been added 
to the original map (Nyenkema, Gwena, Taboun and Bali), therefore their position might be less accurate. 
Kangaba – spelled ‘Kangara’ – falls slightly out of the picture, south of Madina. Villages mentioned in 
the text are highlighted.  
The narrative of Bancoumana’s foundation 
According to the locally established oral traditions, the village of Bancoumana was 
founded by three brothers carrying the same patronymic Camara, in the following order 
of seniority: Kolonwulen, Soridian and Faran. Their living descendants today are the 
three ‘autochthonous’ Camara lineages (kabilaw): Kolonwulena, Soridiana and Farana. 
Every resident in the village is necessarily attached to one of these, either as descendant 
or as guest.  
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The popular characterization of Bancoumana lineages, as previously discussed by 
Diarra (1965), employs the idiom of kinship relationship, when speaking about the 
characters differentiating the three groups of descendants. Similar to the way younger 
brothers are often described, the Farana lineage (the cadet branch) is described as the 
most dynamic, best connected to the wider world; while the Kolonwulena (the 
descendants of the older brother), just like an older brother in chief of the familial 
compound, are characterized as particularly welcoming to foreigners and as having 
great promptness in incorporating them (see also note 46 above).  
According to elder Lamine Sinaba, the three founding brothers were accompanied not 
only by their families, but by a few other families carrying the other first-comers’ 
patronymics Konate and Traore, and by clients and slaves (see Table 1 on page 127). 
The three brothers had left the village of Nienkema after the death of their father (see 
Map 2) and migrated to Makandiana (next to Sibi in the map) and then to Bali and 
Sobé. The former was a small village that still exists today as a hamlet, a few kilometres 
east of Bancoumana, and the latter an agricultural hamlet nearby which has now 
disappeared. It was after that migratory journey that either the three brothers or their 
descendants settled in Bancoumana. In each of those temporary places, diviners made 
sacrifices in order to establish whether the group of migrants would be allowed to settle 
permanently and find prosperity, but each time it was indicated that they ought to move 
on.  
When they reached Bancoumana – Sinaba’s story goes on – the priests asked for a 
human sacrifice. The blood of a young man of the cadet branch Farana was offered on 
the sandy square which still exists on southern edge of the village, in front of the 19th 
century mud-brick mosque. This place is where today the tontiguiw (the age group in 
charge of policing the village, see the next chapter) hold court and punish those who are 
attached to ‘the tree of shame’ (molobalini). The sacrificed blood of the young man 
mixed with the soil of the new location was spread all over the area on which the village 
subsequently expanded. Animal sacrifices producing heaps of feathers were blown by 
the wind over the same area, indicated that the site was favourable and the settlement 
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would grow and reach great prosperity. Reportedly, the Farana lineage was granted the 
village chieftaincy because of the blood offered in this foundational sacrifice.53 
As one might expect when grappling with a different sense of historicity, and with 
myths of origin in general, to understand when such foundation of the village took place 
is far from straightforward. When explicitly asked for an account of Bancoumana’s 
founding, informants like Sinaba refer mainly to historical events that took place in the 
late 19th century. However, when confronted with conflicting claims by other groups, 
the relationship of Bancoumana first-comers’ descendants with their land may be 
presented as established much further back in time. Such vagueness thus may serve to 
strengthen particular claims to originary status, though not without disputation. 
The historical context of the foundation 
Considering the historical events widely referred to in accounts of the foundation of 
Bancoumana, the time when the settlement was established has to be set in the late 19th 
century, after the attacks on and the consequent destruction of Nyenkema – the village 
Bancoumana settlers left – by the army of El Hadji Oumar Tall. This jihadist army 
operated from the 1850s until 1883, when it was defeated by the French.  
Nyenkema was a Camara village located somewhere in the area between Sibi and 
Narena (see Map 2) and built close to the Mande hills for defensive reasons. 
Neighbouring villages were Taboun and Gwena, which still exist, although not in their 
original sites. Nyenkema, having being destroyed, no longer exists, nor have its ruins 
been found. Jansen (2005) suggests that it is, in fact, the same as Taboun – probably the 
most ancient and prestigious Camara settlement in the area. Similar to other villages of 
the region, in 1943, after the French conquest and the end of the Oumar Tall’s jihad 
(involving warfare and slave raids), Taboun was moved from the area close to the 
Mande hills to its present day locale close to the main paved road Bamako-Sibi-Narena. 
                                                 
53 Similar findings are reported by Diarra (1965) and by Camara (2006:147), but most of my informants 
would not agree that the village chief must be a Farana lineage member. Indeed, as explained in Chapter 
One (page 36), in 2011, the office of village chief has been taken by a Soridiana lineage member, my host 
Nanamori Camara. 
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The founding of Bancoumana must have been prior to 1883 for another reason: when 
Samori Toure began the war of opposition to the French (ending in 1888), the village is 
known to have been the border between the two camps, and the Camara to have been its 
inhabitants (Person 1968:387). Although Bancoumana was not among the allies of 
Samori in the war of opposition to the French, the village had been saved by him 
because his mother was a Camara (Person 1963:126; 1968:399, 408), unlike other 
villages that were raised to the ground. 
The 19th century was characterized by extreme warfare in Mande, in particular after the 
1850s, when the rule of the Kangaba chiefdom was challenged from several sides. In the 
second half of that century, there were at least four armies raiding the same territory and 
fighting for different purposes such as religious conversion (jihad), colonization, control 
of the land and slave-raiding. There was the army of the Kangaba chiefdom, on the 
Niger river, under the leadership of Mambi Keita and the Toucouleur empire army, 
settled in Mouroula, north-west of the Sibi-Narena region, and led by El Hadji Oumar 
Tall and then by his son and successor Sheikh Ahmadou Tall. More significant in 
resisting French penetration between 1883 and 1888, there was the army of Samori 
Toure. Finally, there was the French army which, advancing from Kita, first defeated 
the jihadists, destroying their fortress in Mouroula in 1883 (under Commander 
Desbordes), and then, under the command of Vallière, pushed Samori south of the river, 
destroying the palace of the ruler of Kangaba, Mambi Keita, the principal ally of Samori 
in the area. The French took definitive control of Mande in 1888 (Jansen 2005). 
Other oral historical sources, however, recount that a village called Bancoumana 
already existed at the same location before the arrival of the Camara. Jan Jansen’s Keita 
informants, for example, report that Bancoumana was founded by Nankoman Keita (or 
by one of his sons) who had left the village of Nyagassola (west of Narena in Map 2), 
then migrated to Kong, in Côte d’Ivoire (at the time an important religious centre), and 
founded Bancoumana on his way back to Mande (Camara and Jansen 1999:50, 62-71).  
According to this version, the ancestors of the present-day Camara inhabitants of 
Bancoumana were settled in Sibi and, being in need of land, they asked the Narena 
Keita for territory. The latter directed the Camara toward their Keita brothers in 
Kenyeroba, to whom they had entrusted (ka kalifa) that land. Then, addressed by 
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Kenyeroba, the Narena Keita agreed to give Bancoumana land (ka dugukolo d’a ma) to 
the Camara (Camara and Jansen 1999:69).  
The use of the founding narrative in present disputes 
The version of the founding story offered by my informants in present-day Bancoumana 
does not directly contradict the one above. It claims, however, that the Camara were 
already inhabiting the area when the Keita arrived. More precisely, the ancestors of the 
actual settlers of Bancoumana were settled in Bali when the Keita arrived on their 
territory.54  
In this case, in order to claim that the Camara were already inhabiting that area of the 
Niger Valley before the Keita, it was emphasized to me that the three founding brothers 
were, imprecisely defined, the descendants of Kamandian Camara and of his older 
brother Masa Dan, two of the characters of the epic of Sundiata said to have lived 
during the Mali empire in the 13th century. Although a Malian academic researcher, 
Seydou Camara, suggests that the three brothers were not the founders of the particular 
village of Bancoumana, they should nonetheless be considered close descendants of 
Kamandian, considering that in virtually all the Camara villages of the area (called 
Sendougou) the founding lineages claim their descent from the same three brothers 
(Camara 1999). 
The perspective of the Keita – as reported by Jansen (Camara and Jansen 1999:50, 62-
71) and partly by Camara (2006:152-3) – and that of the Camara people, differ 
significantly and are at times contradictory. In fact, in these accounts, Nankoman and 
his descendants are said to have conquered the territory by driving the Camara away 
with guns, weapons that they had acquired in Côte d’Ivoire and that were unknown to 
their opponents. Then – the Keita narrative continues – the Camara, who were actually 
settled in Bali and not in Bancoumana, found refuge in the Mande hills by settling in 
Sibi and Nyenkema (or founding those villages). The migration pattern referred to by 
the Keita is the precise reverse of the one offered by my Camara informants. 
                                                 
54 Interviews with Lamine Sinaba, November 2007, and Seydou Camara, October 2008. 
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The opposing views of the Camara and the Keita concerning their relationship with the 
territory and the foundation of Bancoumana are not limited to accounts of the past. They 
have their use in present-day land claims and inter-village disputes. Today Bancoumana 
is surrounded by two Keita villages with conflicts regularly arising between the Keita 
and the Camara.55  
On the east, there is the village of Koursale (see Map 2), with which Bancoumana has at 
least two longstanding and ongoing disputes concerning both the control of bush-land in 
between the villages and fishing rights over a number of natural pools; on the western 
side, in turn, there is the village of Kenyeroba, against which Bancoumana has two 
other ongoing disputes concerning the payment of taxes and, again, fishing rights. Since 
Kenyeroba was included in the municipality of Bancoumana at the time of the 
decentralization reform (in the late 1990s), villagers have always refused to pay the 
head tax to the Camara.56  
A greater tension between the Camara and the Keita also reverberates in these disputes: 
in fact, some descendants of the latter are traditionally considered the Mande political 
chiefs (mansaw) because of their descent from the Emperor Soudiata Keita, while the 
former are traditionally reputed land priests (somaw).57  
Although it is a topic of conversation that many informants prefer to circumvent, 
Bancoumana rivalry with the two surrounding Keita settlements, which are probably 
more ancient, should be interpreted in relation to the lack of evidence of control, by the 
Camara, over that land prior to the foundation of Bancoumana in the late 19th century. 
According to written sources, in this period, the polity of Kangaba played a significant 
role in the founding of Bancoumana. Camara (2006:152-154) reports that in a conflict 
between the Bali Camara and the Koursale Keita, Mambi Keita – the chief of Kangaba – 
                                                 
55 This is documented in colonial archives for 1897, 1931 and 1947 (Camara 2006:153-4). 
56 As documented in Chapter Six, in 2008, only eight percent of the due amount of head tax could be 
collected in Kenyeroba. The tax collector reported to me that that was a success, since no tax at all was 
received from Kenyeroba in previous years. 
57 One of the functions attributed to the Soundiata epics is to put in relation all Mande patronymics or 
djamuw, either by establishing joking relationships among ‘cousin’ lineages or by setting roles and 
divisions of labor distinguishing clans (Conrad 2006; Camara 1999:63ff; Tamari 1991). Curiously, all 
sources prior to this oral history dating back to the 13th century, such as the written accounts of Arab 
travelers do not make any reference to the existence of djamuw (Seydou Camara, personal 
communication, December 2008).  
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offered military support to the Camara, who were the maternal uncles of the former 
Kangaba ruler. On their way back to Kangaba by river, three of his sons were killed by 
the Keita people of Kenyeroba. In revenge, in 1882, Mambi Keita, in alliance with 
Samori Toure, destroyed Kenyeroba and decapitated almost the entire population on the 
plateau of Kurukanfuga, next to Kangaba. Shortly after these bloody events, the Camara 
people of Sibi (also settled in Gwena and Nyenkema), looking for new cultivable land, 
turned to Mambi Keita, who gave them the territory between Koursale and Kenyeroba, 
the site of Bancoumana.58 
Thus, according to this version, the Camara had founded Bancoumana by settling on a 
territory that was given to them by a Keita ruler, in between two Keita places: the ruins 
of Kenyeroba and the village of Koursale. But then, the survivors of the Kenyeroba 
massacre, who had taken refuge in Ouoronina (another Keita village today included in 
the municipality of Bancoumana), asked Mambi’s permission to reconstruct Kenyeroba. 
Mambi gave his consent and annexed from the Bancoumana Camara all the land 
between the ruins of Kenyeroba and the Koba River (see Chapter Two). The Camara, 
however, retained fishing rights over two canals (called Trakajan and Kokoma), situated 
on the ground now returned to the Kenyeroba Keita. The annual collective fishing, with 
the Bancoumana Camara mastery of water, was (and still is) an occasion for conflict 
between the two villages.  
Many speak today of the elders in Kenyeroba as the ‘true’ masters of the land 
Bancoumana occupies and, reportedly, in case of any instance of higher importance 
concerning land, it is they who are consulted and who can reveal landmarks, not the 
elders in Bancoumana. Whereas one often hears that, in Mande, while the Keita have 
the monopoly over political power, the Camara are the priests of the land, holding a 
spiritual power over the natural resources in general, as in the case of control over water 
within Kenyeroba territory. 
                                                 
58 Seydou Camara (2006:153) cites ANM (Archives Nationales du Mali), Rapport Politiques n°44, 1931, 
subdivision de Bamako. Together with one half of the section Rapports Politiques (II E), the document is 
today inaccessible to researchers by decision of the Director of the Archives. According to historian 
Soumaila Sannogo, whom I met in the archives, that decision has been taken in order to prevent 
investigation into the origins of the prestige of the relatively large number of families which have been 
turned from low to ruling class status by the colonial administration (personal communication, Bamako, 
November 2008). This is only another example of historical accounts being used in day-to-day power 
claiming and counter-claiming in a modern, urban setting.  
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Let me summarise the argument relating to the foundation stories and their use. 
Concerning the distinction between first-comers and late-comers and the actual 
employment of these categories, three aspects have emerged thus far. Firstly, whether a 
group of people is identified as first-coming depends on the choice of a ‘pivotal event’ 
(Bledsoe and Murphy 1987:124-25). The founders of a village are by definition 
newcomers, having left one place and settled on new lands that are unlikely to have 
been uninhabited, or unclaimed, prior to their arrival. Even admitting the fact that the 
Camara were given the land by a Keita ruler – who had just destroyed and killed the 
population of a rival Keita village – the relation of dependency originating from this act 
is still contested, depending on how much emphasis the storyteller chooses to place on 
different elements of his account of the past.59  
Secondly, social boundaries defining the group of first-comers are, to a certain extent, 
blurred and contestable. A distant and, at least in part, mythical past is evoked in order 
to justify territorial claims with the clear intent to legitimate land use and occupation in 
present-day disputes. The oral transmission of (unrecorded) village foundation 
narratives leave considerable room open for historical manipulation, as demonstrated by 
the opposite migratory and settlement pattern offered by Camara and Keita informants 
with regard to the foundation of Bancoumana. It will be noted in the conclusion that, in 
territorial claims such as this, the boundary between first-comers and late-comers 
appears much more open to manipulation than in land disputes between ‘private’ 
subjects might do, requiring mobilization of a more recent past and involving people 
whose status and ‘place in society’ is less easily contestable.  
Thirdly, farming and ecological patterns widely diffused throughout West Africa push 
villagers to establish agricultural hamlets (bugudaw), which may transform into villages 
over time, especially by the incorporation of foreigners, i.e. subsequent newcomers. 
These established settlements may also revert into agricultural hamlets some time later, 
as in the case of Bali reported above. Therefore, it remains very hard to determine 
whether (and when) a seasonal settlement, to which farming land has perhaps been 
                                                 
59 See also, with reference to Western Cameroon, Goheen’s analysis on changing interpretations of 
historical events, selective recalling of historical past and changing meanings attached to gifts and to 
signs of political subordination (Goheen 1992:95ff). 
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entrusted by others, has transformed into a less dependent polity with ‘legitimate’ 
claims over a territory. 
It was observed in the introduction that, in Bancoumana, the principle of anteriority in 
land occupation underpinning dependent relations between first-comers and late-comers 
is in the process of becoming connected in more complex ways to sales of land in return 
for money. This occurrence is further complicated by the fact that people often resort to 
written, semi-legal arrangements in order to secure land transactions (attestations de 
vente) and that these paper documents increasingly involve the local administration of 
the state (municipal officials) in land disputes. 
For this reason, in order to pursue our discussion on accessing land in Bancoumana, we 
now have to turn to analysing the rapidly growing market of land in return for money 
and the role of the local administration of the state. The principle of anteriority of 
occupation and the idiom of hospitality articulates in complex ways with the growing 
importance of monetary land sales and the involvement of local bureaucracy, imposing 
constraints on them, but also opening new opportunities. As will be observed in the 
conclusion, cash and local bureaucracy do not straightforwardly equate to ‘the market’ 
and ‘the state.’ 
Sales of land and the use of paper documents 
The land today is increasingly marketed in return for cash. If this happens only 
occasionally for farming land, it has become standard practice when a newcomer tries to 
acquire some compound land in Bancoumana. In doing so, people make an increasing 
use of written documents, sometimes entirely handwritten; more often by filling a 
simple form headed attestation de vente available (in photocopy) at the municipal 
office. The parties involved in the sale, along with a number of witnesses and the village 
first councillor, head of the village council,60 sign the document, which is then 
‘legalized’ (légalisé) by the Mayor. Official state law does not require the signing of an 
                                                 
60 For detail on the village council, see later in the text (page 151) and Chapter Six. 
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attestation de vente in order to legally transfer land or any other property; however, in 
practice, this is the way people use these documents.61  
Following the model of French civil law, Malian state law requires all land to be 
registered in the registre domanial et foncier in order to dispose legally of it or to obtain 
a mortgage. If an entitlement already exists on a particular land plot being sold, the law 
requires a notary to draft a document allowing the buyer to update the record in the land 
registry concerning the particular plot. Unlike in continental Europe, however, most 
land in Mali does not figure in the registre domanial et foncier, because no de facto 
owner ever asked for its registration, nor was it demarcated or mapped with a plot plan, 
as would be required for registration. 
When someone wants to have his property legally recognized by the state he has to go 
through the procedure of entitlement established by article 75 of the Code Domanial et 
Foncier. This long and costly procedure starts by getting a geometer to demarcate the 
plot and to draw up a plan, which is submitted to the Prefect along with the application 
and various other documents. A public land inquiry then follows (enquête commodo et 
incommodo). An agent of the district land registry must go to the locality to register 
declaration and to minute any discussion regarding the site (Djiré 2007:7).62 Before 
such a visit takes place, an announcement must be published in the national daily 
newspaper l’Essor. Village authorities (i.e. the village chief and his advisors) and the 
Sub-Prefect sign the minutes (procès verbaux de palabre) and the administrative 
certificate.  
After the payment of a tax and provided that there are no counter-claims, the Prefect 
will grant a concession (concession rurale) for a five-year period, provided there is an 
undertaking to put the land into productive use. At the end of this period, a commission 
verifies that the land has been put into productive use and the concessioner is finally 
entitled to possession with a land title (titre foncier) after payment of a fee. A study 
conducted in the peri-urban area of Sanakoroba (Djiré 2007) has estimated the total cost 
                                                 
61 One may hesitate to call it state ‘legal practice’ (e.g. Mathieu 1997), since state law professionals such 
as lawyers and judges are not involved at all in the kinds of land sales practiced in Bancoumana. 
62 The competent district land register office for Bancoumana is in Kati. 
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of the procedure of land registration to be four times greater than the cost of the actual 
plot. 
As already observed by Keita (2003), in Bancoumana, virtually no land is registered 
through this process. From a query to the district land registry in Kati, it resulted that 
only seven land titles had been issued on lands in the village area since 1946.63 Three 
are state-related land plots: two hosting the buildings of Office de la Haute Vallée du 
Niger (see Chapter Two) and another one the house reserved to the director of 
Bancoumana’s school. The rest of the plots are registered in the name of two urban 
migrants: an anthropology professor born in the village (Seydou Camara, see note 52), 
who registered a plot of compound land, and a businessman (Charles Camara). The 
latter managed to register an extension large enough to include some agricultural land 
surrounding his isolated house on the bank of the river, about seven kilometres away 
from Bancoumana. This is the only land title including some farming land issued in the 
immediate surroundings of Bancoumana – possibly without prior knowledge or consent 
by local elders. 
Only a few exceptions to this pattern emerge when considering the entire territory of the 
municipality: for example, seven hectares of farming land near the village of Kenyeroba 
are registered in the name of former secretary general of the municipality Lamine 
Tounkara (see page 79 above), and a few other registered plots can be found around the 
village of Samako.  
Registered land sales in practice 
The fact that there are virtually no formal land titles in Bancoumana, however, does not 
mean that land sales are completely unregistered and that the local bureaucracy of the 
state is not involved in these. As noted above, people have started resorting to a written 
document legalized by the Mayor and archived by the municipality: the attestation de 
vente. Even though there is a substantial legal difference between this and the transfer of 
                                                 
63 The registry contains all land titles issued in the district of Kati. Volumes IX to XVII, covering the 
period between 2005 and 2008, had to be searched manually, for several days at the end of my fieldwork. 
The content of previous volumes, covering the period 1946-2005, has been transferred to a computer 
database and thus has been more readily accessible.  
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a proper land title, this practice is significant. As noted by Keita (2003), it is reasonable 
to believe that the use of the attestation increased considerably after the institution of 
the rural municipalities in 1999. Keita also notes that, even before the institution of the 
municipalities, similar papers were signed by Sub-Prefects: a finding that will be 
confirmed in the analysis of the dispute between Traore and Diarra (see later in this 
chapter).  
The attestation is envisaged by the law as a means not to transfer property, but to certify 
someone’s identity by acknowledging his signature as authentic. All sorts of documents 
can be legalized in this way, which is indeed one of the main sources of revenue for 
Mayors and their delegates when they manage to pocket the required fee. This 
pocketing of proceeds is a current practice in rural municipalities like Bancoumana, 
where ‘legalizations’ are rarely registered in bounded record books, as is required by 
law. The only guarantee that the Mayor will not divert the fee is that receipt must be 
issued to the budget secretary (Régisseur des recettes, who holds receipt booklets), but 
the Mayor may overcome this obstacle since he has both disciplinary and economic 
forms of pressure over municipal officials. The Mayor keeps the official stamp of the 
municipality which is used to legalize documents and – as many public and private 
officials do with various kinds of stamps in Mali – he is likely to have it on him when 
he leaves the office building, either for fear that it may be improperly used by others or 
falsified, or for legalizing documents ‘privately’ (when out of office). 
In a land sale document legalized by the Mayor, for example, it is neither guaranteed 
that the seller is the actual owner nor that he has the right to dispose of the land. 
However, in rural areas like Bancoumana where the land is not registered by the state 
and where buyers can reasonably rely on social recognition of the seller’s ownership, 
this document is used as if a legal means to transfer property.  
Despite the fact that the attestations are issued by a public official, it is impossible to 
know how many such transactions are conducted every year in Bancoumana. On a land 
sale of 150,000 CFA Francs (approximately £200, the average price for a 20x30 m 
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housing land plot), the municipality claims a fee of 10,000 CFA Francs (£15).64 Data 
held by the secretary general indicate an average of 11 attestations per year between 
1999 and 2008, but this number is unreliable. In fact, the Mayor is rumoured to hide the 
vast majority of documents of this kind in order to claim the legalization fee for himself. 
One copy of the attestation de vente is kept in the municipal archives, unbound and 
unregistered, under the supervision of the secretary general. As I was told by former 
secretary general Lamine Tounkara, a bounded registry of the attestations de vente was 
established only in 2005, one year before his resignation. When I conducted my field 
research, however, no traces were found of such a registry: the attestations (those that 
have not disappeared) still being kept by the secretary in normal, unbound files.  
This informality of arrangement, together with the Mayor’s influence over his 
underlings, increases the difficulty of assessing the number of sales. The three members 
of staff of the municipality (the Secrétaire Général, the Régisseur des recettes and the 
Régisseur des dépenses, see Chapter Six for more details) are chosen by the Mayor from 
a list of public officials established on district basis. The Mayor reports on them to the 
head of the district and virtually, in practice, holds the power to fire them. Moreover, 
the Mayor also disposes of various financial means to delay the payment of their 
salaries. During my stay, the salary of municipal staff was delayed for more than seven 
months on average. If the Mayor manages to put pressure on the secretary general or 
reaches an understanding with him, attestations can be removed from the file after the 
receipt has been issued. One reason the Mayor can keep the document in his home is in 
case a dispute arises and he is requested to show it by the litigants. In sum, from what I 
observed in the files kept in the municipal building, documents were entirely missing 
for the years 2003, 2005, and 2006; most of the transactions were unlikely to have been 
                                                 
64 This is 7.5 percent of the price. Although I have not been able to check the legislation, it seems unlikely 
that this percentage is required by state law. More plausibly, it is the outcome of an agreement between 
the Mayor and the village authorities, headed by the village council, who often negotiate the price of such 
services. This occurred, for example, in relation to identity card photocopies (documents most demanded 
in ‘legalized’ form by various state agencies), which was ‘agreed’ by local authorities at 2,500 CFA 
Francs. 
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registered. The frequency of registered land sales from one year to another appeared not 
to follow any intelligible pattern.65 
Land sales and hospitality 
Since people have started resorting to paper documents in land sales, particular kinds of 
land disputes have emerged. The most recurrent scenario is when a seller’s kinsman 
claims that the person who sold the land was not entitled to dispose of it. Typically, an 
older brother of the seller will claim to have been unaware of the transaction at the time 
it took place. It is claimed to be unacceptable that a single person take an action such as 
selling the land: although the headman of a group may, in principle, dispose of the land 
rights of its members, such power is often contested.  
Different agencies are called upon to settle land disputes and, although the involvement 
of state authorities such as the Mayor and the municipal officials, together with the use 
of written documents, may seem a recent phenomenon, it represents in fact continuity 
with the practices of land dispute settlement of colonial times, when the Commandant 
de Cercle, and later the Chef d’Arrondissement (today the first has been suppressed 
while the second is the Sub-Prefect), were very much involved in such matters (Keita 
2003:23). 
Both buyer and seller use attestations as a means to sell land while keeping fellow 
lineage members, who may claim to have some right to it, in the dark. Amongst the 
seller’s kin, for example, it may be contested that the seller is the individual with the 
power to dispose of family land. Even if he is recognized as having the right to act in 
this way, it may be disputed whether he correctly disclosed information both to those 
who are most directly concerned (for example his younger brothers) and to those 
holding customary – although not always effective – control over the land, notably the 
elders of the lineage.  
                                                 
65 Three transactions were registered for 1999, five for 2000, five for 2001, 31 for 2002, six for 2004, 12 
for 2007, 15 for 2008. Such variation in the quantity of land sales is not supported by qualitative findings, 
since all my informants suggested a steady increase of attestations over the last years.  
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In this sense, the attestation de vente offers the seller the opportunity to market family 
land with a degree of security accepted by the buyer, even if he fails to disclose his 
intentions to all those who would be normally required by local, traditional law to show 
their agreement.66  
In the same way, the document may offer the buyer a relatively secure way to acquire 
land, while also avoiding an ostentatious display of wealth before members of his 
extended family, who may claim a right to use the newly bought land. In cases like the 
one presented below, a buyer who is a late-comer in the village resorts to the attestation 
in order to bypass his hosts’ involvement in the sale. In this case, the written land sale 
disrupts the language of hospitality by introducing the possibility of receiving some 
land without involving one’s host, leading to a kind of land sale that literate informants 
described to me (in French) as ‘secret et anarchique’ (secret and anarchic, see page 79 
above).  
Secrecy is in fact one of the most recurrent concepts associated with written land sales 
in Bancoumana, just as with other actions related to money, no matter whether the 
monetary gain is real or merely hoped for. In the case of land sales in Bancoumana, the 
fact of resorting to writing is perceived by most informants in a strikingly different way 
than in Western legal culture, where the more secure and long-lasting effects of the 
written over the oral form are almost a matter of common sense (verba volant, scripta 
manent) also acknowledged by the law requiring the written form for valuable 
transactions. The hidden character of the written, formal document gives it a very 
different character from that entailed in such transactions. Here, it is the secrecy that is 
intended to achieve fixity, whereas transparency would render it subject to possible 
dispute. But even its formality may further unsettle, rather than ‘fixing,’ ownership. As 
shown by various analyses of land reform in a variety of African contexts, the recourse 
to written documents and the enforcement of land titling may often result in further 
insecurity of tenure (Shipton and Goheen 1992:316ff; Platteau 1996; Lund 2001:151ff). 
                                                 
66 Agreement here refers generally to the consent of various peoples, from younger brothers to the lineage 
elders, in very different positions in relation to both the seller and the piece of land in question. The 
binding nature of their agreement, or the efficacy of their eventual disagreement, varies accordingly. For 
example, the agreement of an older brother (especially if living in the same compound) would be 
perceived as more required and more binding than that of a younger brother.  
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Despite attempts at concealment, when either a buyer or a seller resorts to the 
attestation in order to conceal such a transaction from his kin, he is normally unable to 
avoid facing the social consequences of his choice. Disputes frequently arise in these 
cases, usually involving claims of land restitution, either within the buyer’s or the 
seller’s lineage or both. Given that claims about lack of information are an often-used 
pretext, one never knows in such disputes whether the claimants were actually informed 
of the sale or not. Further it is not certain whether customary law truly requires 
agreement of the whole family and, if so, with what degree of effectiveness. In other 
words, all these issues are the subject of constant negotiation and all are evoked by the 
litigants in very circumstantial ways.  
A written document such as the attestation may give an extremely unreliable degree of 
security to both the seller and the buyer (depending on who may later contest the sale 
and try to claim back the land), but it is at any rate better than nothing in many cases. 
Ultimately, it offers a way to circumvent some restrictions on access to land (and its 
possible non-agricultural uses) in the locality established by customary law, adapting 
the local land tenure system to the increasing need for money. Such a use of the written 
document was particularly favoured by literate, late-comer informants during my 
fieldwork, as the case study below illustrates.  
A land dispute between two different types of late-comers 
Cheickneba Traore is a retired official in his late 60s, who spent the last part of his 
career in Bancoumana working for a government project on adult literacy (baliku 
kalan). He arrived in the village more than 20 years ago to take that office. At the time, 
he had just lost his entire nuclear family (wife and children) in a boat accident near 
Segou, where he was serving as Sub-Prefect (a respectable post in the Malian 
administrative career). He moved to Bancoumana, accepting the undoubtedly less 
prestigious position of baliku kalan agent. After a few years, he re-married. His new 
wife, Djeneba Coulibaly, an educated woman, employed in Bancoumana by the local 
para-statal agency for agricultural development (OHVN), bore him two children. At the 
time of my fieldwork one was studying in Bamako while his younger brother was living 
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in Traore’s compound in Bancoumana with a few other siblings (classificatory brothers) 
of his age.  
Like every foreigner, Traore was given a host, Namakan Camara,67 who provided him 
with the village land plot where he built his house in a modern style: iron roofed, 
painted and made from concrete bricks, looking like the houses of other salaried, 
schooled persons in Bancoumana. Similar to other salaried people in the village, Traore 
soon realized that by farming one field he could support his family while saving the 
salary for consumption goods or other activities. He started looking for a piece of land 
for farming. 
There are many and various reasons why foreigners like Traore, who were able to make 
a living from their salary, try to acquire some farming land in Bancoumana, either by 
borrowing it from their hosts or by buying it with or without the agreement of the latter. 
The most obvious reason is to make an investment, allowing them to re-sell the land in 
case they have to move elsewhere. Others relate to other aspects of the integration of a 
foreigner in the village. Salaried people generally do not like to show that they have 
money and that they are making a living without even touching the land. Moreover, by 
having their children farm they benefit from free labour while giving them an education 
and a life-style that helps them to conform to local standards. Not least, many literate 
newcomers also like to show that the knowledge they have acquired through schooling 
and working, combined with their ability to afford the price of fertilizers, gives them 
better harvests than non-schooled farmers. In this light, the desire to be seen ‘to be 
farming as everyone else does’ may have motivated a literate foreigner like Traore to 
buy a plot of agricultural land in Bancoumana. 
As is the case with other salaried officials, instead of asking his host for land, Traore 
preferred to buy a plot when he could afford it, from a farmer who was not related either 
to him or to his host, but was a neighbour in need of some money. Moreover, rather 
than asking his host to act as intermediary in the sale, Traore bought his field without 
informing him about the transaction between himself and his neighbour Jidjigui Diarra. 
                                                 
67 There are no exceptions in the village: all 252 late-comer compound headmen who have been 
interviewed for my survey were able to indicate their jatigui (host).  
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His choice is likely to have been related to a desire to distance him from his host family 
(in order to avoid the tradition of the guest and his descendants farming in the interest of 
the host) and to affirm his financial independence. The decision, while it may have 
achieved these ends in the short term, resulted in a land dispute 20 years later. 
Jadjigui Diarra is a late-comer like Traore, but one in a rather different position: one 
which did not permit the claiming of similar rights to the land. While Traore is a literate 
outsider who moved to Bancoumana to assume his office, Diarra’s family settled there 
earlier and has a well-established social role as blacksmiths of the Soridiana lineage.68 
Diarra – the oldest among his co-resident brothers – is, and was at the time of the sale a 
compound headman. He is also well known because of his role as town crier. Almost 
every evening at sunset time, his loud voice, anticipated by a series of beatings on his 
drum, shouts public announcements, such as decisions taken by tontiguiw or 
summonses for members of a particular age group (see Chapter Five) for public interest 
works to be held the next day.69  
At the time of the land sale, Diarra and his nuclear family were left alone to take care of 
his mother, all his younger brothers having migrated to Côte d’Ivoire. Confronted with 
the duty of taking care of her and with no support from his brothers for the farming of 
the family fields, Diarra decided to sell two hectares of his agricultural land to Traore 
for 50,000 CFA Francs (£70). 
A written document was produced and signed by a number of witnesses, among them 
the headman of the seller’s lineage, El Hadji Messere (see page 121 above). Being a 
nyamakala (caste man) attached to the Soridiana lineage, it is very unlikely that Diarra 
could have sold or borrowed his land without the consent of the head of his lineage: 
dependent men are, in fact, expected to show that they received the land from their 
                                                 
68 Although I was told that Diarra’s family was one of blacksmiths, his patronymic would be exceptional 
in Bancoumana, associated with that professional specialization. All blacksmith compounds are in fact 
Sinayogo or Sinaba (see page 127ff above). It might be that the family immigrated to Bancoumana from a 
place where they were socially considered as blacksmiths and they kept that status, or that they were of 
lower status – nymakalaw or captives – and they are now addressed as blacksmiths. On the fluid and 
dynamic nature of these social distinctions, see Conrad and Frank (1995); see also Chapter One (page 
28ff). 
69 Diarra’s role as town crier, along with public announcing during ceremonies, message-carrying and 
inter-mediation in general, requires lower caste status and would not be performed by people of noble 
descent. 
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patrons and, in principle although not in practice, they are not supposed to be allowed to 
practice farming, as they have another professional specialization.  
Moreover, thanks to his connections in public administration, Traore managed to get the 
sale document signed by the Sub-Prefect of Sibi, i.e. the competent administrative 
authority (government representative) before the office of Mayor was created. Although 
not unusual at the time, the written form of the transaction and the Sub-Prefect’s 
involvement can be related to both Traore’s connection to the public administration (he 
was a former Sub-Prefect) and his literate late-comer status in the village. As explained 
below, however, Traore was unable to make any use of such written document in the 
course of the dispute, not even in front of the Mayor who objected that it was not 
‘legalized,’ i.e. registered and stamped by a public official after payment of a special tax 
(not simply signed as had the Sub-Prefect).  
In 2008, toward the end of my fieldwork, a younger brother of Diarra returned from the 
Côte d’Ivoire to settle in Bancoumana. After some time, he informed Traore that his 
family was now in need of the field that had been sold to him 20 years earlier by his 
older brother Diarra. He professed that, having been absent at the time of the sale, he 
had not been in a position to give his consent to the sale of family land. Now that he 
was back and needed to support his family, it was his right to claim it back.  
Traore turned to the seller Diarra, who seemed to take his side against his younger 
brother, but also said he did not know what to do, given that his younger brother was 
refusing to acknowledge his authority as head of the family.70 He repeated to Traore 
that, at the time of the sale, he had given the due information to his host lineage 
headman in front of witnesses. He also affirmed that all his younger brothers had agreed 
to sell the land in order to support their aged mother, given that Diarra was the only 
member of the family who had not left Bancoumana. Indeed, he added, all his younger 
brothers, including the litigant, would have been compelled to take that same decision to 
sell, given the migration of the majority of the family’s farming workforce to Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
                                                 
70 Different from what was observed above (p.144), in this case, it is a younger (not an older) brother 
returning home from migration and trying to claim back the land that was sold by his family.  
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My informants, who were friends of Traore (the buyer), commented that during the last 
two decades the younger brother of Diarra (the seller) had visited his family in 
Bancoumana at least four times, but had never previously contested Traore’s property.71 
They shared with Traore the feeling that Diarra’s younger brother was short of money 
rather than having any deep desire to start farming: having realized that land was now 
more fungible than at the time of the sale, he was trying to claim the field back in order 
to re-sell it. Now, they commented, a two hectares field is worth 500,000 CFA Francs 
(£700), i.e. ten times the price paid by Traore.  
These friends also noted that by claiming back Traore’s land at this moment, Diarra’s 
younger brother was hoping to take advantage of the death of El Hadji Messere, the 
headmen of the Soridiana lineage who, by witnessing the sale, had approved his caste 
man Diarra’s decision (Messere died in April 2008, shortly after the dispute arose). My 
informants stated that if Messere had still been alive this dispute could have never 
progressed, and would have been settled within the seller’s lineage in favour of Traore: 
both because Messere had witnessed and agreed to the sale of Soridiana land and 
because of his well-known mentoring and protective attitude toward foreigners 
(especially literate people), more even than to his own direct dependents.  
By the time the dispute started, Traore was getting older and increasingly ill. At the 
beginning of the agricultural season in May 2008, his illness required him to spend an 
entire month in Bamako for hospital treatment. Diarra’s brother took advantage of his 
absence to move from words to deeds and had a section of Traore’s field ploughed. 
When he recovered and returned to the village, Traore was very discouraged and told 
me that his case had been ‘turned down by village authorities.’ He lamented that the 
dispute could have been settled within their host lineages (in particular within Soridiana, 
the lineage of the seller), but that authorities within the lineages had been very 
dismissive for several reasons.  
Within Traore’s lineage (Kolonwulena), his host regretted that he was not in a position 
to defend him, because he had not been properly involved at the time of the sale. This 
                                                 
71 The case of Traore raised a significant concern among his friends, who also played a remarkable role in 
reaching the final settlement, see later in the text (page 152). 
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lack of involvement was also blamed ex post facto by Traore’s friends as the mistake 
which had lain at the origins of the whole dispute: if his jatigui (host) had been involved 
in the sale or at least informed in advance, Traore could have relied much more on his 
support in the dispute.  
In the seller’s lineage, in turn, the death of El Hadji Messere and the transitional period 
of his succession was certainly taken by Diarra’s family as an opportunity to claim back 
some land. Furthermore, Fadensé ‘Suruni’ (the short), who was expected to succeed 
Messere as Soridiana lineage headman after a period of mourning of four months, did 
not have the same reputation as mentor and protector of literate foreigners. Finally, as 
Traore commented, his status as a foreigner had meant a failure by the ‘traditional 
authorities’ – who could have settled his dispute by discouraging his opponent’s claims 
– to take the matter seriously enough and to deal with it timeously.  
Unable to have his case settled by lineages, Traore turned to the village council, an 
hybrid institution which acts as an interface between, on the one side, the more lineage-
based powers holding control of the land such as the gwatiguiw (extended family 
headmen) and the lineage headmen (kabilatiguiw) and, on the other, the ‘official’ 
political authorities with little control of land issues such as the Mayor and the 
municipal councillors.72 In June 2008 he paid a visit to Makan Camara – my host, who 
served as village first councillor (Premier Conseiller). The latter probably informed the 
other village councillors, but he was unable to do more than to summon Diarra and his 
brother. He heard from them, but then declared that, as such a dispute exceeded his 
competence, he was unable to settle it.  
Traore was invited to turn to the municipality which gave him, in his view, the last 
possible chance of having his case settled.73 It is uncertain whether the Mayor was 
                                                 
72 This institution is made by 13 representatives of the three lineages: five members each for Soridiana 
and Farana, and three members of the less numerous Kolonwulena lineage. More on the village council 
and on its history as institution created by the colonizers in order to collect head-tax and re-invented today 
as ‘traditional’ in Chapter Six. 
73 Going to court (tribunal de première instance) is possible, but rarely practiced when the disputed land 
is not registered in the registre foncier, although in this case the judge is fully competent to settle the 
dispute being assisted by two assistants (assesseurs à la coutume) who are in charge of advising the judge 
on ‘traditional law’ (coutume). Apart from the high costs of the procedure (increased by diffused 
corruption), the decision is unlikely to be enforced without a more ‘local’ agreement between the parties 
and their lineages.  
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involved, but I suspect that Traore avoided this official’s involvement because he knew 
a bribe of a considerable sum would be required to settle the matter in his favour and 
that this investment would be risky, considering that the Mayor’s term of office was 
about to expire. Instead, Traore spoke to one of the three deputies assisting the Mayor 
(adjoints) – perhaps placing a certain reliance on the commonality of their official 
positions – who tried to negotiate an arrangement between the two parties. The deputy 
heard from both and tried to convince Traore to return the field to the Diarra, for a sum 
larger than the original price, with Diarra’s promise that the field would not be re-sold 
so long as Traore lived (‘under Traore’s eyes,’ as I was told). 
While Traore was close to accepting the conditions suggested by the deputy, his friends 
played a significant role convincing him to resist. They felt extremely concerned by the 
case, not only because of friendship ties, but also in their capacity of educated late-
comers and farmers of land that many of them had bought with their salaries. As well as 
providing Traore with daily advice – ka ladilikan d’a ma, a significant expression of 
friendship in Mande – his literate late-comer friends took the case of Traore as an 
example of the fact that strangers can always be dispossessed of the land in 
Bancoumana and that transactions are never certain, no matter how much money was 
paid and documents exchanged.  
From then on, the agricultural season was almost finished and the field remained 
uncultivated, except for the part ploughed by Diarra’s brother: this was another reason 
that persuaded Traore not to capitulate so quickly. When I left Bancoumana, in 
December 2008, the dispute was still ongoing, but an agreement was then reached at the 
start of the following agricultural season. The field was split equally by the parties (one 
hectare each) without any further monetary compensation. However, municipal 
elections were held in May 2009 and a new Mayor, Adama Dantouma Camara, took 
office along with a new set of deputies. This delayed the production of a written 
document signed by witnesses (by some of his friends, for Traore) and legalized by the 
Mayor. When this finally occurs, it is not unlikely that the dispute may be revived, 
resulting in a different outcome.  
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Conclusion 
The analysis conducted in this chapter has suggested that land is an important attribute 
of political leadership in Bancoumana and that the control of access to it through rules 
of ‘hospitality’ expresses the legitimate rule of a group of ‘autochthonous’ Camara 
people. On the one hand, the socially codified system of jatiguiya (hospitality) provides 
an ideological apparatus justifying the primacy of first-comers and their sentiment of 
belonging to the ancestral land. On the other, such a system results in a relatively clear 
and non-negotiable social distinction between this group of Camara first-settlers and 
other non-autochthonous, and non-Camara people. The principle of anteriority of 
settlement, coupled with the right to rule reserved (in principle) to Camara people of 
‘noble’ descent, underpin such distinction limiting in very practical ways access to land 
and to political power. 
The distinction between first-comers and late-comers, however, is not as clear-cut a 
dichotomy as it might seem at first sight. Rather, it is a status distinction performed in 
complex ways (subtly, and often tacitly). A closer look at the various kinds of guest and 
dependent people in Bancoumana, some of whom may have settled a long time before 
and may also be autochthonous without openly claiming such status (see Table 1), has 
suggested that the categories of first-comer and late-comer are, in fact, internally 
diversified.  
The analysis of the dispute between Traore and Diarra shows not only that not all late-
comers are equals, but also that the mobilization of one’s relations of dependence is 
crucial in securing one’s access to land. Timing of the dispute – taking advantage of the 
death of the lineage headman who had witnessed the original land sale – is extremely 
significant at this regard. More generally, the use of the distinction between first-comers 
and late-comers has been described as highly circumstantial, being deployed with a 
variable degree of intensity depending on context and particular stakes.  
Although the line between ‘the people from here’ and others is strongly articulated in 
society, some room for strategic manoeuvre appears to exist. It is important to observe, 
however, that the multiple ways in which this dichotomy can be handled and performed, 
and the blurring of the boundary between the two, seem to constitute a much more 
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important skill now than it did historically. We observed such a strategy being 
consistently employed in the village foundation narrative, clearly aimed – in the context 
of present-day disputes – at legitimating Bancoumana as a polity controlling its own 
territory. We can now conclude that similar manipulations of past events would be less 
successful in disputes between people whose status in society is less easily contestable 
or manipulable, because such a status is grounded in a relatively recent, still 
remembered, and therefore less negotiable past.  
The idiom of hospitality provides one example of subtleness in handling the 
dichotomousness of categories such as first-comers and late-comers, and in 
consequently performing social distinctions based on status. The analysis reveals more 
than a set of rules – more or less rigidly applied – through which the elite group of 
autochthonous people tries to control late-comers’ access to land, while also granting to 
the latter some legitimate access to an important productive resource. More importantly, 
I have shown that by referring to the rules and principle of hospitality, social actors in 
Bancoumana articulate political relations of dependence using a single idiom, a whole 
set of attitudes and behaviours shared to an extent (although contested) by people in 
structurally different position such as first-comers and late-comers.  
Since land is an attribute of political leadership and an important symbol of legitimate 
rule, it is clear that dependent relations concerning access to it, as well as the use of this 
important resource, are of crucial importance for the understanding of the local political 
process in Bancoumana. However, the last part of the chapter, involving the dispute 
between Traore and Diarra, has made clear that ‘hospitality’ is only one strategy 
employed by late-comers to secure their interests. Another way, not necessarily an 
alternative to the former, is to resort to a written document called attestation de vente. In 
the dispute between the two late-comers, negotiation of the litigants’ status and relations 
of dependence with ‘autochthonous’ people seemed to be pitted against written 
documents. The involvement of the Mayor and the municipality, however, suggests that 
the recourse to written legal-bureaucratic instruments such as the attestations de vente 
may, in the future, affect Bancoumana’s land tenure system. 
The analysis of these atypical legal instruments, conceived originally for the purpose of 
certifying one’s identity, but used in practice to secure land transactions, has introduced 
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some complexity into the picture presented at the beginning of the chapter: rules and 
principles of hospitality are in fact mobilized through – and occasionally against – such 
written documents.  
On the one hand the meaning attributed to hospitality seems to be undergoing a process 
of change: from managing access to land as a non-commoditised resource crucial for 
both productive and political relations to a socially accepted way of selling the land as a 
commodity. On the other hand, however, the increasing involvement of municipal 
authorities in (perhaps increasingly frequent) land sales does not automatically imply 
greater state control over land. Indeed this occurrence has been questioned by showing 
the lack of effectiveness of the state’s complex, bureaucratized system of land 
registration. Apart from being extremely costly, state control over land seems to be 
successfully resisted by Bancoumana as a semi-autonomous polity. In Chapter Six we 
will see the same thing happening in relation to the collection of taxes. 
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Chapter Five 
Group Farming: the exchange and performance of 
agricultural work 
Introduction 
In the local agricultural economy of Bancoumana, work is normally shared and 
undertaken by mostly same-sex groups. Working groups (also known as ‘work parties’ 
in the anthropological literature, e.g. Saul 1983) are constituted for disparate tasks and 
can take a variety of forms, from the compound – the most common unit mobilizing 
labour analysed in Chapter Three – extending to various other associations of kin, 
neighbours, friends and the like. Among these, cohorts of ‘people circumcised together’ 
or groups of people of similar age, sometimes called ‘regiments’ or ‘age-sets,’ play a 
significant role both in terms of the energy they put into agriculture and with regard to 
their local reputation.  
Working groups can be understood in different ways: from an economic point of view, 
for example, they consist of arrangements of work-sharing or of exchange of labour in 
return for a payment (in money or ‘in kind’); but they can also be considered as social 
entities, offering solidarity and mutual help, and acting as the elements of a larger socio-
political configuration. Age groups in Bancoumana present all these aspects. They have 
many traits in common with more provisional sharing arrangements, such as 
associations of people aimed at accessing agricultural credit, buying fertilizers, selling 
crops after harvest or farming onion fields during the dry season, and yet are recognized 
as distinct from these. 
Age groups attracted my attention because analogous associations are widespread in 
Africa, having been studied by an older generation of anthropologists interested in 
‘social structure’ and socio-political institutions (see below for a brief review). My own 
concerns are also political in character, but in a different way. The analysis will focus 
on one particular age group – the Sina kari – numbering people of my own age and also 
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including three of my host family members: Lanceni, Bourama and Abou (see Chapter 
Three). Although my participation was not requested, as was probably appropriate for a 
temporary guest and a researcher, I was associated with the Sina kari and I 
intermittently joined it for farming and various other activities during my fieldwork  
In the description of the Sina kari working day, special emphasis will be put on the 
repertoire of behavioural codes and patterns which give age-group farming a ritual 
character, and which distinguish various kinds of farming in formal terms. A 
particularly prominent aspect of codified behaviour is played by structured speaking. By 
showing how these aspects matter crucially for the performance of particular kinds of 
work in Bancoumana – not entirely commensurable to money, i.e. where work is not 
entirely commoditised – this chapter will more broadly illuminate important aspects of 
collective and political agency.  
Weeding together 
Along with other groups, such as gatherings of friends (grins) and farming associations 
(tonw), age groups meet a considerable part of the local demand for group workforce in 
Bancoumana. The presence of a variably sized group of farmers working in one field is 
especially needed at bottleneck periods in the agricultural cycle and for particular tasks 
such as weeding during June to September, the rainiest months. At this time, weeds 
grow particularly fast, hindering the development of crops and needing to be removed 
in order to have a good harvest.  
Short of resorting to expensive herbicides, there are no mechanized methods of weeding 
in Bancoumana. The use of ox ploughs, which in other areas is adapted to weeding, is 
limited by the uneven way most fields are seeded in Bancoumana: even when seed-
drills are employed (i.e. seeds are not planted by hand, as is also the case), the spacing 
between rows is not regular enough to allow for the use of weed-ploughs.  
At both ends of the agricultural cycle (April-May and October-November), age groups 
may also be in great demand for sowing, labouring, harvesting and processing the 
harvest. All these activities benefit greatly from being performed in a short time by a 
large group rather than by a smaller number of labourers over a longer period. In the 
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case of weeding, which this chapter addresses in detail, one of the needs for unusually 
large groups of labourers (sometimes the whole compound workforce) is that fields 
need to be weeded more intensely and repeatedly during the first stage of growth of the 
cereals. Furthermore, if all weeds are eliminated at the same time, crops can develop 
uniformly and their growth will not be affected differently for different areas of the 
field. After a certain stage in their growth, crops do not benefit significantly from 
weeding.  
The work provided by age groups in Bancoumana can take various forms. Two of these 
which relate to farming – ‘bonda baara’ and ‘contrat’ – will be analysed in some depth 
in this chapter. A different kind, unrelated to farming and referred to more generally as 
‘kari baara,’ will be also briefly discussed. A detailed description of one day of farming 
the fields with the Sina kari will foreground elements such as speaking and 
commensality, showing the crucial part they play in defining the particular kind of 
interaction between the farming group and its ‘hosts’ (the landlord family), hence 
distinguishing one kind of kari farming from another.  
‘The people circumcised together’ as social institution 
After puberty, all Bancoumana residents, irrespective of any difference in descent and 
status, integrate by joining age-based groups called kariw (sing. kari). Differentiated by 
sex, these groups are widespread in Africa and elsewhere. They have attracted the 
attention of anthropologists for a considerable time (as far back as Radcliffe-Brown 
1929). In particular, they have been widely researched in relation to political 
organization in both East and West African societies.  
Starting from Evans-Pritchard’s and Fortes’ seminal classification of African political 
systems as divided between the poles of ‘state’ and ‘stateless’ societies (1944), age 
groups have been studied comparatively. By raising the question of how they fit with 
the models of political organization based on lineage and descent, age groups present 
anthropologists with an opportunity to nuance the rigidity of descent theory in studying 
societies allegedly ‘without a state.’ Authors following Evans-Pritchard maintain that 
age groups play a complementary role in political organization in relation to lineage, 
given that descent is the primary principle of political organization. Others, like 
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Middleton and Tait in Tribes Without Rulers (1958), argue that age groups are the 
elements of a different, more egalitarian type of political system to be distinguished 
from the type based on lineage. 
The subsequent debate gave rise to a number of cross-cultural analyses, general theories 
and comparative studies of age and age groups in Africa and beyond (Eisenstadt 1954; 
Stewart 1977; Bernardi 1985). It also divided West African anthropologists, insisting on 
the overwhelming importance of lineage and descent (e.g. Paulme 1971) from East 
Africanists, who observed instead that age groups were more fundamental institutions in 
the societies studied by them (Baxter and Almagor 1978). 
In Bancoumana, age groups are described as being formed on the basis of the common 
experience of circumcision (bolokoli, literally ‘washing of the hands’): a key marker 
distinguishing phases in the life course. While this is considered to turn boys into young 
men, girls’ status does not change to that of a woman (muso) until she marries (Arnoldi 
1995:153). In Bancoumana, young people (both boys and girls) are addressed with the 
same term kamalen when circumcised but unmarried. Unlike the formation of age 
groups, circumcision has lost today some of its meaning as a rite of passage: it is rather 
interpreted as a religious practice (associated with Islam) and in many cases it is 
performed at an earlier age than that which marks the association of young people into 
age groups. The association with circumcision, however, is still an important element of 
age group characterization and identity, as illustrated by the fact that kariw are defined 
as ‘the people circumcised together.’  
As documented by earlier anthropology of the Mande area, the formation of age groups 
marked the end of a village-wide ceremony of circumcision (Leynaud 1966; Cissé and 
Leynaud 1978). Nowadays, children in Bancoumana (both boys and girls) normally are 
circumcised within the first ten years of age, while in the past this operation was 
performed at the age of puberty (around fifteen years) within the same ritual context of 
age group formation.74 The operation is done in small groups or even individually, often 
by a doctor at the local health centre. The cohorts in which young boys and girls (both 
                                                 
74 For a recent account of a circumcision ceremony in Mande assessing its change over time, see Jansen 
(2009:116-118). 
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are circumcised) are grouped by decision of the lineage elders, in turn, may be formed 
even ten years later than circumcision: at around the age circumcision is reported to 
have been practiced in the past. 
So, in contrast to the past, being circumcised ‘together’ means today at around the same 
period of time, no longer in a single, village-wide ceremony. Despite this, the periods of 
time immediately before the operation and, even more, the aftermath, are marked by 
collective practices and celebrations. Groups of neighbours, kin and friends whose 
children are circumcised at the same time share some of the expenses families incur in 
similar circumstances. It is not uncommon, however, to find children whose 
circumcision was isolated and not followed by particular celebrations, especially among 
people recently settled in the area. 
Every group of men is associated with one or more groups of women on a day in which 
elders proclaim that groups have been formed. Male age groups can be associated to 
more than one female group (kari-musow), because they are less numerous than female 
ones. This is explained by differences in the activities male and female groups normally 
engage in, requiring groups of different size (not by demography as suggested by some 
informants). Although some of them suggested that female groups were more numerous 
because there were more women than men in the village, this interpretation is 
challenged by my census data, numbering the resident population of Bancoumana in 
4040 men and 4299 women (48 and 52 percent respectively). While the main 
occupation of female groups is preparing, cooking and transporting food, which can be 
done in small groups or by clusters of groups, male groups mainly engage in farming, 
an activity benefiting from larger groups of labourers, particularly for weeding. 
This discrepancy between numbers of male and female groups is likely to be recent. 
People remember equal numbers of associated kariw, and complain that age groups 
have been progressively understaffed by schooling and migration. While female groups 
simply became smaller in size, the frequency of male kari formation had to be slowed 
down, because of the need for cohorts of men large enough to farm effectively.  
Pointing to the different frequency with which male and female groups are formed, 
some informants remarked that, while two full brothers (sons of the same mother) may 
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find themselves in the same age group – a fact perceived as an anomaly, since it disrupts 
the egalitarian relationship among the same age group members – this is never the case 
for full sisters. In fact, it should be noted that, unlike men, many woman marry outside 
the village and many others who become members of a female age group come from 
elsewhere. For this reason, it is much more unlikely for full sisters to integrate in the 
same group.  
Emphasizing the limited nature of available agricultural group work in Bancoumana, the 
elders also refer to a ‘custom’ which would require a new age group to be constituted 
every three years. Although it seems unlikely that groups were formed after such an 
interval of years in the Gregorian calendar, this information suggests the following 
rationale: that the sons of the same mother would be unlikely to integrate in the same 
age group. Indeed, this occurrence is an image frequently evoked when complaining 
about the slowing rhythm of kari formation. Migrants and students beyond secondary 
school are excused from kari work (even for the time they reside in the village). Both 
are often attributed a status of ‘hero-rebel’ implying the suspension of many of the 
obligations required of age-mates (Bird and Kendall 1980:22). In consequence, age 
groups are understaffed and it now takes more time to constitute a cohort numerous 
enough to farm the fields. 
Particularly ‘rosy’ versions of the past are likely to be evoked in these discussions. 
However, beyond the historical/chronological accuracy, these claims highlight the 
important role played by dynamics such as schooling and migration in the understaffing 
of age groups and the disruption of values such as egalitarian membership, which now 
conflicts with the rules of seniority to be observed between full brothers.
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Kari name Known members/observations Year of birth 
Tamba kari  
El Hajj Messere (only surviving member, who died 
in April 2008) 
1905 
Banjugu kari - - 
Lamine kunba kari  -  - 
Mambi kari - - 
Lamine gnemé kari  - - 
Tantan kari kunba - - 
Tamba kari Host compound head Nanamori 1926 
Kaba Lamine kari  - - 
Adama kari Host and village first councillor Makan Camara 1939 
Tantan kari - - 
Shaka kari - - 
Shebou kari - - 
Adama kari 
Holding the tontiguiya (see in the text) until early 
April 2008 
- 
Moussa kari 
Host compound brother Abou. This age group 
succeeded the Adama kari as tontiguiw in early 
April 2008 
1965 
Lamine kari Host compound brother Yacouba 
1973 
Sina kari Host compound brothers Bourama and Lanceni 1980, 1982 
Jah kari 
Host compound brothers Bakari and Adama. This 
and the following group are considered ‘too young’ 
for kari work (see in the text). 
1985 
Solimaw kari  
The kari of the ‘[just] circumcised,’ a generic name 
indicating the most recently formed age group 
- 
Table 2. Chronological list of age groups 
 
  
Senior/‘retired’ 
groups 
 
Junior/’active’ 
groups 
Tontiguiw: age 
groups 
coordinators and 
village police 
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The cycle of age group formation and the relations among the members 
The order of succession of age groups (see Table 2) allows every individual to be 
‘located’ in time according to his age and in relation to other people belonging to a 
different generation. Therefore, as in other settings (James 1996:34ff; 1999:110ff), the 
cycle of kari formation provides one way in which people account for the passing of 
time in Bancoumana. Of course, there are other time markers, like the Gregorian and the 
Muslim calendar, concurring with this temporality; but the cycle of kari formation gains 
particular relevance in many circumstances in which rules of seniority are mobilized, 
such as the way interlocutors should address themselves, the possibility to joke or tease 
each other, or the particular deference one may or may not be expected to show to the 
other. In similar instances age – and its consequences for social relations – is understood 
in generational terms and according to the cycle of kari formation, rather than in 
Gregorian years. 
Age group members are bound to each other (and to the members of the associated 
groups of opposite sex) by strong and life-long-enduring bonds of solidarity. The 
relationship implied by these bonds is often characterized by employing a kinship 
idiom. In particular, members of the same age group are spoken of as twins (fla): a 
central concept in Mande cosmology (Tamari 2001; Dieterlen 1959).  
The twin term is significant for two reasons. First, it implies that group members are 
peers and therefore rules of seniority are suspended. This means that, among the people 
of one same age group, there are neither ‘older’ or ‘younger’ brothers, nor classificatory 
‘fathers’ and ‘sons’: all the members should consider and address themselves as equals 
with respect to age, as if age was calculated not in Gregorian years but in cycles of kari 
formation. One exception to this principle, regarding the appointment of the group’s 
headmen, will be analysed later.  
The second aspect of relevance is that the term twin establishes a fictive kinship relation 
of the strongest kind, because twins are necessarily children of the same mother 
(badenw). This evocates the strongest possible social bond in Mande: the sentiment of 
uterine brotherhood by which two members of the same age group are expected to 
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support one another and to keep conflict and disagreement far from their relationship 
(see Chapter Three). 
As shown in Table 2, in 2008, there were 18 age groups in Bancoumana. Two-thirds of 
these (12 groups) were of senior status, i.e. there were no longer engaging in group 
farming, nor in non-agricultural work of the kari baara kind described below. 
Considering their condition of ‘retirement,’ people evoke membership in one or other of 
these groups mainly when principles of seniority have to be used.  
Codes of seniority implied by membership in a particular age group matter in 
determining the order of the speakers, the length of time allotted for their speeches, and 
the eloquence that can be expected from them, on occasions such as group discussions, 
ceremonies and other political rituals (receptions, inaugurations, etc.). In such 
circumstances, it is normally expected that the right to speak circulates from youngest to 
oldest, within different classes of speakers, and from lower to higher status: first, 
dependent and ‘caste’ people and then people from ‘noble’ descent.  
The inter-generational order reflected by age groups is also of importance in 
determining how people should politely address each other using titles such as ‘older 
brother’ (koro) and ‘younger brother’ (dogo), or ‘father’ (fa) and ‘son’ (den), common 
modes of address which determine the appropriate register of a conversation. 
It has been reported to me that, while forming age groups in more recent years, disputes 
have arisen in order to determine the oldest classificatory father, i.e. the headman of the 
group (see below in this chapter) due to the fact that have people resorted to birth 
certificates, issued by the local municipality on the basis of the registry of the carnets de 
famille (see next chapter). Similar to other kinds of ‘chiefs’ or headmen, notably the 
village chief (dugutigui), this office is spoken of as pertaining to the oldest man of the 
most senior generation, but competition among various candidates is the normal case. 
Similar to what was noted in the last chapter with reference to land, this issue suggests 
that resorting to written bureaucratic documents does not necessarily solve conflicts by 
clarifying otherwise disputable facts: it can also increase conflict and uncertainty.  
The six younger age groups (‘juniors’ in Table 2) play a considerable role as the village 
collective workforce, particularly for farming. They are sometimes addressed as a single 
165 
 
cohort as la jeunesse (or dugu ton, village group in Mandenkakan): a term reminiscent 
of the short socialist era under Mali’s first President Modibo Keita (1960-1968), when 
the state tried to incorporate into the one party organisation these ‘traditional’ 
institutions and agricultural cooperatives (Amselle 1978; Cissé and Leynaud 1978).  
The use of kinship concepts and terms of address is pervasive, but complex. First, 
members of the same age group are commonly referred to as twin siblings. Second, the 
relationship between people in a set of groups (such as the seniors) is one of 
brotherhood as structured by age: therefore, the respective members will address each 
other as ‘older brother’ and ‘younger brother,’ but will not think of themselves as from 
the same mother. Finally, the relationship between junior and senior age groups is 
treated as one of (classificatory) fathers and sons, and, in this case only, also furnishes 
terms of address.  
The passage to seniority 
The passage from junior to senior status is not an abrupt one; instead it is marked by a 
liminal status called tontiguiya. Among other things, the position of oldest among the 
group of juniors (or, conversely, of youngest among the ‘fathers’) confers on the kari of 
tontiguiw a power to control all junior age groups and the right to act as the village 
‘police,’ including administering fines and punishments. All male age groups succeed to 
this position for a number of years, while no comparable functions are attributed to 
female groups.  
There is no regular interval of years for the passage of tontiguiya from one group to 
another: some group may hold it for a variable number of years depending on the 
formation of new junior age groups and ultimately on the elders’ decision. By acquiring 
senior status, the age group of the tontiguiw symbolically returns the power to the 
elders, who will then entrust it to the following age group.  
The power of directing all junior age groups can encompass different things. It can 
consist, for example, of organizing cohorts of young people – usually less numerous 
than kariw, but based on age group membership – who will do some collective work, 
like the construction of a building. This is referred to as kari baara (literally, ‘work by 
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the kari’). During my fieldwork, this was the case for some buildings that were required 
as the village contribution towards the establishment of various development projects.  
Kari baara may also consist of the preparation of a village reception, as I witnessed in 
April 2008, when the President of the Republic (Amadou Toumani Toure) paid a short 
visit on his way to the neighbouring village of Kangaba. On this occasion two age 
groups (the tontiguiw and the group that will succeed to them) provided more than 100 
kg of rice and were involved in the slaughtering of animals and the organization of the 
reception. 
The tontiguiw also hold the power of policing the village (and fields), holding court, 
administering fines and sanctions including lashing people held responsible for serious 
offences. This happens on the little square on the southern edge of the village, where the 
founding sacrifice is reported to have been made and where the tontiguiw gather in 
assembly, next to the ruins of the most ancient mosque. As I witnessed on two 
occasions during my fieldwork, the offender is tied to a wooden pole called ‘tree of 
shame’ (malobalini) and lashed. The very tense and dramatic situation surrounding this 
punishment on both occasions I witnessed – with the offender being dragged, 
handcuffed all over the village and imprisoned in various places before being lashed and 
chased from the village – was theatrically managed by the tontiguiw in front of a public 
of hundreds of young men and women, while no other people were allowed to 
intervene.  
By charging money fines, the tontiguiw collect significant amounts of money. They 
seize wandering animals and forbid people to fish or collect fruit at specific times when 
such activities are not allowed. The power of the tontiguiw of policing the village and 
the bush collide at some point with that of the ‘hunters’ (donsow) who also patrol the 
bush and the village at night. They are members of the association called donso ton, 
which, in contrast to age groups, men join on a voluntary basis. 
The tontiguiya passes from one adult age group of tontiguiw to the one immediately 
following by decision of village elders, as indeed happened in April 2008 during my 
fieldwork. As expected, the transition occurred during the dry season – a period of 
relative rest in the agricultural cycle – requiring less intense action for the tontiguiw, 
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whose powers are often connected to the local practice of agriculture, notably the 
protection of crops from wandering animals. 
The moment the transition of the tontiguiya takes place, however, is set by village 
elders rather than occurring after a precise, set number of years as claimed by previous 
anthropology in the Mande area (Dieterlen 1955, 1959; Leynaud 1966). According to 
these and other authors of the school of Marcel Griaule and Germaine Dieterlen, all 
over the Mande area circumcision ceremonies took place at regular intervals of seven 
years, determining a longer cycle of 49 years (seven times seven). The great 
cosmological significance attributed to this numbers, along with the method of these 
early French ethnographers, has been disputed by later anthropologists like Jansen and 
Van Beek (2000). 
As was observed with reference to the interval in the formation of new age groups, it is 
unlikely that the succession of tontiguiw occurs after a precise number of years (or after 
a precise number of new groups are formed): what is crucial is to maintain a certain 
equilibrium between the formation of new cohorts and the ‘retirement’ of others. This 
mechanism allows elders to maintain the age groups as viable institutions, thus 
bolstering their own influence and control, while also coping with reductions in the 
local agricultural workforce, mainly caused by schooling (students are exempted from 
kari work) and migration.  
A day with the Sina kari 
One day in early August 2008, the Sina kari was due to weed a millet field. At around 
seven in the morning, a number of people were entering my host compound to gather on 
the clay space facing the single-room dwelling of Abou. Two benches were arranged in 
an ‘L’ shape on carefully swept ground.  
A very large pot of millet porridge (moni) was set on the ground, covered, at equal 
distance from the benches. The bicycles of the dozen or so people present were leaning 
on the wall of the adjacent house, with machetes fitted in the frames and hoes tied on 
the luggage racks. Kari members were in a quiet yet talkative mood. The combination of 
a friendly gathering of young men with the slow rhythm of the housekeeping activities 
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being performed – by women – all around in the compound gave this occasion its 
particular character.  
Abou was sitting in front of his home with everyone else, chatting and welcoming the 
few late-comers. Plastic spoons, freshly washed in the kitchen, were brought by some 
children.75 Abandoning the benches, we crouched down all around the pot, each holding 
a spoon in his right hand. The cover was gently opened by Abou, emitting heavy steam. 
Some sugar was poured in. ‘Ai bissimila’: having thanked God and those present, 
everyone dipped his spoon into the pot to stir the still-too-hot contents before tasting the 
meal. The fellow diners were talkative and lively during the meal, acting rather 
differently from how they did at more ordinary meals shared between the compound’s 
members.  
While everyday meals are consumed by the family members of different generations 
eating from one pot (see Chapter Three), in this case, all the fellow diners were about 
the same age and unrelated by close kinship ties and co-residence. The group was able 
to eat only about a third of the extraordinarily abundant meal, which – I came to know 
later – had been prepared with more than 20 kg of millet. Sated, one fellow dinner after 
the other gave thanks: ‘A barika’ – the rest of the group replying ‘a barika ye Allah ye’ 
(‘Thanks’ – ‘Thanks be to God’). 
The rather relaxed atmosphere created by chatting and commensality was interrupted by 
Abou’s voice addressing those present. With a slight change of register compared to the 
ongoing conversations, he reminded the group whose field the kari would be farming 
that morning – information probably already known to most of those present. His 
communication was met by some acquiescing comments, to which followed an – again 
chatty – exchange of information concerning which kari members were expected to turn 
up later that morning and who, in turn, would be absent and for what reason.  
My host brother Bourama, also one of the kari members sharing the food, seized the 
occasion to let us know that he would not take part in farming because both his hands 
were injured on his recent trip to France (see Chapter two). Since his hands were only 
                                                 
75 These are colored plastic spoons, deep like a ladle, but with a short handle like a spoon. All age groups 
have stocks of such spoons to be used at breakfast before setting to the fields. 
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superficially scratched, the context of his self-justification at the group breakfast 
suggested that his absence from work right after he had returned from France was, to an 
extent, expected. His unusual behaviour during the following weeks – not eating and 
farming with the rest of the family – later confirmed this observation. 
Following these communications, some men expressed uncertainties about exactly 
which field was being worked and where it was located; these were answered by 
intervening explanations which lengthened the conversation even more. While they 
were still speaking, people began to stand up and prepare to leave, arriving at the field 
in sparse order. A few bicycles and small motorbikes were already there, parked under a 
tree by the time I reached the field.76  
The group of farmers was more numerous than at it had been at breakfast: another 
dozen people – all members of the kari – had joined the others at the field. About 25 
young men in total had started weeding the millet field. This, I was told, measured two 
and a half hectares and had indeed been entirely weeded by the kari by the end of the 
day. Two members of the family of the ‘landlord’ (forotigui) were also present in their 
role as ‘hosts’ of the farming group (both characterizations will be explained below). 
These men were two younger brothers of compound headman Mamadou Camara, who 
was in turn absent. As frequently happens in Mande, he let his ‘deputy’ younger 
brothers organize the hospitable reception of the kari. 
The group – including the two hosts and me – hoed in a row, advancing simultaneously 
along as many furrows as the members. Weeds were scraped by the hoes, picking 
rhythmically at the ground all around the millet stems. Weeding hoes, with their larger 
and rather sharp scoop designed for scraping and their short handle, require that one 
assume an inclined posture. The effect of the hoeing action is to swing the workers 
forward as they move across the field. Occasionally, the workers showed off their skills 
by taking sets of parallel rows while races to weed the furthest were called by people 
shouting and inciting each other. 
                                                 
76 These are called jakartas, from the place of their manufacturing. 
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The work of the kari was extremely energetic. Compared to everyday hoe-farming it 
was more pleasant, despite also being vigorous and demanding. While advancing in a 
row, people were often jeering and scoffing at one another, shouting, inciting or 
praising. Such a way of talking jokingly while weeding contrasted sharply to the 
moderate way of talking, alternated with gasps and silences, that characterize everyday 
household farming. In the course of farming, almost every working man was met by 
humorous comments, also addressing – with a more formulaic language – the kari as a 
whole, the landlord family, the village, the Camara, etc.77 
About two and a half hours after work started, a pause was called. The same large pot 
containing the millet porridge we had had for breakfast was brought to the field by 
Abou’s wife, accompanied by other young women from the same compound. The group 
of food caterers was also met by teasing comments (related to both them and Abou), 
with which they engaged very briefly before returning home. As at breakfast, women 
seemed not to be allowed to engage with the formulaic speaking interaction that 
accompanied kari activities, perhaps because of the gendered division of work, or 
because they were not age mates of the corresponding female group.  
The group of farmers, including the landlord family members, gathered in the shade 
under one of the trees right on the field.78 Some sat on the back side of the scoop of the 
hoe; others just crouched on the ground. Besides the fact that the ground is likely to be 
humid during the rainy August, to sit directly on the soil would be considered rather 
dirty and inappropriate. As had been the case for breakfast, the millet porridge was 
uncovered and sipped with short-handled ladles. However, since this time the group was 
too numerous to all fit around the large pot, people were taking it in turns to consume 
their portions. The workers could then rest for a while, sucking sweets that were 
distributed to all in equal number. The time to go back to work came soon. 
Farming carried on for about two more hours. The end of the working day was called 
when another group of women, this time from the compound of the hosts of the kari, 
                                                 
77 Camara is the most widely distributed family name associated with the ruling clan in Bancoumana (see 
Chapter Four). 
78 Save for rice fields, which are located on the flooded part of the countryside, all fields normally have 
several trees in the middle.  
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brought the lunch. This group of women was again met by jokes – especially since one 
of them unfortunately slipped on the muddy ground while carrying a lunch pot on the 
top of her head – but again engaged in little verbal exchange, just as they had done 
previously. 
Under the same tree as at the mid-morning break were set several pots containing rice 
(kini) and meat (sogo), this time of standard size.79 The meat juice from an additional 
pot was poured on the rice and everyone ate until he was satisfied. An abundant 
quantity of this main course was left over. Then the one pot of meat was uncovered and 
its contents were divided with care into equal portions, which were then handed to each 
of the participants. 
The aftermath of the meal presented an occasion for the hosts and the guests to thank 
reciprocally each other. This consisted of rather more structured and formulaic 
speaking.  
Structured speaking and other codes of hospitable behaviour 
It was Abou who first addressed the hosts in the name of the kari: ‘the group worked as 
hard as it could’ – he said – ‘and for the whole day.’ To this he added that the hosts 
were really to be thanked for the quality of their hospitality, as confirmed by the food 
they had graciously provided and, even more, by having slaughtered an animal. The 
older of the two hosts – Abou jan (the tall) – replied by thanking the kari and by 
praising its members for the work they had done on that morning.  
As usual in this kind of conversation in Mande, Abou jan’s reply was addressed not to 
the previous speaker Abou kunba, but to the one who was expected to speak after him, 
in this case his younger brother Kalou. The latter expressed a similar gratitude towards 
the group while addressing the Sina kari as a whole. The word was passed this way to 
their ‘guests’ on that day, i.e. the kari members. The first to speak was one of the 
nyamakalaw (‘caste men’) of the group, followed by others who also gave their thanks.  
                                                 
79 In contrast to the larger pots used for breakfast, about six/eight adult people can crouch around it. 
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Both the order of priority of the speakers and their location in space were clearly the 
object of consideration. The two hosts were facing the 25 guests; despite the fact that 
they had farmed together and despite the evident difference in numbers, they were not 
sitting among them.  
In contrast to other instances of codified use of space associated with speaking (such as 
group conversations by the elders), people’s placement was not rigidly determined. 
Such formality would have looked odd in an open space like a field. However, the 
positioning of the speakers clearly produced consequences for the ‘quality’ of speech 
and its effects on the listeners, who could experience the feeling of a proper circulation 
of the word between different points in space. Speech was launched and received, 
perhaps in rather unpredictable ways for less experienced listeners, but effectively 
engendering a feeling of circulation in space.  
The content of such conversations is usually rather banal and repetitive – thanking, 
praising, blessing, etc. What matters for the participants, however, is its form. With 
variable degrees of codification, structure and use of formulas, the speech interaction 
that was occurring at the end of the farming day was constructed as clearly distinct from 
ordinary conversations. In its most structured utterances, it was rather similar to the 
speeches made by elders (the classificatory fathers of kari farmers) in discussion spaces 
such as vestibules. The people here, however, were younger and were performing a 
working activity in an open space. In Mandenkakan, such a codified way of speaking is 
called kuma (‘the spoken word’) and distinguished from baro (‘chatting’) which denotes 
instead more ordinary conversations in which linguistic codes, patterns and formulas 
play a less prominent part. 
In the account of a setting such as this day of kari farming, the analytical description of 
all the material elements that appear to support and to surround the spoken words risks 
hindering the combination of lively and immaterial aspects experienced by the 
participants. The ‘good quality’ of these aspects, including how verbal interaction was 
performed, is reflected in the way people comment on occasions such as the Sina kari 
farming day. As people remarked to each other at the end of that Saturday: ‘kuma 
dyara,’ – ‘the word has been pleasant, properly spoken.’ 
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Group farming calendar 
August is a typical bottleneck time for Bancoumana farmers. Around this time, fields 
have to be properly weeded in order to benefit best from the heavy rains which begin to 
fall at that time. While some compounds can afford to employ seasonal labourers in 
order to supplement the household workforce, others rely on the work of age-based and 
similar groups (called tonw or grupuw). In a compound like Messerejanna,80 for 
example, the men (and women) who farm the fields on a daily basis – normally between 
five and seven – were insufficient in number to work the almost ten hectares that were 
cultivated by the compound members for the family’s needs, especially at weeding 
time. In only one day, in contrast, an age group of the size of the Sina kari could weed 
one quarter of such an extension (two and a half hectares). 
Considering that most fields need to be weeded two or three times in the span of four 
months, the advantages of this kind of group farming are evident. Weeding frequency 
can reduce to two for quicker growing types of cereals like ‘three months’ rice (malo 
sabani) and equivalent types of millet, provided that rain has not been too abundant. For 
the tiny minority that can afford the use of expensive herbicides in sufficient dosage, 
then one only session of weeding might suffice.81 
Kariw are very busy for the whole length of the agricultural season and especially at 
weeding times. From July to October 2008, the age groups of working age regularly 
hoed fields once per week, giving the impression that their calendar was entirely 
‘booked up.’ Although weeding usually stops in September, age groups are still 
frequently called upon in the following month for harvesting and husking. Some of 
them also own husking machines which are hired out (with or without kari workers) at 
harvest time. 
Hired group work such as that performed by kariw is not only employed on family 
fields – known as foroba and farmed by the compound’s workforce. In addition, age 
groups can also be hired for farming individual fields. These may be fields which have 
been entrusted by the household head to one member of the compound (either a man or 
                                                 
80 This was my host compound (see Chapter Three). 
81 Herbicides cost about 25,000 CFA Francs (£30) per hectare in 2008. 
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a woman) for the needs of a more restricted part of the family. These are called ‘servant 
fields’ (jonforo): a term echoing the ideological slant put on the fact of non-compound 
land allocated to individuals. As one might expect, though, benefiting from compound 
work is not as likely in this case. Resorting to a farming group is a common solution to 
the problem, especially for tasks like weeding, which require the highest possible 
number of labourers.  
Wealthier people may have recourse to the more expensive but less socially binding 
solution of hiring day labourers for a variety of operations, from sowing to weeding. 
The ox-plough can be employed effectively for weeding, provided that the field is 
seeded in an extremely regular way (with the help of a seed drill) and that, as soon as 
the crops stem, young stalks are transplanted at a regular distance from each other. 
Despite the efforts of the local para-statal agency for agricultural development (OHVN) 
to promote this technique, however, the vast majority of Bancoumana farmers prefer to 
avoid such a time-consuming sowing phase. Most farmers carry on sowing by hand 
(with no transplanting) in order to spend as much time and energy as possible for 
weeding, which may include resorting to group farming by kariw or other groups hired 
specifically for this task. 
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Week day Group farming 
Monday (market day) - 
Tuesday Lamine kari 
Wednesday 
Namasa ton (association of former 
banana cultivators) 
Thursday Moussa kari 
Friday (holy day) - 
Saturday Sina kari and Adama kari 
Sunday Donso ton (hunters’ association) 
Table 3. Weekly calendar of group farming 
 
 
As for hired agricultural work, in turn, there is in fact little availability. As Table 3 
shows, at the time of my fieldwork, only four age groups, including the Sina kari, and 
two other associations were each farming one day per week. The Namasa and the 
Donso groups farm on Wednesday and Sunday: in contrast to age groups, these are 
joined (by adult men) on a voluntary basis. They also have other group activities beyond 
farming, like operating a rotating credit fund in the case of the Namasa ton. Some other 
groups, including women’s, do not figure in Table 3, although they also engage in group 
farming on a regular basis. 
In 2008, the weekly schedule presented in Table 3 was followed for the whole length of 
the farming season. Groups farmed four days in the week. Since Monday is the market 
day, it is considered inauspicious to engage in agricultural activities and work of other 
kinds. Friday, in turn, is the day adult people gather at the central Mosque for mid-day 
prayers: although work is not prohibited – indeed much individual work, such as 
gardening or collecting wood, is done on Friday – proper agricultural work is 
suspended.  
During my fieldwork, some requests for kari work were not responded to because of 
time constraints, suggesting that such groups are in high demand in Bancoumana. After 
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a certain stage in their growth, then, crops no longer benefit significantly from weeding. 
Striving to meet the high demand for their activities, age groups in Bancoumana offer 
two different forms of farming distinguished, among other things, by the exchanges and 
performances of work (and of words too, as we have seen above). 
Different types of kari farming 
The work of the Sina kari on Mamadou’s field was of a kind referred to as bonda baara: 
this is ‘work for a compound’ (literally, ‘in front of the door of the house’).82 Since 
bonda denotes the house of the mother – the place associated with maternal grouping, 
see Chapter Three – such terminology evokes uterine brotherhood.  
In this form of work, codified speech plays the most significant role. The landlord had 
paid the age group 5,000 CFA Francs (£10) and, most importantly, he provided an 
appropriate reception to the group working on his family field. This consisted in feeding 
the group of about 25 farmers with approximately 20 kg of millet porridge, three large 
pots of rice and one large pot containing the meat of one goat. Moreover, it required the 
landlord family to work together with the age group members, in order to host them 
properly. 
The fact of being paid in kind and not in money – specifically in food that needs to be 
readily consumed, jointly by hosts and guests – has important consequences and 
meaning. Firstly, it tends to characterize group farming as interaction of a ‘ritual’ kind, 
whereby labour is only indirectly exchanged for money, and is not fully commensurable 
in monetary terms. Much acting and speaking are required in order to mediate the 
exchange of group labour for money. It will be observed later that the calculation of the 
labour of the kari members towards the group itself seems of a more commoditised 
nature, since absent people are required to pay a fee. As shown in this instance, 
however, the work of the group as a whole, vis-à-vis the outside world, appears less 
directly convertible into money, and less commoditised.  
                                                 
82 As explained later in this chapter, this normally consists of a compound of the same lineage as the 
group of laborers.  
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Another consequence of being paid in kind is that, in contrast to exchanges which can 
be ‘settled’ by monetary payment, ritual interaction of the bonda baara kind leaves both 
parties mutually obligated: the landlord toward the age group because the latter farmed 
his fields, and the age group towards their hosts for providing food and hospitality. 
Finally, the money paid to the group (about £10) is an almost symbolic amount: clearly 
not enough to be intended as monetary compensation for the two dozen workers. This 
aspect ultimately distinguishes the members of a farming group such as the Sina kari 
from a group of daily labourers. 
The landlord paid not only a sum of money to the kari, but also for the food, including 
meat, and its preparation by women in his compound. All this was probably worth 
20,000 CFA Francs (£30): a sum approximately corresponding to the daily wage of a 
comparable number of casual labourers (or to half a day of tractor ploughing as 
observed in Chapter Three). Bonda baara, however, consists of more than a monetary 
exchange, since the parties involved behave as if what they exchange is 
incommensurable. As described above, this type of group work entails speech, 
commensality and performance of a particular kind of farming characterized by the use 
of specific codes and patterns of interaction, such as structured speaking, both between 
hosts and guests and among the farmers themselves, as illustrated by the ritual joking 
and the showing off of individual skills during the day with the Sina kari.  
All the different aspects distinguishing this kind of activity from others are undoubtedly 
difficult either to categorize or to commensurate in monetary terms. However, they have 
in common the fact that they are enacted in a performance of work which prominently 
relies on ritual codes (compared to other forms of work), including codified interaction 
among so-called ‘hosts’ and ‘guests,’ and formulaic speech. 
The ritual dimension emerging from the performance of speech among other codes in 
group farming of the bonda baara kind may be pushed further by emphasizing its 
predominantly ‘oral’ character. Reference to measurements and accounting are kept to a 
minimum. The portion of the field to be farmed by the kari is not agreed in advance 
with the owner, neither in form of a specific measurement (a number of hectares) nor as 
an approximate extension. Instead, the kari works at its own rhythm for the 
conventionally established length of the working day (from 7-8 am to 2-3 pm).  
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Similarly, there is no established measure of money payment concerning the hospitality 
of the kari: normally, this would include the payment of a sum of money and the 
preparation of food for the kari according to their hosts’ means. The standard is flexible, 
although proper hospitable behaviour entails overabundant portions of food – which 
cannot be consumed entirely, as during festivities – and, in particular, the slaughtering 
of an animal (normally one goat). 
Group farming ‘by contract’ 
All these features differentiate the farming described above from the alternative way age 
groups farm in Bancoumana: ‘by contract.’ There is no Mandenkakan word referring to 
this more commoditised form of kari work, instead the French contrat is used. In this 
case, the age group is hired by the landlord for a specific agricultural task. In contrast to 
bonda baara, the landlord will not be expected to provide nourishment for the group; he 
will pay, instead, a more consistent sum of money agreed with the kari averaging 
25,000 CFA Francs. The precise piece of land to be farmed is agreed in advance 
between a representative of the group (see below) and the landlord, who may meet on 
the field before agreeing on the extension of land to be farmed ‘as seen.’ Farming does 
not necessarily take the full length of the working day.  
Breakfast – and lunch if necessary – is prepared by women of the associated female kari 
(kari-musow), who are provided with cereals bought by their male counterparts to which 
is added the ‘price of the sauce’ (nasongo), a sum of money presented as for buying 
ingredients, but in fact also a form of payment. The food prepared on such occasions is 
supplied in large quantities, although both the meal and the atmosphere of its 
consumption hardly compare to the bonda baara setting. Notably, while in that case 
over-abundance of food clearly is a sign of hospitality, here it would be perceived as 
unnecessary, or wasteful. On such an occasion, there would be no reason to slaughter an 
animal and, consequently, to consume a meat dish like the one that was eaten by Sina 
kari members. 
Bonda baara and contrat entail comparable amounts of money flowing from one party 
to the other: in bonda baara the sum spent on hospitality – or what is often thought of 
as ‘in kind’ – is the equivalent of what, in contrat, is paid more overtly in exchange for 
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work, hence constituting a more commoditised exchange. What distinguishes the bonda 
baara setting, then, is a codified pattern of social interaction in which speech and other 
elements play a crucial role in mediating the economic exchange; so participants can 
pretend and behave as if their labour were not being exchanged in return for money.  
Hospitable behaviour involves exchange of hospitable words such as thanking and 
praising, the good quality of the meal and the slaughtering of animals. As experienced 
through the senses of a participant observer, this kind of work is more than surrounded 
or accompanied by words: the exuberant quality of words performed in bonda baara is 
what confers great seriousness and meaningfulness on the various social and material 
exchanges involved in group farming.  
The administration of fines and money by the tombolomaw  
The relative lack of references to written practices and culture in the setting of kari 
farming should not be overemphasised. It was noted earlier that, despite the 
performance of elements connected to the domain of orality, some type of group 
farming makes explicit recourse to measurements and prices – two aspects classically 
connected to written culture (Goody 2010). Moreover, in the very setting of bonda 
baara farming, I observed a limited recourse to writing in the form of a book-keeping 
activity.  
When the first break from work was called in the fields, the names of those present were 
roll-called, both absent and attending people being registered in a notebook. Since those 
absent are fined, such recourse to writing is connected with the collection and 
administration of money. This not only plays a particularly important role in the 
functioning of age groups in Bancoumana, but also has significant consequences on 
their organization.  
A day of unjustified absence from communal work costs each member of the group a 
‘tax’ of 750 CFA Francs (£1). The French verb taxer is the vernacular term often 
employed in Mandenkakan in this instance, as well as in other instances, of fines 
collection. It is no coincidence that such an amount of money corresponds to the daily 
casual work wage in Bancoumana. This indicates, in fact, that individual labour of age 
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group members is measured and exchanged in monetary terms, at least to a greater 
extent than the work of the groups overall as observed above.  
Every age group gives some of its members the task of collecting these fines, alongside 
hearing justifications and more generally solving disputes and enforcing group 
decisions. Higher fines, punishing misconduct of kari members – no matter whether 
related to the group activities or not – are also administered. The money thus collected, 
together with the income generated from farming and other kari activities (like letting 
mills and husking machines), goes into the kari coffers. The powerful role played by 
those in charge of collecting and keeping the money – the tombolomaw – is connected 
with basic literate skills such as book keeping.  
As in most such associations, the administration of the communal fund is a crucial 
aspect of group life. Money is spent, lent or invested by age groups throughout the year, 
and kariw have significantly different reputations concerning their wealth, their ability 
to generate, collect and administer money. Small sums of money can be gifted or lent to 
a member on occasions such as marriages and funerals; greater sums are spent for 
buying food for public festivities (e.g. sugar during the Ramadan fast) and village 
receptions (e.g. the reception for Mali’s President) and even invested by better-off 
groups in trading cereals, buying from the same local farmers on whose fields they 
harvested the crop. These activities can be done either for the benefit of their members 
or for market speculation.  
All actions connected to the administration of money are carried on by the tombolomaw, 
who are likely to keep written notes and consult their most skilled and schooled friends 
on accountancy matters. Book-keeping aids the effective collection of fines in a number 
of ways, for example by allowing those who are short of money to delay their payments 
without losing the record of how much they owe. Moreover, performing acts referring 
to written records, like roll-calling on the fields, provide tombolomaw with a 
disciplinary power echoing that in school. Similar aspects may have reinforced the 
tombolomaw’s authority over time, hence altering the hierarchical relations, 
organization and functioning of age groups in Bancoumana. Another, perhaps more 
important aspect of hierarchy in this office is that its higher ranks are occupied 
exclusively by ‘first-comers,’ as will be explained shortly.  
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However, even when agricultural work is more commoditised and monetised, as in 
contrat farming, the clients of the kari may be chosen and prioritised according to 
criteria such as the client’s position in his lineage, kinship affiliation or status 
distinction, as against the time of the request or the amount of money offered. Although 
writing appears to have reinforced the tombolomaw’s authority, the social nature of 
work prioritisation has perhaps made it unnecessary for kariw in Bancoumana to keep 
particularly accurate records concerning the calendar of their work.  
The tombolomaw are sometimes spoken of as the men counterbalancing the kari 
headman, the other authority described in the concluding section. In contrast to the 
headman, who is chosen by the elders, tombolomaw are designated by the kari members 
themselves. In respect to their fellow members, they can be either sons or fathers in 
classificatory terms; however, they are chosen from among the ranks of those who are 
spoken of as the descendants of the first-settlers of Bancoumana.83 Therefore they are in 
some respect separate from the rest of the group, which includes late-comers and 
strangers who have resided since some time in the village. 
The number of tombolomaw differs in each age group, but is always distributed 
according to lineage membership. Most groups have six: two for each of the three 
lineages (Kolonwulena, Soridiana, Farana). However, some other groups have different 
and even variable numbers, resulting in a rather flexible organization of authority. The 
equal balance among the two most populous lineages – Soridiana and Farana – is 
always observed, while this cannot always be the case in relation to the less numerous 
Kolonwulena, who are entitled to fewer representatives in some of the groups.84 
Flexibility in group organization, authority and shape will emerge more clearly in the 
conclusion as an important aspect in relation to the headman.  
Compared to other domains such as tax collection (see next chapter), the recourse to 
writing seems fairly limited in kari farming. Notably, the forms of book-keeping and 
accounting used by age groups seem to have resulted in, or paralleled, fewer significant 
barriers in literacy. Tombolomaw are not particularly more schooled than their fellow 
                                                 
83 This is the category of people described in detail in Chapter Four. 
84 As explained in Chapter Four, the three lineages have a population of 3,436; 2,873; and 2,005 
respectively (or 41, 35, and 24 percent of the overall resident population). 
182 
 
kari members. After descent from first-comers, more significant for their appointment is 
their status and prestige, which seem to be not prominently affected by literacy and 
schooling; at least as long as age groups in Bancoumana perform such a crucial role in 
the agricultural cycle and economy. It was noted (page 161), on the contrary, that 
people pursuing their studies beyond secondary school (the highest level of education 
offered in Bancoumana) are excused – excluded, from another point of view – from 
age-group farming.  
The comparison to the domain of taxation suggests that the relatively limited influence 
of writing on age-group farming bears a significant connection to the central role that 
age groups still play for hoe-farming in the local economy. In particular, despite the 
other tasks described above, including more commoditised forms of selling their 
agricultural labour, bonda baara does still constitute a major occupation for age groups, 
requiring remarkable amounts of time and physical energy without which local food 
production would hardly be sustainable.  
True, the connection between age groups and hoe agriculture is far from univocally 
determined, and indeed evidence suggests it has gone through significant changes over 
time – including some commoditisation of labour that is now exchanged in return for 
money. However, the means of mediating such transactions – in more or less intense 
ways following the distinction between bonda baara and contrat – all seem to require a 
certain ‘embeddedness’ in the local social context and skills which are unlikely to be 
possessed by foreigners and outsiders.  
Conclusion: the segmented and flexible organization of kariw 
As emerged from the account opening this chapter, my host brother Abou was 
addressed as the representative of the Sina kari. Since all age groups are named after 
their headmen (see Table 2), I wondered what could explain the exception of the Sina 
kari and why I did not meet the man called Sina until some time later. The fact that 
Abou was about 20 years older than the rest of the members, then, was an apparent 
anomaly. In fact, I knew Abou as belonging to a different age group, namely the 
Moussa kari (see Table 2 and Table 3, on page 162 and 175 respectively). However, for 
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the reasons that I address in this section, every Saturday he was joining the age group of 
his ‘younger brothers’ (the Sina kari) for farming. 
The first time I asked why the kari head Sina was not present to farm with our group on 
Saturdays, it was explained to me – rather evasively – that he had gone to Bamako for a 
period of time. Although this was true, Sina never joined ‘his’ kari. When he eventually 
returned to Bancoumana, he farmed instead with a separate group of people from the 
same age group. As I soon understood – and later discussed in more explicit terms with 
my informants – the Sina kari was spoken of as one, but there were actually two groups 
of people farming with that name. The existence of this division was not a secret, but it 
was not emphasised either (not only to me, of course, but also more widely).  
Unsurprisingly, the dispute followed lineage divisions: the members of the Farana 
lineage were farming in one group, which included Sina, while those of Kolonwulena 
and Soridiana were in another. Both groups were called ‘Sina kari’ as were their 
members: another aspect, perhaps, of the subtleness/ambiguity which pervade a setting 
with little recourse to central registration based on formal, written and bureaucratic 
practices.  
Every man in Bancoumana can be addressed with the name of his kari, since the people 
farming separately in this case could be – and they were – both referred to as Sina kariw 
(in the plural form, meaning people of the Sina kari). As a result, Sina’s role as a 
headman (kari-tigui) was apparently undisputed. Further conveying a sense of unity, the 
two factions were both farming on the same day of the week (Saturday, see Table 3), 
although they were doing so on the fields of different clients, who normally belong to 
the same lineage as the group of farmers.  
The Kolonwulena-Soridiana group, however, managed to find a diplomatic way of 
appointing another leader or representative, in the person of Abou. The fact of resorting 
to a distinguished member of an older age group has to be interpreted as a not too 
manifest way to oppose Sina, who had been legitimately appointed by elders as the 
headman of the whole kari and hence theirs too. Abou, a man in his forties, is a very 
respected character within his lineage Soridiana and has a reputation as a skilled and 
knowledgeable farmer. His activity in the Sina kari is made acceptable precisely by the 
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fact that he was older than the rest of the members by almost 20 years, hence clearly 
belonging to a different age set.  
To find an alternative headman within the group of peers would have threatened both 
Sina’s and the elders’ authority, since only one headman is appointed by them for each 
age group and he has to play the role of the classificatory father and representative of 
the whole group. Such an attitude would also have been an evident sign of a dispute, a 
declaration that lineages were standing on separate sides. It would have been a very 
bold and undiplomatic statement, both towards the outside world and for the people 
directly involved: after all, these people had to cooperate in domains different from 
farming and, even more importantly, they may have to count more on each other in the 
future.  
Other age groups in Bancoumana were also uniting or splitting into smaller sets when 
doing certain work, although the Sina kari was the only group doing this for farming: a 
sign of strong disagreement, although also suggesting how principles of chieftaincy and 
authority are subtly adapted to practical circumstances. When taking turns to work on 
the construction of the storage building mentioned above (page 165), the four age 
groups involved decided to rationalize their work by each dividing into four sets (so that 
one person had to work on the site once every other week). In another circumstance, 
two age groups – Lamine and Adama kariw, totalling about 200 people – were asked by 
the elders to travel together to the nearby village of Koursale to present their apologies 
for the fact that one villager had chased away his wife who was native to that village.  
Age groups are flexible entities because the internal divisions are not established once 
and for all: their configuration may adapt over time and change according to various 
circumstances, including variable degrees of tension among the three lineages. The 
shape of a group may also depend on the particular tasks performed (construction of a 
building, for example) or by whom they have been requested to work, since a group 
may be united when requested to work by the elders in the interest of the village (kari 
baara), but separate for farming compound fields (bonda baara) and ‘private’ ones 
(contrat).  
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In conclusion, Abou’s attendance at the Kolonwulena-Soridiana group offered a 
practical solution to the problems engendered by dissent within the Sina kari. Moreover, 
it was a strategic and diplomatic move by which one part of the group appointed an 
alternative leader, one that had to be respected by the kari headman Sina because of his 
age and reputation. Similar dynamics reveal how crucial the dimension of flexibility is 
in the functioning of such group, when this is not part of their very nature (which, as in 
the case of lineages, may be interpreted as ambiguous). Age groups seem to configure 
and re-configure according to the same ‘segmentary style’ unveiled in other parts of the 
thesis. They are constituted around a form of collective agency which generally praises 
unity, but operates separation or cooperation according to specific, adaptable and ever-
changing circumstances. 
Other elements in the organization of age groups and their activities in Bancoumana 
suggest that these associations are rather open and flexible entities. A similar conclusion 
is reached in other parts of the thesis in relation to other sets of people, like first-comers 
and late-comers (see Chapter Four), same-mother and same-father descendants (see 
Chapter Three), among others. As for these other groups, membership in a specific age 
association along with status among one’s peers are elements played out 
circumstantially, suggesting that the strategic use and manipulation of one’s position 
does open a significant space for individual agency.  
My observation of age groups fits this general model, showing that social groups are 
ambivalent entities in Bancoumana, and that such ambivalence is crucial to their actual 
functioning. One person integrates simultaneously into several groups and sub-groups 
and stresses his membership to the one or the other as a matter of strategy and agency.  
Perhaps the notion of ‘practice’ or ‘practice-oriented behaviour’ is suitable for capturing 
such aspects of individual and collective agency that emerged as crucial from my 
ethnographic enquiry. On the one hand, this concept allows for highlighting the gap 
between proclaimed rules (of age group membership and formation, for example) and 
actual behaviour, which may often be inconsistent with the rules. On the other, it allows 
the discovery that the inconsistency between the rules concerning age group’s 
organization and actual, practically oriented and motivated behaviour can be played out 
with different results. Strategy and diplomacy are prominent elements of agency in 
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Bancoumana: in some circumstances, unity and harmony are performed, while dissent 
dominates in practice; in other instances, however, unity is enacted with more actual 
effect on the social structure, which practice contributes to inflect effectively. 
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Chapter Six 
Ensuring Communication, Denying Control: the mediated 
process of tax collection 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the most important local tax paid annually by Bancoumana 
residents: the Taxe de Développement Régional et Local (TDRL). A successor of the 
colonial head tax, TDRL is payable to the municipality according to the records 
resulting from the registry listing taxable people and properties for each chef de famille 
(literally ‘family headman’), each of whom is entitled to request a small booklet (carnet 
de famille). Similar to the impôt de capitation in colonial times, the obligation to pay 
TDRL mostly weighs on the heads of family as resulting from written records listing 
taxable people and properties.85 For the sake of simplicity, I will frequently refer to it as 
‘the tax’ in this chapter. The local population calls it ‘the soul’s price’ (ni songo).  
The chapter starts by addressing the crucial connection of TDRL with written 
registration by the state bureaucracy. I give an analysis of the Bancoumana registry of 
the carnets de famille, illustrating the way information is recorded and updated; then I 
go on to explain how TDRL is calculated and issued by the local state administration, 
before turning to details on the process of collection in 2008 and the main participants 
involved. The latter part offers an important insight into the functioning of the state 
local bureaucracy, emphasizing complexity and institutional plurality among political 
actors in different positions and with different agendas, both officially or in the shadow 
of administrative procedures. 
Tax collection in Bancoumana is an exercise in negotiation between individuals, the 
municipal bureaucracy and other local political actors. The intensely mediated process 
                                                 
85 Table 7 in the appendix to this chapter (page 221) contains detail on taxable people and properties 
under TDRL.  
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through which the TDRL was collected in the village in 2008 involved the village 
councillors – an institution established and overseen by state law with the purpose of 
‘counselling the village chief’ – and elder notables (gwatiguiw), whose role, in turn, is 
unofficial from the perspective of state law and administration. While the latter were in 
charge of collecting tax money within the extended family networks that they 
represented (gwaw, sing. gwa), the village councillors were supervising the process of 
collection by keeping written records of the payments within each gwa; they then made 
the payments to the municipality.  
Illustrating the way these extended family networks and their representatives 
(gwatiguiw) are implicated in the tax collection procedure, the analysis will show the 
flexible configuration of Bancoumana’s ‘segmentary lineage structure.’ Despite the 
great importance of lineage and descent in a variety of domains, the way I present this 
configuration is contingent both on the way my data was collected and on the precise 
time of the observation. As I will explain, this configuration does not constitute ‘the’ 
structure of lineage segments in Bancoumana, which cannot be registered in such a 
simplistic way without compromising their flexible and adaptable nature. 
The key element in the relationship between the village council and the municipality – 
which had come into existence only in the late 1990s with the decentralization reform – 
was one of lack of trust and guarded – even tense – cooperation. The council refused to 
disclose its written records about taxpayers’ solvency, making it impossible for the state 
administration to control the collection process and, more importantly, to resort to legal 
proceedings against tax evaders.  
The analysis of the mediated character of TDRL collection does not simply reveal the 
power balance among different local political actors endowed with contrasting 
legitimacies in collecting tax money. It also makes clear a process of interaction 
between the written bureaucratic culture of state administration and the different ways 
Bancoumana residents group into extended family networks and lineages. The 
dynamism and the flexibility of this process of grouping cannot be frozen without being 
misrepresented for administrative as much as for research purposes. Yet the setting is 
not one of pure ‘orality’ (see Goody 1987). Writing and, more generally, literacy are 
employed by the village council with the aim of setting up a screen between the state 
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written bureaucracy and dynamics of grouping by lineages. Very effectively, this 
interface ensures communication with the state, but denies it control.  
TDRL and the registry of the carnets de famille 
This local tax is the most important of the taxes paid by village residents. From the 
perspective of the majority of the population making a living off extensive, man-
powered agriculture, TDRL represents the greatest sum of money extracted annually by 
the state. Consequently, it is the most important local revenue for the municipality, 
accounting for about 17 percent of its budget over the past ten years (the rest is mostly 
provided by the state and foreign donors).86 One fifth of the revenue generated by 
TDRL is transferred to the district and the Region (15 and five percent respectively), the 
rest funds the municipal budget. 
Another distinguishing feature of TDRL is its connection to written registration by the 
state administration, unlike other taxes collected locally.87 The registry of the carnets de 
famille is kept by the local municipality and consists of more than 20 bound volumes 
containing data from last national census.88 Volumes are pre-printed, but entirely filled 
out by hand. They are kept by the secretary general – one of the three trained municipal 
staff – and regularly updated and consulted by him. About half of the volumes concern 
Bancoumana as a village, while the rest pertain to the other 13 villages forming the 
municipality (Commune Rurale de Bancoumana).  
While consulting the registry, I noticed a first instance of local practical knowledge 
affecting the bureaucratic practice of registration. The printed form of the registry 
allows for a division into neighbourhoods (quartiers) and the volumes concerning 
Bancoumana are divided accordingly into three sets. The three ‘neighbourhoods’ 
                                                 
86 Source: budget documents (2000-2009) on file with the researcher.  
87 See Table 8 in appendix to this chapter for an illustrative (non-exhaustive) list of local taxes different 
from TDRL with relative amounts. From the documents that were made available to me, I estimated that 
these local taxes other than TDRL account on average for six or seven percent of the overall municipal 
budget. 
88 The Recensement Général de la population et de l’Habitat (RGPH) is revised every ten years by the 
Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique. The last census was carried in 1998 (see Mali 
Government 1990). However, the enquiry for the 2008 revision had not yet begun when I left 
Bancoumana in late November 2008. 
190 
 
figuring in the registry, however, do not correspond to any geographical areas of the 
village; they refer, instead, to the three lineages (kabilaw) in which the population of 
Bancoumana is cast, by descent from one of the three brothers who allegedly founded 
the village two centuries ago (see Chapter Four). Mirroring the division of the 
population into three lineages, four volumes of the registry contain the carnets de 
famille of the Soridiana people, four volumes those of the Farana and three those of the 
Kolonwulena (the least populous lineage). Each of these eleven volumes is headed 
accordingly with the name of the lineage accompanied by a progressive number: 
‘Soridiana 1-4,’ ‘Farana 1-4’ and ‘Kolonwulena 1-3.’ 
This registration according to lineage-based ‘neighbourhoods’ is surprising for two 
reasons. Firstly, neighbourhoods are administrative units of urban municipalities in 
Mali, while rural ones like Bancoumana – no matter how populous – are not to be 
further divided.89 Secondly, and more importantly, such administrative divisions into 
‘neighbourhoods’ do not reflect spatial arrangements on the ground. As observed in 
Chapter Three, the disposition of residential compounds in Bancoumana is not 
determined by lineage membership: people from different lineages may reside next to 
the other, while same lineage members may live far apart. While the ‘fission’ of large 
compounds into smaller ones makes it likely for neighbouring compounds to be 
genealogically related (at least for older parts of the village), no portion of the village 
territory is thought to belong to any of the three lineages.  
Why, then, in the registry, was the population divided into ‘neighbourhoods’? A 
plausible answer is that a kind of compromise had taken place, whereby the local 
bureaucracy acknowledged the existence of lineages by adopting an urban-like 
classification. When registering familles and chefs de famille, the local state 
administration had, through a process of negotiation, recognized the presence of the 
three lineages. It is unclear whether this choice was taken at the initiative of the 
compilers of the registry – acknowledging that, in practice, the tax was collected within 
lineages – or, instead, whether they were somehow compelled to register people by 
lineage affiliation. As a result, however, families belonging to different lineages were 
                                                 
89 Code des Collectivités Territoriales, articles 2 and 60. 
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registered as if they were settled into spatially different neighbourhoods. For this 
reason, the numeration of the carnets de famille bears no reference to location. 
Nevertheless, the order of registration has not been random: indeed, it prioritised 
prestige in lineage membership (see later Figure 10). 
Formal registration of ‘families’ for administrative, tax-related purposes (or familles, as 
I will refer to them hereinafter) had to acknowledge the presence of ‘informal’ groups 
such as lineages – plausibly, because these groups mattered for purposes of tax 
collection. The consultation of the registry, however, also revealed the opposite process, 
whereby the formal categories employed in bureaucratic registration have influenced 
vernacular ones and created new groups. This happened with the definition of familles 
and chefs de famille as different from compounds and compound headmen, as I now 
turn to explain.  
 
Table 4. Compounds and carnets de famille 
This Table shows the distribution of familles resulting from administrative registration and actual 
compounds in the three lineages. While the average size of familles (fourth column) does not seem to 
differ significantly among the three lineages, the fifth column shows a greater variation of compound 
densities. 
 
On my last visit to the secretary general’s office in October 2008, the records 
concerning Bancoumana showed 812 carnets de famille, i.e. corresponding taxpaying 
units. As shown in Table 4, however, the familles resulting from the registry do not 
correspond to actual compounds, i.e. the spatially defined, co-residential units which 
can be more intuitively understood as ‘families.’ At around the same period of time, 
compounds were in fact about one half less numerous than the familles registered for 
tax purposes. The discrepancy points to the crucial fact that virtually any married 
individual, man or woman, can be considered chef de famille, if only he or she requests 
Lineage ‘Familles’ Compounds Population Density of‘familles’ Compound density 
Kolonwulena 195 135 2005 10.3 14.8 
Soridiana 310 158 3436 11.1 21.7 
Farana 307 153 2873 9.4 18.7 
Total 812 446 8314 10.3 (average) 18.4 (average) 
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a carnet de famille, with the consequence of becoming accountable for the payment of 
TDRL of all the family members registered on it.  
As a consequence of the formal registration of ‘families’ for administrative, tax-related 
purposes, in a compound there are normally several chefs de famille (as opposed to one 
person socially recognized as headman). Each chef de famille has dependents for whom 
he pays the head-tax, either related or unrelated to him. On average, there are two 
carnets de famille for every compound, and ten dependent people for every chef de 
famille, as opposed to 18 for every compound (see Table 4).
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Figure 10. Registry of the carnets de famille: first record of the Soridiana volume 
This picture shows the first record of the first of Soridiana volumes: that of El Hajj Messere (November 2008). Taxable properties figures in three columns on the right. At the 
bottom of the column ‘imposable TDRL,’ numbers were annotated by pencil in order to calculate last TDRL amount. The field ‘quartier’ can be seen in the upper right corner.
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Paperwork: updating the registry, calculating and issuing TDRL 
The registry of the carnets de famille contains tax-related demographic information 
regarding each family member as well as properties. Every year, the secretary general 
(known as the Segal and referred to as such hereinafter) calculates the amount of taxes 
due from every chef de famille. This is a long and painstaking task which requires the 
consulting of every page of the 20 volume register, the calculation of taxable amounts 
and their annotation by pencil in the margins of relevant rows and columns and, finally, 
the addition of these amounts (some of these pencil annotations are visible in Figure 10 
and in the appendix to this chapter). 90 
Written records are updated whenever the secretary general is asked to do so by the 
carnet holder, but more intensely during the last months of the year, when the tax is 
collected and forthcoming amounts (to be collected on the following year) are 
calculated. By late December, the Segal must calculate TDRL amounts for every carnet, 
in order to provide the exact figure in the municipal budget voted before the end of the 
year.  
Updating obliges the Segal to hand-write corrections on the register and to copy on the 
corresponding carnet held by the chef de famille. While a copy of the carnet may be 
easily issued, records in the registry are progressively numerated in a bound volume; 
therefore, a blank page can be used only in cases where a new taxpaying unit is formed. 
If a member of the family has moved (for example, a daughter has married or a son has 
migrated), the corresponding entry will be crossed out with a red line and a notation in 
the margin in the same colour will specify to which other carnet the record has been 
moved (married daughter’s case) or it will simply mention ‘transferred’ if residence has 
been moved permanently out of the municipality (migration).  
Handwritten annotations and corrections are made for any other change affecting the 
payment of TDRL. Students, soldiers, persons over the age of 65 and women with more 
                                                 
90 Only the yearly revision of the electoral registry takes the Segal a longer time. In this case, hundreds of 
pre-printed notebooks containing data from the census for electoral purposes (Recensement à caractère 
électoral) must be browsed page by page in order to identify all the residents who will be 18 years old 
before the next elections. 
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than four children are tax-exempt: the attainment of such statuses has to be registered at 
the municipality in order to qualify for exemption.  
Figure 10 shows some of these annotations: some entries are crossed out with a red line, 
including that of Messere, who died some months before the picture was taken. For 
each entry which has been crossed out, a handwritten note on the last column on the 
right specifies whether the family member has died (‘DCD’ for décedé) or has moved to 
another carnet, as in the case of members 015 and 016 (‘récensé au N°...’). The field ‘N° 
de carnet de famille’ in the upper left corner also shows that numeration is a sign that 
local prestige matters in administrative registration: it is no coincidence that the first 
record of the ‘Soridiana volume’ of the registry is that of El Hadji Messere: the 
headman of that lineage. His carnet covers several pages – ending with two stapled, 
unbound sheets. It comprises 215 people figuring as dependents of the chef de famille 
(indicated by the initials ‘CF’).  
Most volumes of the registry date back more than 10 years, beginning with the 1998 
census. New volumes are started over time, reflecting both the growth of the population 
and the constitution of new familles (for tax purposes).91 Like the document in Figure 
10, most pages of the register are filled with red lines, corrections and annotations of 
various kinds, including past TDRL calculations made by pencil in the margins. 
Occasionally, loose sheets are stapled at the end of the record.  
Although the tax is both calculated and collected locally, the administrative process of 
legalizing and ‘issuing’ TDRL (known as émission) requires the circulation of 
documents among the different levels of the state administration, and it takes 
considerable time.  
Since the register is hand-written, the tax is calculated by the Segal consulting every 
page and counting taxable people and properties with the help of a calculator. As a 
                                                 
91 Last available national census (RGPH 1998) shows for the whole municipality of Bancoumana (see 
note 42): 1,069 compounds (concessions) and 2,465 ‘ménages.’ (Note that this is not the village of 
Bancoumana, for which there are no available national statistics.) Although I have not been able to check, 
the latter category of ménage is likely to correspond to the famille for tax purposes analysed in this 
chapter. If so, in 1998 there were 2.4 carnets de famille for every compound: a figure consistent with the 
data for the village of Bancoumana in 2008 that I have presented in this chapter. The average of 18 
residents for every compound is also consistent with my findings (see Table 4 above). 
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result of this activity, the Segal produces two documents: one listing all carnet holders 
(rôle nominatif), the other cataloguing taxable persons for every village of the 
municipality (rôle numerique). Such lists are handed in to the district offices (in the 
town of Kati) to be computer processed. They are held for some time by the Prefect (the 
district chief). During this time the National Tax Services can review and revise the 
lists.  
From the district, the two rôles are sent to the Regional administration in Koulikoro for 
approval by the Governor (the Region’s head), after which documents are returned to 
the municipality and the operations of tax collection (recouvrement) can properly begin. 
In 2008, this happened in the month of June, more than six months after the TDRL 
amounts had been calculated by the Segal.  
Tax collection in 2008: mediation and negotiation  
In the two years covered by my fieldwork, the Segal updated the register with care and 
calculated the precise TDRL amount due by each chef de famille. However, the way the 
tax is actually collected in Bancoumana seems to undermine such bureaucratic zeal. 
One of the three trained municipal staff – the Régisseur des recettes – is officially in 
charge of collecting the tax directly from each chef de famille; however, this is not what 
happens in practice, where tax collection is a much more mediated and discontinuous 
process.  
The chefs de famille do not pay the tax to the municipality as required by the law, but 
instead to the representatives of extended family networks called gwaw (sing. gwa). The 
headmen of these groups – the gwa-tiguiw – then transfer the money collected within 
their gwa to the village council, a ‘semi-traditional’ institution which is given by state 
law the function of ‘helping the village chief in the exercise of his functions’ (CCT, art. 
70), including the duty ‘to assist the municipal collector in the collection of taxes and 
the Mayor in the operations of registration’ (CCT, art. 67).92 Only then does the village 
council remit the money to the municipality.  
                                                 
92 CCT stands for Code des Collectivités Territoriales, containing relevant legislation. 
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The crucial aspect of this mediated process of collection (in three stages) is that the 
municipality is given no details as to how much it is being paid by each chef de famille. 
When paying the tax collector, in fact, the only information disclosed by the village 
council concerns which of the three lineages is to be charged, with detail of any lower 
levels completely lacking. Correspondingly, the municipal collector issues three 
receipts, one in the name of each lineage. No receipts in the name of individual chefs de 
famille are issued (as is by law). 
Despite the presence of relatively accurate and updated information in the registry of the 
carnets de famille, the municipality has no means of knowing how much is paid by each 
chef de famille. In this way, the state bureaucracy is disempowered from monitoring 
collection and, more importantly, from legally pursuing tax evaders.  
The process of collection is not only mediated, but also remarkably discontinuous. In 
fact, money is collected in many successive collection rounds and paid to the 
municipality as a result of pressures and negotiations, after which further collection 
rounds and further payments may follow. In 2008, for example, four collection rounds 
had been made in the village, with the Segal making threats to the elders of his intention 
to bring in the army should they not comply. On that year, probably as a result of the 
Segal’s obstinacy, the collection rate in Bancoumana was 31 percent. While this might 
not sound impressive, it was a remarkable result, when compared to 24 percent for the 
whole municipality (which included 13 other villages) and to the average of 13 percent 
over the last nine years (again this data applies to the whole municipality).  
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Table 5. Collection rate of the Taxe de Développement Régional et Local (TDRL), 2000-2008 
Source: municipal budget documents on file with the researcher. Years 2001 and 2004 are missing. The 
diagram shows proportions of TDRL issued and TDRL actually collected over the years. The greatest 
amount of TDRL in the municipality was collected in 2006: 31 percent (40 percent in Bancoumana). In 
2007, instead, the average was lowered by the fact that no TDRL at all could have been collected in the 
villages of Bancoumana and Gonsolo. In other years, that has been the case of other villages (notably 
Ticko and Kenieroba).  
The village council 
Acting as intermediaries between extended family networks and the municipality, the 
village councillors play an ‘interface’ role in tax collection. Crucially, they are the only 
one of the three actors involved in the position to keep track of the ongoing payment of 
taxes by the chefs de famille (or at least by each group of families headed by a 
gwatigui). 
After the tax is issued and ‘legalized’ (as described above), the municipality does not try 
to collect the tax on its own. Instead, the Mayor gives to the village council the list of 
taxable people and properties extracted from the registry of the carnets de famille. Such 
document (rôle nominatif) states how much is due by each chef de famille. With the 
help of a literate man, the councillors use this list both to request payments from the 
headmen of the extended family networks, and to keep track of the whole process. 
While some other villages in the municipality return the list filled in with the amounts 
as collected from each chef de famille, this is not the case in Bancoumana, where the 
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village council refuses to disclose to the municipality any detail concerning the payment 
of taxes, except for the total amount each of the three lineages had paid.  
During the four to five months period when the tax was collected in Bancoumana, the 
village council met weekly to discuss with – and collect payments from – the extended 
family heads. Meetings took place sometimes in vestibules (discussion spaces inside a 
courtyard), at other times in a shaded space on the market square. Gwatiguiw are likely 
to participate in these discussions, making it difficult to distinguish the assembly which 
receives some recognition by state law – the village council – from the elders who have 
in turn an unofficial role. Clear delineation is particularly difficult when the councillors 
meet in a vestibule, since such a space belongs either to a lineage or to an extended 
family, whose representatives – the gwatiguiw – will attend the discussion.  
The role played by the village council is crucial in at least two aspects. The first is to 
keep written records, thus allowing chefs de famille to make successive payments and, 
more generally, to stretch tax collection over the longest possible period of time. Such 
use of written registration provides chefs de famille with a relatively secure and 
accountable way of delaying and dividing up their tax payments, while the village 
council protects them against the risk of being sued.  
The second crucial aspect of the council’s intermediary role is as a sort of barometer, 
forecasting for the elders and lineages the municipality’s insistence on its need to collect 
tax, while also enabling them to resist such demands. During the time my observation 
took place, councillors reported to the elders all reminders, pressures and threats 
expressed by the Segal on different occasions. For example, two councillors attended a 
public meeting during which forthcoming TDRL amounts were announced and 
comments on the ongoing 2008 collection were made by the outraged Segal. Both 
before and after the meeting at the municipality, the two attending councillors met in a 
vestibule with elders and other members of the village council.  
This communicative function allows for fine-tuning the intensity of the ongoing 
collection to the level of the pressure exerted by the municipal administration at 
different moments in time, especially during tense periods. Mediation grants a certain 
control of the tensions with the municipality. In 2008, the Segal’s repeated threats and 
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ultimata to resort to legal proceedings, brought the tension to a remarkably high level. 
However, the councillors and the elders demonstrated perhaps greater control.  
The extended family headmen 
I have referred to lineage elders by evoking the presence of networks of extended 
families in Bancoumana or ‘segments’ of the three lineages. Who are these headmen 
and how are the networks they represent distinguished from each other? Does mediation 
in the process of tax collection affect the shape of extended families and the function of 
their headmen? As in other parts of this thesis, the search for a clear delimitation of 
similar groups, especially when based on kinship or quasi-kinship affiliation, is likely to 
produce contextual and circumstantial answers. In my analysis of local government in 
Bancoumana, vagueness emerges as one of the central features of the way people 
identify themselves in multiple groups and subgroups; and networks of extended 
families are no exception.  
With such an important caveat in mind, I will nevertheless venture into a brief and 
merely illustrative analysis of the ‘segmentary lineage structure’ of Bancoumana. As the 
case of tax collection plainly shows, in fact, lineage-based groups and sub-groups play a 
very significant role: no matter how vague their definition and identity may be, they 
cannot be dismissed as if they were merely ‘invented’ by the researcher.  
During my fieldwork, I conducted a survey of the whole resident population with the 
(perhaps simplistic) aim of mapping lineage membership and patrilineal affiliation 
between different courtyards. Instead of revealing ‘the’ lineage structure of 
Bancoumana, however, this exercise has taught me that extended family networks are 
flexible entities and can hardly be identified with clear-cut groups. As pointed out by 
critiques of ‘descent theory’ (see Kuper 1982 for a review), the determination to map 
‘segments’ into ‘territory’ (or specific spaces as showed below) can be misleading.  
My census data show 45 ‘extended family networks’ (gwaw or dubaw) and as many of 
their headmen (gwatiguiw). This number, however, is only a likely figure which 
requires further explanation. If asked, most compound headmen have no hesitation in 
casting their compounds into groups larger than their residential unit and smaller than 
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their lineage. However, since lineage segmentation occurs at many levels, asking 
questions such as: ‘to which extended family network does your compound belong?’ or 
‘with which other compound does yours farm?’ would be sure to yield inaccurate data. 
Extended family networks lack spatial or material referents, particularly inasmuch as the 
people claiming to be part of one of such groups live and farm separately. When I 
consulted Modibo Diabate, my assistant who was serving as chief surveyor in a health 
project monitoring malaria in Bancoumana, all the questions we could imagine ran the 
risk of producing incomparable answers, revealing all the shortcomings of the idea of 
mapping descent groups. 
Determined to identify the gwaw despite their rather immaterial character, I finally 
decided to ask my survey’s respondents – all compound headmen in Bancoumana – to 
define how their compound (lu or du) fitted into a larger entity (du-ba, great compound) 
on the basis of how it was grouped and represented in a specific space called vestibule 
(bulon). The question, however, had to be further specified by the example of marriage, 
ultimately asking: “to whose vestibule does this compound go when one of its daughters 
marries, by whom is it represented and within which group of represented people”?  
Although responses were biased by the reference to marriage, the only way I could find 
to overcome the problem of the immateriality (and consequent incommensurability) of 
extended families was to link them to vestibules as material spaces. Similar to the 
compounds as residential units, in fact, vestibules consist of actual buildings and 
discussion spaces particularly relevant for marriage arrangements and celebrations.  
More or less extended family groups may constitute themselves around different grades 
of patrilineal descent for various purposes. Furthermore, segmentation can also be 
ambivalent. A segment or family group may stand alone in a given situation (say, tax 
collection) and merge into a larger group in another (marriage). Therefore, not only the 
45 gwaw and gwatiguiw surveyed in my census might have been involved in tax 
collection. This number only refers to lineage grouping as reported by my census 
respondents confronting a simulated case of marriage in their compound. It represents 
perhaps a likely figure; however, to consider this figure as ‘true,’ even in a real and 
specific domain such as marriage or tax collection, would not do justice to the flexible 
and adaptable ways segmentation occurs. 
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The role of the village council and the gwatiguiw 
‘Elections’ 
Village chiefs and the council assisting them were originally created by colonization, 
drawing on pre-colonial political institutions such as ‘the councillors of the ruler’ 
(kangorosigi). After independence, their functions were firstly regulated by the short-
lived federal government of Mali and Senegal (the Sudanese Republic, 1958-1960) and 
then by a statute issued in 1977. Since the early 1990s, with the project of 
decentralization of Malian administration, they have been the object of further 
regulation by the Code des Collectivitées Territoriales (CCT) of 1995, then by Law 
No.06/0124 of 28 June 2006 (on the civil registry), and by several other administrative 
sources (décrets and arrêtés).  
Depending on the size of the village population, the village council is composed of 5 to 
11 members, whose election is supervised by a local state representative (either the 
Mayor or the local representative of the district chief, the Vice-Prefect). The mandate of 
the councillors is for five years and no specifications are made by the law concerning 
their re-election.93 However, the Bancoumana councillors had not been forced to seek 
re-election since 1988. Indeed, three councillors had died when I arrived in 2007 and 
three were elderly men (one in his eighties, two others in their late sixties). This echoed 
the situation throughout the country, where no elections had been held since the 1980s.  
The village council has thus been an institution rather neglected by Malian 
administration in the last two decades, despite development aid-giving organizations’ 
increasing mantra of decentralization throughout the 1990s, which, translated into local 
idiom, proclaim the need to return power to its home (‘fanga segina so’). Showing 
perhaps an increased tendency to connect to the central state, it is important to note that 
things were changing precisely around the time of my stay. In mid-2008, the Ministry 
for Territorial Administration launched a campaign for village council renewal 
                                                 
93 Art. 70 CCT states that councillors should be ‘elected in general assembly of the people having the 
right to vote in the village [Assemblée générale des électeurs du village], presided by the representative of 
the state at the rural level [the Sub-Prefect].’ The list with the names of the councillors thus elected is 
‘established [fixée] by decision of the representative of the state at the level of District [the Prefect],’ who 
also has the power to discharge them. 
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(‘renouvellement des Conseils de Village’). The timing was significant, since the 
Ministry publically acknowledged that such renewal was taking place in anticipation of 
the municipal elections of April 2009. Unsurprisingly for the observers of Malian 
politics, the campaign was conveniently framed as a further step in administrative and 
political decentralization and in revitalising grassroots institutions.  
As far as I could observe, the renewal of the village council in Bancoumana did not 
consist of an ‘election’ but of a lengthy bargaining process ending with the nomination 
of the new councillors by the headmen of extended family networks. Following a 
calendar established by the Ministry, from 15 June to 15 July 2008, Sub-Prefects made 
visits to villages and towns, in order to supervise the alleged ‘election’ of the new 
councillors according to law.94 In Bancoumana, where this visit took place in early July 
2008, the supervision consisted of the Sub-Prefect being given the list of names agreed 
by lineage elders.  
The new councillors were then expected to be appointed officially only by a decision of 
the Prefect, although such a decision was still awaited in Bancoumana when I left five 
months later. The renewal of the village council also reduced the number of 
Bancoumana’s councillors from 13 (of which three had died by 2008) to 11, adjusting it 
to the administrative law in force at the time of the election.95 Only two members of the 
former council were re-confirmed in their position. 
Given such a patently rusty set of institutional arrangements, I now turn to explore 
what, if not elections, affects the choice of village councillors. This will be done by 
looking at the composition of the newly elected village council of Bancoumana and 
comparing it with the previous composition. From this comparison, and the analysis 
more generally, three key factors emerge: position in the lineage, literacy and the status 
of ‘younger brother.’ The resulting picture of the village council is entirely consistent 
                                                 
94 These visits, called ‘tournées’ are clearly evocative of colonial past. See the edited volume by Francis 
Simonis (2005) addressing the connection between power, administration and mobility in French colonial 
West Africa. 
95 The older composition of Bancoumana’s village council perhaps exceeded the limit set by the law 
(although I was unable to find the law in force at the time of their designation, in 1988). In 1995, the 
number of village councillors was set by the CCT ‘from 5 to 7’ (art. 70) and then amended by subsequent 
legislation into 5 to 11. See Government of Mali, Communique du conseil des ministres du mercredi 5 
mars 2008, http://www.sgg.gov.ml/Ccm/ccm5mars08.pdf (last retrieved 26 August 2010). 
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with the role we have seen this institution playing in tax collection. The council can 
perhaps be best characterized as: a) representing the interests of first-comer people; b) 
able to effectively deploy literacy skills; and c) comprising ‘deputy headmen,’ i.e. 
people who are of senior status, but subject to their elder brothers’ authority. 
 
Table 6. Distribution of Soridiana councillors according to internal lineage differentiation and related 
factors 
Lineage distribution 
The new composition of the village council, after its re-election in 2008, was the 
outcome of negotiations held within lineages and extended families, which started as 
soon as the decision of the Ministry had been broadcast on the national radio. A 
comparison with the former council shows that both versions clearly reflected the 
division between the three lineages. In the ‘old’ council of 13 members, five councillors 
were Soridiana, five Farana, and three Kolonwulena. A similar pattern (four-four-three), 
although slightly increasing the representation of the less populous lineage, was 
followed in designating the 11 members forming the new village council. 
                                                 
96 18 other compounds which responded to belong to the same segment ‘konatela’ are members of the 
Farana lineage and not of Soridiana.  
Segment of 
Soridiana 
lineage 
Patronymic 
name 
Status N.extended 
families 
(gwa) 
N.compounds 
(lu) 
First-
comers / 
late-
comers 
(ratio) 
Representa
tive in the 
old village 
council? 
Representa
tive in the 
new village 
council? 
Messerela Camara Noble 3 72 12/60 (0.2) X X 
Bomboila Camara Noble  4 23 13/10 (1.3) X X 
Selila Camara Noble 2 12 8/4 (2) X X 
Morila Diakite Caste 
(moriw) 
1 11 3/8 (0.4) - X 
Noumoula Sinaba Caste 
(blacksmith) 
3 11 9/2 (4.5) X - 
Konatela96 Konate Marriage 
partners 
3 10 8/2 (4) X - 
Traorela Traore Marriage 
partners 
3 19 13/6 (1.6) - X 
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As documented in the previous section (page 200), lineages were further divided into 
segments, which were reflected in councillors’ designation, as additional detail on 
Soridiana members will make clear.  
According to my enquiry into the ‘segmentary’ kinship affiliation in Bancoumana, the 
people of Soridiana can be grouped into seven ‘vestibules’ (bulon, sing.), representing 
the extended family networks (as explained above) listed in the left column of Table 6. 
These can be further subdivided into 19 gwaw, i.e. the extended family networks which 
we have seen playing a key role in the collection of taxes; and, finally, in 158 
compounds, comprising both first-comer and late-comer people (see relevant column in 
Table 6).  
The proportion of first-comers and late-comers within each vestibule proved highly 
variable, despite the fact that, looking at the lineage as a whole, late-comers decidedly 
outnumber first-comers. Despite this fact, shared by all three lineages in different 
proportion,97 each of the seven vestibules of Soridiana (their headmen, more precisely) 
traces its origin to Bancoumana’s first settlers. Since late-comers are incorporated at the 
level of compounds – each late-comer compound has a first-comer hosting compound – 
it is virtually impossible for larger groups, such as ‘vestibules,’ to originate from a late-
comer compound. Of course ruptures in the logic of this system of representing descent 
might occur in the future, but for the time being all the vestibules of Soridiana identify 
as a group of descendants of first-comers.  
How were the divisions of these seven extended family groups mirrored in the old and 
new councils respectively? The three Camara branches clearly prevailed, being 
represented by one member each in both. The other four, in turn, found limited place: in 
the ‘old’ council, among the five representatives of Soridiana, there was one member 
from ‘Morila’ and one from ‘Traorela’ (one specialized and one ‘marriage partner’). In 
the new council – with lineage representatives shrunk to 4 – the only non-Camara 
member was from ‘Noumoula.’ As was explained to me by my host Makan Camara 
                                                 
97 The ratio for Soridiana is 66 first-comer compounds and 92 late-comers, i.e. the lineage has 58 percent 
of late-comers. The proportion is even more favourable to late-comers in the other lineages: the 152 
Farana compounds comprise 59 first-comers and 93 late-comers (61 percent); the 135 Kolonwulena 
compounds comprise 42 first-comers and 93 late-comers (69 percent). 
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when commenting on the new council composition, the four non-Camara branches were 
given one place to be shared between ‘specialized’ people (marabouts and blacksmiths) 
and ‘marriage partners’ (Traore and Konate first-comers).  
Although I cannot provide evidence at the same level of detail, it is plausible to assume 
that the equivalent sub-lineage divisions were significant in comparable ways in the 
designation of both Farana and Kolonwulena members of the village council. 
Membership of lineages and very extended family groups are thus two factors 
influencing the appointment of councillors. A further look at the composition of the new 
council, however, shows that literacy and the status of younger brothers were also 
factors of considerable importance.  
Literacy and seniority 
In the new council, each lineage had at least one literate member. Out of 11 councillors, 
four were either educated at school or fully literate (two of the Farana lineage and one 
each for Soridiana and Kolonwulena). Others were able to read and write, like minibus 
driver Kamissa Adama.98 One of the four literate people – Kolonwulena member 
Banjugu Camara – was a retired school teacher from the Bancoumana primary school. 
When moves were made to appoint the councillors and determine who might serve as 
Premier Conseiller, Banjugu was rumoured as the favourite for this position. 
Eventually, it was my host Makan Camara, Soridiana councillor and former Premier 
Conseiller, who was confirmed in this post.  
The competition between the two candidates that concluded with Makan’s confirmation 
as the village first councillor must be understood in relation to two factors. First, the 
vestibule headman (bulon-tigui) of ‘Messerela’ was the very influential El Hadji 
Messere. Messere had been responsible for the vacancy of the position of 
Bancoumana’s village chief, having successfully blocked the succession for more than 
two decades years with his insistence that ‘he and no-one else’ would fill it. However, 
                                                 
98 Minibus taxis, commonly referred as SOTRAMA, are the most diffused means of public transport in 
Mali. They usually are vans, transporting 20-25 passengers and running on fairly regular journeys, 
although they can also be hired for specific transports, from marriages to commerce. The name derives 
from a short lived company established in Bamako long ago: the Societé des Transports du Mali. 
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as already mentioned in Chapter Four, he died in April 2008, only three months before 
the renewal of the village council, which presented a chance for Banjugu.99 Secondly, 
due to Messere’s unrivalled ‘wealth in people’ – commonly framed as ‘love for 
foreigners,’ – ‘Messerela’ comprised an outstandingly high number of compounds when 
compared to other vestibules. Of the 72 Messerela compounds shown in Table 6 above 
(46 percent of all Soridiana compounds), 47 are Messere’s direct guests (see also 
Chapter Four). This also explains the extraordinary number of late-comers in that 
vestibule (the greatest ratio of all). Such extraordinary representativeness, coupled with 
the social prestige derived from El Hadji Messere, were crucial determinants in the 
confirmation of the ‘Messerela’ councillor (my host Makan) as Premier Conseiller.  
The intermediary function performed by the village council in TDRL collection requires 
a degree of literacy from at least some of the councillors. Acting as the interface 
between the village and the local bureaucracy, the council needs to have at least some 
literate members and these should better be evenly distributed among the various stake 
holders (like the vestibules outlined above). Virtually all communications or requests 
from the Mayor to the councillors, for example, are written and in French. Moreover, 
some councillors are frequently requested to attend meetings at the municipality (like 
the one described later in this chapter), including those known as ‘restitution sessions’ 
and particularly favoured by development agencies willing to involve the local 
population or ‘traditional authorities.’ In many of these meetings documents are 
circulated, numbers often shown (on blackboards) and both written and spoken 
communication may be in French.  
In one case, a moderately literate member of the village council (in its old composition) 
– Mahamadou Camara – was also elected as municipal councillor (serving from 2000 to 
2004), an office requiring literacy skills since it is part of the bureaucratic 
administration of the municipality. As these examples show, literacy might not have 
been necessary for all village council members, but it is certainly a desirable quality for 
at least some of them, given the role of the village council. It is not by chance that each 
lineage chose at least one literate person to represent it on the council. 
                                                 
99 In the land dispute analysed in Chapter Four, we have seen how Messere’s death presented a similar 
opportunity for one of the litigants.  
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Another quality shared by Bancoumana village councillors and likely to influence their 
appointment is the status of classificatory younger brother and, sometimes as a result, 
their relatively young age when compared to lineage elders. It is significant that the 
council is often referred to as ‘the arm’ of lineage elders (gwatiguiw bolo), an 
expression that is frequently employed with reference to the status of younger brother 
(Jansen 1996; Jansen and Zobel 1996). Similarly, the (even younger) age group of the 
village ‘police’ (the tontiguiw, see Chapter Five) are spoken of as ‘the arm’ of the 
councillors.  
In both the old and the new village council, five members rather than being compound 
heads (lutiguiw) in 2008, were the ‘younger brothers’ of such heads. A further member 
belonged to the junior generation (classificatory ‘son’). At the same time, only one old 
councillor and two among the new were at the head of an extended family, i.e. 
representing a gwa in their vestibule (bulon). Moreover, since the old council was 
appointed two decades before I collected my data, it is likely that some old councillors 
with chiefly status in 2008 (either as compound or extended family head) had achieved 
that only some time after their appointment.  
The age of the councillors in both compositions supports the observations made so far, 
but also suggests that some changes occurred over time. Although I chose to focus on 
similarities, in order better to capture the function of the village council, differences 
between the two compositions of the village council are also significant. In 2008, when 
I conducted my survey of the population of Bancoumana, the average age of the newly 
elected councillors was 58, while that of the previously elected councillors was 37 (57 
years old in 2008).100 These numbers suggest a steep increase in age of the councillors: 
the newly established council is composed of people on average 21 years older than 
their predecessors. Despite this fact, however, their position in terms of seniority does 
not seem to have changed, since we have seen that new councillors (like the old ones) 
are predominately younger brothers, i.e. members of the senior generation (that of the 
heads of compounds and extended families) while, at the same time, subordinated to 
                                                 
100 In the first average, there are three missing values (out of 15), since as many ‘old’ councillors had 
already died by 2008. In the second average, there is one missing value (out of 11), since councillor 
Mahamadou Camara resided in nearby hamlet Bali, not covered by my survey. 
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their older brothers. In conclusion, the almost 20 years of difference between the 
average age of old and new councillors confirms that seniority (the order of the 
generations) does still have precedence over age in the composition of both councils.101  
This points to a last difference: while the old councillors were all members of first-
comer compounds, two out of the 11 new councillors were late-comers (Adia Moussa 
Camara and Fali Traore, both from Farana). This fact suggests that the families of Adia 
Moussa and Fali achieved considerable social acceptance within their host lineage 
Farana: despite being late-comers, they are now the ‘representatives’ in the village 
council of one of the first-comer branches of this lineage. This is further confirmation 
that, as shown in Chapter Four, ‘autochthonous’ status is played out circumstantially 
and social distinctions based on the principle of anteriority in land occupation can be – 
although not always are – rather flexible.  
The Segal (Secretary General): the backbone of local bureaucracy 
Some of the references made so far to the secretary general of the municipality have 
already indicated both the importance of this administrative position and the strong 
character of its then incumbent, Gerôme Dakono. His involvement in the 2008 TDRL 
collection will give us an insight into the perspective of a local state representative and 
trained bureaucrat, while also elucidating why Bancoumana is often – and somehow 
frustratingly – described by bureaucrats, and more generally literate informants, as an 
extremely ‘problematic’ area, particularly with reference to the perception (or 
extraction) of taxes. 
The Segal is one of three trained and unelected officials of the municipality.102 His 
position requires a higher rank in the Malian administration, and consequently more 
training and experience, than does that of his fellow officials. The secretary general is 
the most important state official after the Sub-Prefect (a government representative 
                                                 
101 A further, complementary suggestion may be that, in 1988 (at the time of first election of the village 
council), there were fewer literate elder people than in 2008. 
102 Staff varies from one to five according to the size of the resident population of the municipalities. A 
fourth non-elected member of the staff in Bancoumana is the Mayor’s personal secretary. This is a local, 
literate woman, whose main occupation is the typewriting of documents. 
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rather than a member of the local administration like the Segal) and the only one based 
in Bancoumana, since the Sub-Prefect is based in nearby Sibi. While the latter is more 
of an itinerant figure – the true heir of the Comandant of colonial times (Simonis 2005) 
– the Segal is the backbone of the local bureaucracy. 
While enquiring into the subject of tax collection, it became progressively clear to me 
that a deep sense of frustration was shared by the three trained municipal staff, as well 
as by other literate residents of Bancoumana (former bureaucrats and schoolteachers, 
now retired). In the view of these people, the remarkably mediated process of tax 
collection in Bancoumana was to blame for poor TDRL collection and the general lack 
of means and power of the municipality. They were partly right, of course, although I 
have demonstrated that mediation in tax collection, and particularly the refusal by the 
village council to disclose the written records concerning taxpayers’ solvency, served 
the (perhaps greater) political purpose of erecting a screen between the ‘segmented’ 
grouping system and the state administration.  
With the decentralization reform that Mali began to implement in the late 1990s, under 
pressure from the international community of donor countries and international 
financial institutions, the funding of local public services by the central state 
administration (including schools and local health centres) was made proportional to the 
TDRL collection rate. This system, known as ‘droits de tirage ANICT’ (from the 
acronym of the state agency in charge of the distribution of funds) have a very negative 
effect on municipalities with very poor collection rates such as Bancoumana. To offer 
an example, if TDRL had been fully collected in 2008, the following year the 
municipality of Bancoumana would have received from the central state 24,000,000 
CFA Francs (£32,300) in ‘ANICT funds’ for local investments. However, since only 24 
percent was collected, only about one tenth of that sum had been received. As was 
shown in Table 5 above, the 2008 collection had been, nevertheless, the second greatest 
result achieved by the municipality since its establishment. 
Completing this picture, in August 2008, the salaries of municipal officials in 
Bancoumana were paid seven months late; the Mayor was accused by his staff of 
having ‘eaten’ (bouffé) such money, which is part of the ordinary endowment of the 
state, through a system of fictitious money orders (faux mandats). The use of these is 
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allegedly widespread among Malian Mayors. Municipal money is withdrawn from the 
district cashier with a regular money order signed by the Régisseur des dépénses, but for 
fictitious purposes (which may or may not be disclosed to the Régisseur). A similar 
illegal practice of which Malian Mayors are often accused is to keep a secret registry 
with the district official in charge of the municipal cashier, allowing them to ‘borrow’ 
money.  
While the two Régisseurs – Diakite and Kone – were resigned to the low collection rate 
and unhopeful about its improvement, the Segal Dakono showed remarkable 
confidence. I observed him on several occasions expressing himself with great 
assurance and perhaps even courage, particularly when addressing the village 
councillors on the topic of TDRL collection. The most memorable of such occasions 
has been already mentioned. It was during the presentation of the forthcoming 
municipal budget, when Dakono, who was in an irritable mood, launched into a tirade 
on the subject of the poor collection rate in the municipality. It was a theatrical 
performance, an odd mixture of gesticulation, shouting and table pounding, before an 
audience of 13 elderly men. Only two of these were village councillors in Bancoumana, 
as mentioned above, while the others were villagers and village councillors from other 
localities. But none were accustomed to be addressed in such a tone.  
His attempts to explain to mostly illiterate people the content of a financial document 
became a veritable public performance.103 It was met with silence from the audience of 
respected men. They let the Segal continue for about an hour before intervening – some 
discreetly, others more vociferously. Dakono spoke in Bambara, his mother tongue 
alongside French, and the only language understood by his audience on that day 
(Mandenkakan speakers easily understand Bambara). He read several lists of taxable 
persons and properties for each of the 14 villages composing the municipality 
(including Bancoumana) and then ranked villages according to the collection rate, 
commenting on each of them (see the documents in appendix to this chapter).  
                                                 
103 I later discovered that the public presentation of the budget is, in fact, a legal requirement in Mali: 
before the municipal council can approve the budget by voting, the law requires the village council to be 
‘consulted’ and the document presented by the Mayor in a ‘public debate’ (art. 174 CCT). At each of 
these stages, the signatures of the persons present (alternatively, their fingerprint) are taken and later 
attached to the official transcript approving the budget. 
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His tone was loud as he shouted numbers and commented on issues related to tax 
collection and registration in every village, and it became increasingly outraged. When 
he turned to Bancoumana, he threatened that, should another payment of the TDRL not 
be made by the end of the month by the village council, the municipality would resort to 
legal proceedings. ‘The rôles will be sent to the Tribunal’ – he proclaimed. He 
mentioned that ‘the list’ had not been returned by Bancoumana’s village council and 
went on to speak of the upcoming involvement of the judiciary, the administration and 
the police. His evocation of the long journeys that the file (le dossier) had embarked on 
was extremely telling. It drew upon a geography of state institutions and administrative 
centres – ‘juge,’ ‘tribunal,’ ‘Koulikoro’ (the siege of the Region), ‘Kati’ (the siege of 
the district), ‘Bamako,’ ‘gouvernement’ – thus providing an effective characterization of 
the ‘local’ administration of the state in rural Mali. 
While praising the neighbouring municipality of Sibi (a village ruled by Camara, like 
Bancoumana) for having achieved ‘a record’ in TDRL collection, Dakono shouted: 
‘People there pay taxes because policemen reside there, knocking on the door and 
making people pay!’ Having been the capital of the former arrondissement, Sibi is 
indeed the residence of the Vice-Prefect and has a resident police force. Bancoumana in 
contrast has only a poste de police staffed by two men on different shifts from Sibi. 
Perhaps exploiting some rumours circulating in Bancoumana or just making his threats 
more convincing, Dakono explained that the municipality tried to ‘hire a policeman’ to 
enforce the TDRL collection, but the costs had proved prohibitive. One policeman had 
requested 4,000 CFA Francs per day of collection (£5) plus meals in return for his 
displacement from Sibi.  
The Segal could not refrain from telling another story, that of a vice-Prefect from his 
hometown Kolokani (in western Mali), where he had served before being transferred to 
Bancoumana. Over several years, this Prefect had spent more money from his own 
pocket than what he was able to collect in his district, with the aim that taxpayers would 
eventually be convinced that tax was necessary. One detail of this story was extremely 
telling: the expenses enumerated by Dakono included the ‘renting of the Governor’s 
car,’ as the Prefect had no vehicle, and ‘paying for the policemen accompanying him 
and for their nourishment’!  
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By the end of the meeting, Dakono apologetically acknowledged that his speaking 
manner had been overly vehement, excusing himself by saying that he had simply 
aimed at mutual understanding between him and his listeners. His confidence surprised 
me as it was decidedly unmatched by the demeanour of other state officials I came to 
know. In the final month of my fieldwork I learnt that Dakono had applied for a 
transfer. When I asked him why, he explained to me that after only about two years in 
Bancoumana he felt that he was ‘getting nowhere with these local people.’ In his view, 
the illiterate farmers’ mentality coupled with the tensions in the village had posed too 
many obstacles for the local administration.  
His situation was reminiscent of that of his predecessor Lamine Tounkara, whom I 
interviewed at around the same time in his new position of district Segal in Kangaba. In 
2006, shortly after Mayor Issa Traore was elected, Tounkara eagerly awaited to be 
assigned elsewhere: he had to leave Bancoumana while he was still in his position of 
Segal, since – he told me – he was feeling ‘unsafe’ and unprotected by the newly 
elected Mayor as a consequence of the failure of the land plotting project (see Chapter 
Two). 
The Mayor and the municipal staff: fugitiveness and mobility 
Taxes were clearly a sensitive issue in Bancoumana. In 2007 the municipality could not 
collect TDRL at all in Bancoumana. In an administrative structure inspired by the 
French model, a temporary administrator (and an outspoken outsider) like Dakono can 
afford to act tough, paying relatively little attention to local power balances: in a matter 
of years he will be transferred to another administration, as a normal shift in his career. 
The Mayor, in contrast, is an elected official, likely to be more embedded in the locality 
and, almost certainly, a native. He might be expected to express himself less directly.  
Issa Traore, Bancoumana’s Mayor at the time of my fieldwork, was a man under 
pressure. For one thing, in contrast to the local ideology of autochthony and anteriority, 
he was a non-Camara late-comer, although his family was locally settled from three 
generations (the time of his grandfather).  
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Mayor Traore played a considerable role in calming Dakono’s temper concerning the 
TDRL collection. Mainly through inertia, he nevertheless showed an interest in 
preserving the status quo, including the intermediary system. In the face of the tensions 
surrounding TDRL collection and the pressures of his office, Bancoumana’s Mayor 
responded by regularly eschewing his responsibilities.104 His behaviour revealed the 
ambiguity and trouble of his position. Some aspects of his behaviour, notably his 
‘fugitiveness,’ were humorously and bitterly mocked by many of my informants. His 
absences were often remarked on and talked about; by some, they were interpreted as a 
sign of cowardice and by others as a confirmation of the Mayor’s embarrassment about 
‘standing in front of the population.’105 Apart from being widespread among informants, 
this judgement of the Mayor as a coward was shared by the trained staff of the 
municipality and particularly by Dakono, whose relations with him were tense. The 
view of the Mayor as a pathetic and dishonourable character prevailed, in turn, among 
illiterate citizens. 
On the day of the budget presentations, when the ongoing TDRL collection had been 
the subject of Dakono’s vitriolic performance, Mayor Traore had been seen in his 
compound earlier in the morning. His absence from the event, however, did not surprise 
anyone in the audience. While speaking to me at lunch, some of the people present 
commented that the Mayor would have been embarrassed to eat from the same bowl as 
my fellow diners. Apart from evoking a metaphor for the misappropriation of funds 
widely employed in Africa, the reference to commensality here points to the Mayor’s 
dishonourable character: as was noted in Chapter Three, eating together is among those 
ordinary activities in which one’s ‘place’ in society, including moral judgement on 
one’s behaviour, emerges more clearly.  
Mayor Traore’s attitude in front of the village councillors and the extended family heads 
was generally dismissive. To my knowledge – and for the duration of my fieldwork – he 
never met the village councillors or other elders, save on public occasions. Most of 
                                                 
104 As in the rest of the thesis, I bear full responsibility for the judgments and the opinions expressed, 
including unquoted reports from my informants, and I do not expect any of my informants to get in 
trouble because of their opinions expressed here. 
105 In Mandenkakan, ‘to stand in front of his people’ (nga-mogo) evocates the combination of authority 
and prestige, which distinguished a headman from a mere power holder (fanga, meaning force and 
power). 
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these occasions were receptions of foreign ‘donor’ agencies, NGOs or state 
administrators, during which all local authorities, including the autoritées villageoises et 
notabilités (Malian bureaucratic jargon for ‘traditional’ authorities), were expected to 
play a role while addressing one another deferentially. However, when it came to the 
‘internal affairs,’ differences were noticeable. The Mayor never entered the compound 
of the village first councillor (where I resided) for the duration of my fieldwork. When 
information needed to be passed between the two authorities, which was a regular 
occurrence, it was either one of the adjoints (three members of the municipal council 
assisting the Mayor) or Régisseur Kone on his motorbike who went back and forth 
between the respective compounds in order to pass on messages.  
Mayor Traore also seldom frequented the municipal building. He could be found in his 
office with some regularity only on Monday mornings, busy signing and stamping 
documents prepared by the Segal and typewritten by his personal secretary or in 
discussion with the municipal staff. He was often accompanied by one of the adjoints 
who were also regular visitors at the Mayor’s compound. Most of my conversations 
with him took place at his home; we also regularly talked at workshops and 
presentations (in Bancoumana, Bamako, Sibi) and occasionally in his car, when he 
offered me a lift to the Capital. The only common sight of the Mayor in the village was 
of him on his motorbike riding between the municipality and his compound. He split his 
time between his compound and Bamako, on the outskirts of which – at Sebeninkoro – 
he had a house, where he spent several days per week. Moreover, since he was running 
an entrepreneurial activity (well-drilling), the Mayor moved often between various 
working sites in the surrounding countryside.  
Mobility was perhaps the main characteristic the Mayor shared with the two Régisseurs. 
These are the two trained municipal staff members subordinate to the Segal, and with 
specific competences. The municipality of Bancoumana is staffed by one Régisseur des 
recettes (of income) and one Régisseur des dépenses (of expenses). The naming of such 
positions invokes registration: an extremely relevant aspect of bureaucracy, as we 
learned from TDRL collection. 
As noted, despite the presence of one member of the staff specifically appointed to the 
role of tax collector – the Régisseur des recettes – TDRL had never been collected 
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through its own agents by the municipality of Bancoumana. During the time covered by 
my fieldwork, the Régisseur des recettes was Diakite, a young man in his thirties 
undergoing his first work experience; he had just passed the public selection (concours) 
to join the public administration when I met him in Bancoumana. Of the three trained 
municipal officials, Diakite was the youngest and least experienced.  
Over a lengthy period of time, I observed that Diakite did not perform any particularly 
active role in the collection of TDRL. His activities were limited to the material 
perception of money (also of taxes different from TDRL) and to the soliciting of 
payments from neighbouring villages. When I visited his office, he would at times be 
busy filling-in and registering receipts or keeping records. But, for the most part, he was 
working outside the office and was very mobile. Perhaps because he was the youngest 
of the staff, his main activity was handing over summonses (convocations) and 
communications (communications) issued by the Mayor.106  
Such errands made Diakite a regular visitor to many of the compounds and nearby 
villages. In fact, written communications preceded virtually any event held at or simply 
involving the municipality, from municipal council sessions to the presentation of 
development project and ‘restitution’ session of the kind illustrated above. Participation 
in such events, especially if involving the welcoming of outsiders, is likely to involve a 
free meal, abundant leftovers to be brought home by some of the participants and 
sometimes a per diem sum of money. Among other things, written invitations restrict 
the participants to similar events, distinguishing very precisely the involvement of the 
municipality. They are most often in French, despite the existence of two ways of 
writing the local Mandenkakan. My host Makan, in his qualification of village first 
councillor, probably received several written communication per week, although he was 
completely illiterate in French.  
Mobility was definitely a characteristic feature of municipal action. The Régisseur des 
recettes Diakite rode a 125-cc motorbike, the only one owned by the municipality. A 
written notice posted right at the entrance of the municipal building stated that the use 
                                                 
106 These documents were type-written by the Mayor’s secretary. They had the peculiar form of variably 
thin ‘strips’ of paper. In order to save paper, the same text – usually only a few lines – was copied three or 
four times on the sheet, which was then cut into strips. 
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of the motorbike was strictly reserved for activities related to the tax collection. It was 
hence for the use of Diakite, the only official specifically in charge of that task. 
However all other municipal agents, with the exception of the Segal Dakono, had 
personal vehicles.  
The other Régisseur rode a Chinese 125-cc ‘Sanili’ motorbike, a not uncommon model, 
but clearly distinguishable from the popular 50-cc ‘Jakartas.’ The Mayor rode a 
Japanese 125-cc Yamaha DT, a much-sought-after motorbike – worth about £1,000 
new, despite cheaper Chinese imitations – which he had bought from the local agent of 
a development project. He also owned two cars, one pick-up model, for transporting the 
material for well-drilling, and an old Mercedes for his regular journeys to Bamako. 
Inside the village, however, he drove his Yamaha DT.  
The use of these vehicles by local bureaucrats was not as much a sign of their means or 
their prestige, as an indication of the necessary commuting related to the administrative 
and bureaucratic structure of the Malian state. As already mentioned, the allegedly 
‘local’ administration comprises three levels and consequently three different 
geographical locations (Bancoumana, Kati and Koulikoro). Written communication is 
necessary between the three offices. This administrative organization is mostly inspired 
by the French model; it is run, however, under significantly different circumstances, 
either because of the scarcity of material resources (means and infrastructure) or 
because of the behaviour of its agents (patronage and ‘corruption’).  
The case of the documents related to TDRL has shown that the material circulation of 
written documents and communications between the various levels of the ‘local’ 
administration (municipality, district and Region) involves a considerable degree of 
mobility by the local agents of the state. In the absence of any reliable and cost-effective 
communication infrastructure like the post (which virtually does not function in Mali), 
local administrators in rural areas are constantly on the move. Since colonial times, 
when the tournées of the Comandants were a distinguishing device of the French 
‘power to administer,’ mobility is still a characterizing and enduring trait of state 
bureaucracy (Simonis 2005).  
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The critical voice of retired bureaucrats and other literate late-comers 
I focused on the process of collection as was effectively practiced by various actors at 
the time of my observation and I was generally less interested in how this was 
experienced by some of the ‘critics’ among my informants, who certainly had good 
reasons for their discontent but did not play a large role in the collection process. The 
position of such informants is, nevertheless, revealing for the argument advanced in this 
chapter, and merits some discussion. 
Most ‘critics’ among my informants were former bureaucrats, who chose Bancoumana 
for their retirement after having served for some time in the village (mainly state or 
development project agents). Consequently, aside from being schooled and 
bureaucratically minded, they were relatively recent late-comers to the village. Often 
such people reported to me that village councillors were ‘corrupt’ and that both they and 
the extended family heads were ‘stuffing’ their tax money, by transferring amounts 
lower than those collected to the municipality. I should add here that such accusations 
were entirely plausible, and they indeed suggest an analogy with some exploitative 
aspect of the relation between first-comers and late-comers illustrated in Chapter Four. 
As shown in that case, however, exploitation was just one side of the coin, while the 
other was perhaps compromise. It allowed both first-comers and late-comers to benefit 
from exchanging access to land in return for wealth (‘in people’ and social relations, 
apart from cash); and also gave security of tenure in return for compliance to the rules 
of hospitality or dependency. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has emphasized two aspects of tax collection as observed in Bancoumana: 
firstly, the role of bureaucratic registration and writing, both by the state administration 
and by the village council; secondly, the mediated nature of the collection process, 
negotiated by a variety of local political actors. 
We can understand the mediation of TDRL collection in terms of institutional plurality. 
The municipality, the village council and the extended family heads were all involved in 
the collection process. Their relationship is one of lack of trust and tense cooperation. 
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On the one hand, such institutions are of a different character, and their actions are 
endowed with contrasting legitimacies; on the other, however, their division of labour in 
collecting the tax reveals a certain degree of compromise between power holders at 
different levels in the structure.  
Plurality also characterizes the ‘internal’ composition of these actors involved in tax 
collection. The examination of the process of tax collection revealed that boundaries 
between semi-official institutions like the village council and ‘unofficial’ ones like the 
extended family heads may be difficult to draw. As the ‘election’ of the councillors has 
shown, then, the legitimacy of this institution is based on rather different grounds than 
that conceived by official law. Finally, as shown in the second half of the chapter, the 
organization called the state, even at its most local level, can hardly be represented 
univocally: local state officials such as the Segal and the Mayor have competing 
interests and significantly different agendas regarding the collection of TDRL and, more 
generally, the administration of the municipality  
Negotiation and compromise have emerged as distinctive traits of the process of tax 
collection in Bancoumana: power balances may vary and are far from static. Addressing 
it as a process has enabled me to describe the collection and, more generally, the 
extraction and payment of taxes, as an aspect of political struggle. While from the 
perspective of the central state, mediation may enable the preservation of the status quo, 
in the locality all actors (including state officials) seem to have a stake in negotiating an 
outcome. This suggests that the process overall is dynamic rather than static or 
conservative. 
The kind of mediation addressed in this chapter has also been that between the written 
bureaucratic culture of the state administration on the one hand and on the other, the 
multiple ways Bancoumana residents group into extended family networks for purposes 
related to the payment of tax – or its negotiation. The description of the collection 
process revealed that such groups connect to the ‘segmentary structure’ of the three 
lineages of Bancoumana. If dynamism, flexibility and even ambiguity in the 
determination of such groups make it almost contradictory to impute any kind of 
structure to them, group formation is perhaps better characterized in relation to a degree 
of ineffectiveness of state control based on written registration, matched by a 
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corresponding degree of effectiveness of local, socially embedded, knowledge and 
institutions. 
Written registration can hardly capture such ways of grouping without ‘freezing’ and 
misinterpreting them. The determination of tax-paying units by the system of carnets de 
famille, which invokes the written bureaucratic culture of the state, certainly affects the 
process of collection in Bancoumana, but it is far from determining all the different 
routes it takes. A similar observation also applies to written registration for research 
purposes, as demonstrated by the case of my survey of the population of Bancoumana 
which aimed at mapping the lineage structure but only achieved a limited result.  
Writing, however, is not the monopoly of bureaucracy. Records are kept by the village 
councillors tracking TDRL payments made by the extended family networks. The 
councillors’ recourse to writing may have served the purpose of erecting a screen 
between the ‘segmented’ grouping system and the written culture of the state 
administration. If this was the intention, however, it was not entirely realized. Family 
headmen were ‘duplicated’ by the system of taxation (envisaging the chefs the famille 
aside compound headmen) and a similar dynamic may have affected the formation of 
extended family networks. Nevertheless, a practical – and politically very effective – 
result was achieved through the interface role of the village council: that of ensuring 
communication while denying control. 
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Taxable categories Amount of TDRL (in CFA 
Francs) 
Persons (are exempted: under-14, 
students, soldiers, mothers of more 
than 4 children, over-60, disabled, 
paupers) 
1,500 
Cows and oxen (labouring animals 
exempted) 
250 
Donkeys 100 
Horses 800 
Sheep and Goats 50 
‘Traditional’ guns (armes de trait) 625 
‘Modern’ guns (armes perfectionnées) 5,000 
Table 7. Breakdown of the TDRL tax 
The Franc CFA exchange rate is indexed to the EURO (1€ = 655,95 FCFA). Hence the head-tax amount 
of 1,500FCFA corresponds to £2.  
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Non-TDRL taxes Amount (in Francs CFA) 
Market-day tax on stalls  250/week (hangar frequently shared by 
several vendors) 
Market-day tax on shops 750/month 
Bicycle road tax 1,000/year 
Small motorbike road tax  3,000/year 
Car road tax  12,000/year 
Transit tax for public transports 250/transit 
Gravel and sand extraction tax 10,000/month 
Gravel and sand transport tax 3,000F/lorry 
Table 8. Non-exhaustive list of local taxes other than TDRL 
The list includes only the taxes whose collection was at least attempted by the municipality during my 
fieldwork. A greater number of local taxes are envisaged by the law but no significant amounts are 
collected in practice. Those figuring in the budget in 2007, for example, were 22, most of which having 
generated no or little revenue when compared to TDRL.
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Figure 11. Registry of the carnets de famille: the record of Nanamori Camara 
The picture shows the record of my host and compound headman (lutigui) Nanamori Camara. Corrections and annotations of different kinds can be seen. The last four members in 
this page have been moved to a new carnet (the annotation specifies at n°246), while the numeration of the members of this carnet has been corrected in red. Pencil annotations for 
the calculation of TDRL can be found at the bottom of the relative column. 
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Figure 12. Registry of the carnets de famille (continued) 
The picture shows the second page of the record of Nanamori. The first 10 entries have been moved to the new carnet as specified by the annotation ‘recensé au [n°] 246 Soridiana 
[of the Soridiana volumes].’ Entries 032-038 have also been moved to another carnet (that of my host brother Abou kunba), although the annotation in the right margin does not 
specify its number. The whole record shows 41 members originally registered in one carnet and subsequently split into three. 
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Figure 13. TDRL amounts and status of the collection up to September 25, 2008 
This document was presented for information by Segal Dakono to a public presentation of the 
forthcoming municipal budget on 21 October 2008. The dates reported in the heading presumably refers 
to the first and the last payment received. Villages are listed in order of solvency (rang, literally 
‘ranking’). The amount pertaining to Bancoumana is broken down to the three lineages, also showing 
important differences among them.
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Figure 14. Breakdown of expected TDRL for the year 2009 
This document read by the Segal to the public presentation of the forthcoming municipal budget on 18 October 2008. It shows expected amounts of TDRL for the year 2009 by quantity of 
imposable persons and properties for each village. Villages are listed in alphabetical order. Bancoumana is not further divided into the three lineages.  
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
The question I asked in the opening of this dissertation – ‘why Mali is different from 
neighbouring states’ – required an investigation of the field of government, and of the 
relationship between state and society. The key to understanding these issues in a 
Malian village, however, lies neither in stressing the ‘gap’ between state and society, 
nor in completely denying the existence of such a gap, but rather in documenting and 
analysing the dense political relations and practices of government of which village life 
is constituted. 
Recent assessments of political relations in Africa have conceptualised or described the 
space between state and society as a ‘grey area’ rather than a gap (see Chapter One for a 
discussion). However, too many such analyses convey radically pessimistic, almost 
sinister, views of the political domain in Africa, depicted ‘solely as a form of 
criminality, or as imbued with personalistic connections which render it impossible for 
state authorities to advance the common good over a large scale’ (Klaits 2005:615, 
referring to Bayart et al. 1999 and Chabal and Daloz 1999, respectively). Thus, African 
states are judged ‘shadow’ or ‘rhizome’ (Reno 1995 and Bayart 2009, respectively) and 
seen as ruled via ‘private indirect government’ in which formal and informal spheres of 
power are connected in complex and – by extension – unhealthy ways (Mbembe 2001). 
What these analyses are suggesting is that the space between state and society in Africa 
is occupied by obscure, morally ambivalent and ultimately ‘corrupt’ political practices 
(see also Englebert 2000). This is a patronizing and paternalistic vision resonating with 
that of western ‘donor’ countries and also of the development industry.  
Countering such views, my enquiry has shown that processes of government intensely 
mediated by groups – social groups, as well as more overtly political actors, of both 
‘state’ and ‘non-state’ kinds – constitute forms of political mediation crucial to the 
practice of the common good. Indeed, these groups also express a particular vision of 
the common good, different from that which prevails within the Malian state and 
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amongst other agencies of development. To substantiate my argument, I have 
intentionally drawn attention to – and re-engaged with – a consideration of ordinary 
grouping dynamics such as those observable in the ‘segmentary lineage,’ or ‘the 
compound’ once the traditional focus of the anthropology of West Africa. While this 
might be seen to give my analysis something of a functionalist feel, and while it might 
appear to convey an impression of the nature of social and political process which 
emphasises balance and equilibrium at the expense of conflict and rupture, this is not 
my primary intention. Nor, adopting a later paradigm in anthropological study, am I 
interested either in processes of compliance on the one hand or resistance on the other. 
What I have attempted, with my rather different emphasis, is to give an account of the 
very real processes entailed in political and legal processes, which are inextricable from 
the varied roles performed by the groups in question. 
Diffused public authority 
 ‘In Africa there is no shortage of institutions attempting to exercise public authority,’ 
claims Lund (2006:686). In Bancoumana, a diverse proliferation of political relations 
and practices characterizes the political landscape in important ways. While the degree 
of institutional plurality varies from one field of observation to another, the overall 
picture emerging from my analysis is one of disperse and diffused government. The 
state has neither the monopoly of public authority nor can it be assumed to operate as a 
monolithic institution. Observed empirically, and from the perspective of a rural 
locality, the decentralized bureaucracy of the state consists rather of a complex 
apparatus, whose officials and representatives do not necessarily operate in 
homogeneous ways. Examining this plurality, my enquiry has shown that a series of 
variably legitimated political actors – groups based on age and descent, the village 
council, the extended family headmen and the like – remove significant shares of 
government from the state. Thus, the people belonging to the age group called tontiguiw 
hold important policing powers (Chapter Five), the headmen of extended family groups 
collect taxes (Chapter Six), while the semi-traditional assembly called the village 
council mediates initiatives of land development involving distant migrants and the state 
administration (Chapter Two). 
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The ways such political actors relate to the state apparatus is a classic field of enquiry 
for political and legal anthropologists, one raising fundamental questions about the 
nature of government, and thus about the relationship between state and society (see 
Chapter One). We have seen these issues emerging when considering the legitimacy 
vis-à-vis the state of the groups that play crucial roles in political relations in 
Bancoumana. Relations to the state shift from one domain to another, and are also 
ambiguous or double-sided. In some circumstances the powers of local political actors 
are more closely bound to the exercise of state authority, as in the case of the village 
council collecting taxes on behalf of the municipality (Chapter Six). In other cases, 
however, assemblies such as the gwatiguiw and the tontiguiw operate more directly in 
opposition to the state, which is thus denied jurisdiction over matters such as punishing 
thieves or seizing wandering animals (Chapter Five). Political activity variously 
conduces to and legitimises formal governance, but also detracts from it, sometimes at 
the same time. 
My detailed analysis of the fiscal domain (Chapter Six), normally considered a typical 
aspect of state authority, illustrates this ambiguity. On the one hand, local authority 
figures operationalize state power; on the other hand, however, they deny it. Fiscal 
authority cannot be exercised by the municipal administration without the involvement 
of the village council, an institution only grudgingly recognized by state law but 
extremely influential in practice. While allowing the state to exercise its fiscal authority, 
the village council also prevents the administration from enacting crucial forms of 
bureaucratic control, such as registration of taxpayers’ solvency. As a consequence, the 
possibility for the state to resort to legal proceedings against tax evaders is foreclosed. 
Moreover, my analysis of tax collection has shown that the village council does not 
operate as a bounded, discrete institution: rather, the councillors represent the interests 
of a group of elder family heads (gwatiguiw), who nominate and control them, and who 
are their ‘older brothers’ in classificatory terms as well as in current terms of address. In 
fact, beyond a certain division of labour between different authority figures – the 
municipal officials, the village councillors and the gwatiguiw – the process of tax 
collection involves the mobilization of groups such as lineages and extended family 
groups. Ultimately, it is in these groups, rather than in the state-recognized familles, that 
the tax is collected.  
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Thus, because of such a shifting and double-sided relation to the state, any 
characterization of groups like the village council and the gwatiguiw as political actors 
of a ‘state’ or ‘non-state’ kind, or as ‘traditional’ or ‘semi-traditional’ institutions, 
inevitably results in inaccurate generalizations. In fact, the prerogatives of different 
power holders, as well as their relationship to other groups and institutions, are the 
object of shifts and constant negotiations. Irrespective of how their relations with the 
state might be described in general terms, or of the degree of ‘formalism’ of their 
actions, the boundaries of political organizations vary according to time and 
circumstances, and from one domain of social life to another. 
It was as I gradually came to recognize the deeply mediated and dispersed character of 
such relationships – at once ‘political’ and ‘social’ in character – that my focus shifted 
from overtly political or state-related institutions and arrangements, onto those more 
apparently embedded in society, that is ‘groups.’ In a similar vein, analysts of economy 
in African settings have pointed to the interpenetration and interdependence of formal 
and informal economies (Guyer 2004). Legal anthropologists have likewise striven to 
overcome the dichotomy between state and non-state – and the dilemma of what 
constitutes ‘the legal’ – by focusing on the study of dispute processes, as ‘moments of a 
certain kind of public visibility embedded in the context of on-going social relations’ 
(Griffiths 1998:591). Along the same lines, claims Griffiths (2000:100), anthropological 
analysis of political and legal practices should focus ‘on the social processes which are 
central to the construction of people’s lives, rather than confining itself to the study of 
institutional forums or the formal framework which structures the relationship between 
common and customary law […].’ Building further on such an anti-formalist 
perspective, my understanding of political relations in Bancoumana has tried to avoid a 
too rigid and limiting focus on institutions as discrete entities inhabiting an abstractly 
defined political domain. My analysis has been centred, instead, on the social processes 
of cooperation, segmentation and government, which show that political relations are 
built by ordinary people while operating in a variety of domains of their social life.  
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Inclusive social structures, collective government, and the production of political 
persons 
As I realized I would be moving beyond a focus on state and state-like institutions, it 
became clear that a broader conceptualization of government, as something including a 
wide variety of social processes, would be necessary. What is particularly interesting in 
this perspective is the collective dimension of government resulting from inclusive 
social groups and institutions. The importance of this aspect emerges from my reading 
of social processes which play a crucial role in the building of political relations in 
Bancoumana. Thus, my analysis highlights important dynamics of socialization of 
power. 
Political authority figures – normally male elder family heads – act through inclusive 
social structures such as lineages and age groups; their capacity to mediate political 
relations depends on inclusion in such groups. Based on social differentiation (age, 
generation, status as first-comer or last-comer, descent and the like), and thus far from 
being egalitarian institutions in the modern liberal sense, lineages and age groups 
nonetheless operate as inclusive groups. Collective government is evident in the various 
means through which power is socialized, in particular the political ‘apprenticeship’ 
enabled by membership of age groups such as the one analysed in more detail in 
Chapter Five.  
On the one hand, there are groups organized for the specific purpose of political 
authority, of a defined and particular type. The tontiguiw – the village police and judge, 
to an extent – provide one example of such a group. This age group is allocated 
particular functions of public authority for a limited period of time, until the cohort 
following in order of seniority takes over (all age groups succeed to the role of 
tontiguiw). Such a group comes close to being a recognized and defined political 
institution, albeit of a somewhat informal character.  
On the other hand, age groups – including, but not limited to the tontiguiw – have a 
much more widely diffused social power. Organized in specific circumstances, but 
without defined and clear-cut arenas of jurisdiction, they hold important political 
functions. They operate, in fact, as a means of diffusing power, because they are both 
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cross-cutting and inclusive institutions. As we have seen, all Bancoumana residents, 
irrespective of any difference in descent and status, become integrated by joining these 
groups, whose capacity and reputation is connected to the ability of their members to 
unite, bypassing lineage and other divisions. Age-group members are peers, bound by 
strong and life-long-enduring bonds of solidarity. Like uterine brothers – ‘twins’ in their 
terms of address – they are expected to support one another and to keep conflict and 
disagreement far from their relationship. These groups do vital work, especially of an 
agricultural kind such as weeding, for which the largest possible cohorts are needed. 
They hold collective funds which normally increase with the size of the cohort (parallel 
to the group’s reputation, as I have mentioned above), and depend on the ability to farm 
the fields of the households ‘hosting’ group-farming performances. 
Age groups also hold important powers of coercion over their members, fining and 
punishing them for misconduct, but more importantly they mark sociality in very strong 
ways: their activities require ‘embeddedness’ in the local social context and skills which 
are unlikely to be possessed by foreigners and outsiders and, in any case, can only be 
performed in the group setting. In other words, through codified social interaction (of a 
ritual kind) distinguishing active group members from people such as women, migrants 
and students, all exempted but also excluded from group work, age groups play an 
important part in shaping the capacity to mediate political relations.  
In the exercise of such powers, age groups define important rules of sociality. They also 
regulate activities and ecological practices which have a significant impact on the local 
economy. As illustrated in Chapter Five, group farming is integral to the social 
organization of work, and more widely to cooperative processes and relationships in 
Bancoumana. The same is true for the powers of the tontiguiw in regulating fish-
catching, the collection of fruit and the grazing of land by cattle during the farming 
season, when wandering animals can damage the crops. Most of the fish-catching, for 
example, is done by groups – by the whole village in case of the larger ponds mentioned 
in Chapter Three. Were people allowed to fish earlier and/or on their own, this would 
impact on cooperative dynamics and possibly on local economic and ecological 
patterns. Despite the other tasks performed by age groups, including commoditised 
forms of selling their agricultural labour (farming ‘by contract’), group farming of the 
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‘lineage’ kind (bonda baara, see Chapter Five) requires remarkable amounts of time 
and physical energy without which local food production would hardly be sustainable. 
The building of political agency, that is the recognized capacity to mediate political 
relations, thus proceeds in a number of ways which are socially embedded. Hence, the 
production of ‘political’ persons is in some sense virtually indistinguishable from the 
production of ‘social’ persons. Social groups have specific practices, a series of highly 
codified and ritualized, hierarchical behaviours, evident in group-farming practices 
(Chapter Five), patterns of hospitality of the people framed as ‘late-comers’ (Chapter 
Four) and modes of dependence as determined by status and descent (Chapter Three). 
Political power of the more obviously recognizable type, such as that of compound 
headmen or lineage elders, is both personalized and diffused throughout various levels 
in society. In order to become such a political person, some ‘apprenticeships’ in 
socialisation are necessary: hence women and migrants, who are not allowed to 
participate in age-group farming, along with people who do not comply with the rules of 
hospitality, are denied such inclusion. A land dispute originating from non-compliance 
to the rules of hospitality was analysed in Chapter Four.  
A major theme here intersecting that of the apprenticeship of codified, hierarchical 
behaviour is the social production of persons, along with their jural construction and 
their separation from ‘things’ (Mundy and Pottage 2004). In the case of land (Chapter 
Two and Chapter Four), as well as in the case of domestic and agricultural labour 
(Chapter Three and Chapter Five), we have seen how crucial is the capacity to give 
access to other persons through hospitable inclusion of people framed as ‘guests’ or 
dependents. The capacity to include people in such groups, and consequently to give 
access to power and resources under the group’s control, is a personal quality and, as 
such, it does not immediately result from the fact of holding a clear-cut, pre-determined 
function of public authority, that is an office: another abstract, jurally constructed entity. 
Rather, such capacity is based on one’s position in the social structure as defined by 
age, generation and descent among other criteria of ordinary grouping. Moreover, 
political personality does not follow such qualities mechanically: hospitality consists of 
codified behaviour, acceptance of rules of social interaction which define sociability and 
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ultimately inclusion into groups mattering in crucial ways for the definition of political 
relations.  
The man-powered work processes of Bancoumana remind us of the fact – obfuscated, 
but still true in northern parts of the word – that land is not productive per se, but only 
inasmuch as it is a means whereby social relations of production (i.e. labour) are 
mobilised. In similar vein, hospitality has meaning and functions beyond that of giving 
latecomers access to the resources that belong to the group of ‘first-comers.’ It is a 
means to recognize political capacity and to include people, since resources such as land 
are not only ‘things’ but also integral aspects of ‘persons.’ Thus, giving access to land is 
an exercise of political authority, while receiving it denotes one’s inclusion in the group 
and, again, marks the capacity to mediate political relations.  
‘Land is to rule,’ or the interplay of politico-legal and property relations 
When land issues are considered in Africa, authors often imply that land is a resource, 
access to which can be gained via willing fealty to a political leader. Arguing against 
this, what I have tried to show in my analysis is that such approaches might miss a key 
insight. Land is not simply accessed via subordination/affiliation to political leaders, but 
it is an integral aspect of the production of political persons. What I have shown, 
especially in Chapter Four, is that land matters crucially in the definition of politico-
legal sociality. One might observe, as Neale observed with reference to the Indian 
context: ‘land is to rule’ (1969:3). But given that ‘rule’ is here so diffuse and mediated 
in Bancoumana, one might go further and say that ‘land is to relate.’  
Conceiving of land exclusively and univocally as a resource implies a jural construction 
of ‘things’ (property) as separated from ‘persons.’ That is, it presumes that land is 
initially discrete from subjects endowed with political capacity and legal personality, 
and can be owned or accessed by them. In the setting of Bancoumana, on the contrary, 
the land belongs to a group of people defining themselves as first-comers, as much as 
they belong to the land. Therefore, access to land is mainly achieved through host 
relationships, that is through codified, hierarchical relations of dependence grounded in 
a political economy of ‘wealth in people’ which prizes inter-personal, relational aspects 
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rather than investment in capital accumulation (Guyer 1995). As I explained above, it 
becomes apparent in such a setting that land has no value without labour and that the 
mobilization of the latter can hardly occur without embedded social practices and 
cooperative relations.  
Hence the way land is accessed and labour mobilized, in other words the social 
organization of production, has been an integral aspect of my analysis of political 
relations. This has emerged particularly in my discussion of processes of transformation 
of land and labour into commodities and the way such processes are intensely mediated 
by groups of ‘autochthonous’ people, first-comers, age groups and lineages. Paralleling 
my reading of more overtly political mediation, the analysis of the transformative 
tensions in the domain of productive relations has shown that mediation of economic 
processes (of commodification) constitute another aspect of government. Thus, Chapter 
Two has shown that the forces channelled by plans to ‘develop’ both farming and 
inhabitable land in Bancoumana were mediated by such groups and resisted to an 
extent. Going further, local attempts to control and restrict migrants’ involvement in 
plans to plot the village-site land resulted, too, in the blocking of incipient class 
formation.  
The group farming practices illustrated in Chapter Five provide another example of 
mediation of transformative economic processes. By performing the important 
productive and regulatory functions discussed above, and in particular by exchanging 
group-farming labour for hospitable reception on households’ fields, age groups play an 
active role in controlling economic processes of transformation of land and labour into 
commodities, hence limiting capital accumulation and its power to induce a ‘great 
transformation’ (Polanyi 1944). That farming groups are paid in kind and not in money 
– specifically in food that needs to be consumed promptly and jointly by ‘hosts’ and 
‘guests’ – has important consequences and meanings. Firstly, it tends to characterize 
group farming as interaction of a ritual kind, whereby labour is only indirectly 
exchanged for money, hence is not fully commensurable in monetary terms. As I 
documented, much acting and speaking are required in order to mediate the exchange of 
group labour for money. While the labour of the age-group members seems more 
directly convertible into money (absent people are ‘taxed’ by the group), the work of the 
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group as a whole appears of a less commoditized kind. What distinguishes group 
farming as a collective practice, then, is the codified pattern of social interaction, in 
which speech and other elements play a crucial role mediating the economic exchange. 
Participants can thus behave as if their labour were not being exchanged in return for 
money. 
Conclusion 
My interest in social grouping has not led me to abandon the state as a field of enquiry. 
Nor does it lead me to argue that its presence is unimportant. Rather, a focus on social 
grouping has allowed me to represent the ‘grey area’ between the state and society in a 
less implicitly sinister way than in the literature on ‘shadow’ African states and 
‘private,’ neo-patrimonial practices. Government in Bancoumana is intensely mediated 
by open and flexible groups, reflecting dynamic processes of segmentation. By 
inclusion into such groups, ordinary people not only build cooperative relationships 
sustaining an economy of local food production, but they also mediate political 
relations, keeping a remarkable degree of control over the involvement of the state and 
other ‘developers’ in the organisation of their social and political life. Moreover, such 
groups mediate and partly control broader transformations. What is at stake is nothing 
less than the moderation of what one might gloss as modernising processes in the social 
and economic life of Bancoumana.  
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